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OFFICE OF POPULATION CENSUSES AND SURVEYS
SOCIAL SURVEY DIVISION

Company organisation and worker participation

A survey of attitudes and practices in
industrial democracy with special emphasis
on the prospects for employee directors

Ian B. Knight



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Company organisation and worker participation

A survey commissioned by the Department of Employment
of attitudes and practices in industrial democracy
with special emphasis on the prospects
for employee directors

Ian B. Knight

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Contents

List of tables	Page
	viii
List of figures	x
1. Introduction, purpose and design of the survey	1
Focus and purpose of the survey	1
The universe	2
Defining a company	2
Representing a company	2
Types of company included in the survey	3
The sample and response rate	3
Weighting	3
Defining roles within the company	4
Role overlap and omission	4
Problems in interviewing role incumbents within companies	4
Interpretation of the survey results from the selected roles	4
The tables	5
2. A brief description of the survey participants	6
The sampled companies	6
Subsidiary companies	6
Size and industry	7
Industrial relations and union membership	9
The selected roles	9
Responsibilities of the sampled directors	9
Responsibilities of individuals in selected management roles	10
The employee representatives	10
The selected individuals	11
Characteristics	11
Summary	12
3. Company board and boardroom practice	13
The size of the board	13
Non-executive directors	14
Frequency of the board meeting	15
Topics discussed by boards	15
Board involvement in policy making	16
The board dealing with industrial relations matters	19
Decision taking	20
Control mechanisms	21
Delegation to board committees	21
Subsidiary boards	23
Outside influences on the board	23
Perceptions of the board held by non directors working in the company establishments	24
Summary	27

4.	Approaches to increasing participation: current practices	29
	Information disclosure	29
	Disclosure for negotiating purposes	30
	Collective bargaining	31
	Non-negotiable issues	33
	Role of lay representatives in negotiations	33
	Contact between stewards and full time union officials	34
	Joint consultation	35
	Joint consultation at company level	35
	Joint consultation in the company establishments	37
	Comparisons between company-wide and establishment-based machinery	37
	Consultation and bargaining	38
	Other forms of communication	39
	How management learn of employee views	39
	Access to management for employee representatives	40
	Recent industrial relations in the sampled companies	40
	Summary	41
5.	Views and perceptions of industrial relations, decision making and the level of participation	42
	Attitudes to industrial relations	42
	Concepts of industrial relations	42
	The meaning of worker participation	42
	Views of decision making at company level	45
	Decision making at establishment level	48
	Views on current decision making at board level	49
	Summary	50
6.	Views on worker directors	52
	General view of worker directors	52
	The selection of worker directors	55
	Definition of constituency	55
	Source of candidates	56
	The duties of worker directors	58
	Collective responsibility	58
	Accountability to constituency	58
	Problems and effects of a worker director scheme	60
	Problems for the board in coping with worker directors	60
	Problems of worker directors in coping with the board	62
	Rights and powers of worker directors	62
	Effects on employees associated with worker director schemes	64
	Advantages and disadvantages of worker directors	65
	Worker directors on supervisory boards	68
	Summary	72
7.	Intra-company role comparisons	74
	The analysis approach	74
	Expectations and problems of intra-company role comparisons	74
	The selection of comparisons to be made	75
	Comparisons between directors on the functioning of the board	75
	Comparisons in company establishments on joint consultation and collective bargaining	76
	Comparisons between directors and between establishment-based informants on information disclosure	77
	Comparisons between all levels on opinions of worker director schemes	78
	Summary and appraisal	80

8.	Summary of survey findings and some conclusions	82
	Summary of findings	82
	The prospects for worker directors in manufacturing companies in Britain	84
	Some tentative conclusions	84
	Appendix A. Report on sample design and implementation	87
	Appendix B. Specimen sampling questionnaires	95
	Appendix C. Specimen interview schedules and associated cards	101
	Appendix D. Additional tables	133

List of tables

	Page
1. Number of interviews achieved at each sampled level within companies	5
2.1 Location of parent companies controlling subsidiary companies in the sample	6
2.2 Issues on which subsidiary company board had to seek parent company approval before taking action	7
2.3 Number of establishments employing 200 and over in sampled companies	7
2.4 Distribution of companies by industry	9
2.5 Age on completing full time education of sampled informants	11
3.1 Size of board related to specialist and other boards	14
3.2 Reasons for having non-executive directors	14
3.3 Frequency of board meetings reported by managing directors	15
3.4 Topics discussed at last board meeting	15
3.5 Board style	16
3.6 Board style analysed by frequency of meetings	17
3.7 Way in which Board deals with specified items of business	17
3.8 How board dealt with specified industrial relations matters (part 1)	18
3.8 How board dealt with specified industrial relations matters (part 2)	19
3.9 Industrial relations/personnel specialisation on the board	20
3.10 Other responsibilities combined with industrial relations by directors	20
3.11 Methods of board decision taking	21
3.12 Comparison of the boards of subsidiary and independent companies	23
3.13 What informant thinks is discussed at board meetings	24
3.14 How informant thinks the board makes decisions	26
3.15 Informant knowledge of the name of the company managing director	26
4.1 Satisfaction of informants at establishment level with the amount of information currently given to employees or their representatives	30
4.2 Range of bargaining by whether information provided in confidence for negotiating purposes	30
4.3 Whether specified issues were within the range of bargaining for the company-wide negotiations.	31
4.4 Concurrence of subjects negotiated at company-wide level	32
4.5 Issues negotiated with trade union/staff association at establishment level	32
4.6 Issues negotiated at company-wide level or establishment level or both	32
4.7 Issues believed to be inappropriate for negotiations at company-wide/plant level	33
4.8 Management prerogative and issues which the unions wish to negotiate in company establishments	34
4.9 Number of times lay officials visited by full time paid union officials during the past year	34
4.10 Issues raised in joint consultative committees at company-wide level	36
4.11 Directors' views of what does happen and what should happen at company-wide JCCs	36
4.12 Informants' views on what does happen and what should happen at their establishment level JCCs	38
4.13 Issues covered in JCCs at company-wide level but not negotiated	39
4.14 Issues covered in JCCs at plant level but not negotiated	39
4.15 Main methods by which the board learns the views of company employees	39
4.16 Employee representative access to senior management	40
4.17 Strikes in sampled companies in past 12 months (excluding national strikes)	40
5.1 Industrial relations ethos	42
5.2(i) Opinion of industrial relations in sampled companies by informants' personal model of industrial relations	43
5.2(ii) Opinion of industrial relations in sampled establishments by informants' personal model of industrial relations	43
5.3 Informant's view of what people mean by the term 'worker participation'	44
5.4 Informant's view on what worker participation should involve	44

5.5	Informant opinion of what worker participation should involve compared with perception of the general view	45
5.6	Perception of actual decision making and opinion of ideal decision making approach (companies at managing director level)	46
5.7	Perception of actual decision making and opinion on ideal decision making approach (companies at finance director level)	47
5.8	Perception of actual decision making and opinion of ideal decision making approach (companies at Industrial relations/personnel director level)	48
5.9	Informant's view of the factor with the most influence over the company board	49
5.10	Managerial level: believed influence on board decisions	50
5.11	Union/staff association: believed influence on board decisions	50
6.1	Whether in favour or against worker directors related to conception of industrial relations	53
6.2	Views on how worker directors would function on the board	54
6.3	Views on the right proportion of worker directors on the board	54
6.4	Views on how worker directors should be appointed	55
6.5	Whether everyone employed by the company should be allowed to vote in worker director elections	56
6.6	Whether all employees should be eligible to become worker directors, and if not which group should be excluded	57
6.7	Views of informants on the selection of worker directors as a model	57
6.8	Whether worker directors should be free to discuss board matters with other employees	58
6.9	Whether worker directors should report back to employees on board decisions and the reasons behind them	59
6.10	Views on the effect of worker directors on what is discussed at board meetings	60
6.11	Views on the effect of worker directors on the way in which matters are dealt with in board meetings	61
6.12	Whether worker directors would find difficulty in joining in board discussions	62
6.13	Views on whether there are issues which worker directors should not discuss	63
6.14	Model for powers which should be granted to worker directors	64
6.15	Whether existence of worker directors would increase employees' feelings of involvement, related to overall view of worker directors	65
6.16	Whether worker directors would affect managerial authority	66
6.17	Disadvantages of having worker directors on the board	66
6.18	Advantages of worker directors	68
6.19	Views of informants about worker directors on supervisory boards, related to their views about worker directors on unitary boards	69
6.20	Views on parity and minority employee representation on supervisory boards	71
7.1	Board style (directors intra-company comparisons)	76
7.2	Board control mechanisms (directors intra-company comparisons)	76
7.3	Existence of joint consultative committees (industrial relations/personnel managers and convenors intra-company comparisons)	77
7.4	Issues negotiated in company establishments (selected manager and convenor intra-company comparisons)	77
7.5	Information disclosure to employee representatives for negotiating purposes (directors intra-company comparisons)	78
7.6	Views on whether all company employees should be eligible for worker directorship (intra-company comparisons)	79
7.7	Opinion on whether or not worker directors should be paid for their services (intra-company comparisons)	79
7.8	Opinion of industrial relations in company/establishment (intra-company comparisons)	80
7.9	Opinion on the nature of industrial relations: conflict-consensus model (intra-company comparisons)	80

This lists only the tables which appear in the main body of the report.

Additional tables appear as Appendix D and are listed at the beginning of that appendix.

List of figures

	Page
1. Distribution of companies by size	8
2. Distribution of establishments by size	8
3. Average board size related to company size	13
4. Co-existence of executive boards, board sub-committees and management committees just below board level in the same companies	22
5. Card shown to illustrate two tier board structure	70
6. Illustration of independence in role comparisons	74

1 Introduction, purpose and design of the survey

This chapter describes the purpose and design of the survey. It includes a brief summary of fieldwork response and a guide to the interpretation of results which will follow.

Focus and purpose of the survey

Over the past decade, industrial democracy has become a major public and political issue. The importance attached to it has been reflected in the EEC by the Green Paper, Employee Participation and Company Structure, and in the UK by the activities of the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy chaired by Lord Bullock¹, and the White Paper published in May 1978. All major political parties in Britain have broadly committed themselves to programmes designed to extend industrial democracy, though considerable differences of opinion remain about the purpose of such developments and the best ways of achieving them.

In part, these differences are mirrored in a wide variety of participative arrangements to which the label 'industrial democracy' can be applied. In both theoretical and practical discussions, the term is frequently used to denote arrangements as different in form and purpose as job satisfaction schemes and worker co-operatives. As a result, its descriptive and analytical value has been much reduced. In the immediate political context, however, the meaning of 'industrial democracy' is relatively clear. According to the recent White Paper, it 'stands for the means by which employees at every level may have a real share in the decisions within their company or firm and, therefore, a share in the responsibility for making it a success'. As the 1970s progressed, increasing interest has been shown in a variety of experimental arrangements designed to achieve this aim, both in Britain and overseas, and it seems clear that this interest will continue into the future.

Against this background the Department of Employment (DE) has been developing a programme of research designed to monitor and explore a range of options and possibilities which have been and are likely to be suggested².

¹ See Commission of the European Communities (1975) 'Employee Participation and Company Structure', Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg; and 'Report on the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy' (1977), Cmd 6706, London, HMSO.

² Details of the programme as a whole can be found in the Department's Annual Report on Research for 1977-8.

As one part of its work in this broad field the DE decided that a survey was needed, both to discover more about existing practices and attitudes, and to provide some basis for comparison with any changes in the future. In particular, it was evident that systematic information on the composition, organisation and functioning of boards of directors was extremely sparse. So, given that many of the initiatives currently being discussed involve the creation of employee directors drawn in some way from representatives of the workforce of companies, and that these worker directors would of necessity interact with existing directors, it was felt that effort should be concentrated on filling this gap. The survey, whose main results are reported below, had five main objectives:

- (a) to explore the role and functions of the board of directors in modern companies.
- (b) to compare impressions of current and other possible approaches to 'decision making' held by individuals at key levels within companies.
- (c) to explore the incidence and importance of the main forms of industrial democracy currently found in a representative sample of British companies so as to describe the environment within which future change takes place.
- (d) to seek the views held at key levels within companies on the purpose, introduction and benefits of one particular form of industrial democracy proposed, that is employee representation at board level.
- (e) to investigate whether the answers given by individuals at key levels in the same company were the same or different on major questions of interest.

In order to seek views held at various key levels within the sampled companies, a system of role sampling³ was designed. Thus, not only could

³ Researchers conducting industrial surveys often select a given role to be approached within sampled workplaces which:

(a) for 'factual' questions allows enquiries to be directed to the individual 'most likely to know'.

(b) for opinion questions controls one source of variation in the results, namely that due to the differing perspectives attributable to different roles.

The present survey has attempted to go one stage further and interview the incumbent of a series of specified roles to explore the differing perspectives on the same issue at different levels.

variations of view attributable to different roles be compared, but also to some extent controlled.

To summarise then, to meet the objectives and aims of the survey, the design was based on a sample of companies with functioning boards of directors, represented by the perceptions and views of role incumbents at various key levels. The main purpose of this introduction is to explain how the companies and roles were defined and act as a general guide to the interpretation of results.

The Universe

Defining a company The term 'limited liability' company can and does describe anything from a single person to an international conglomerate employing tens of thousands. Clearly, a minimal legal definition¹ would include many bodies for which the design of this survey and its requirements would be inappropriate. The basic model for this survey is that of the company with one or more operating units (that is industrial establishments) under the ultimate control of a functioning board of directors.

As will be explained later in the report, the survey is based on a sample of operating units for which we have traced the controlling company in search of a functioning board. So the companies in this survey are defined to some extent by our definition of a functioning board, which is a group of directors meeting regularly to discuss the affairs of the company.

Even this minimal definition of a functioning board becomes difficult at the margin. Company law requires that every company must have at least one director (two directors in a public company) but it does not require that any company should have a board which meets regularly. In many subsidiary companies there are no board meetings except for a brief annual meeting which includes no discussion but simply an approval of the company accounts and the use of the company seal. Our minimal definition would exclude this situation, but it has included a few boards which, while they only meet once a year, do discuss the affairs and future plans of the company for the following year. In subsidiaries without a functioning board it is usually possible to trace a functioning board at parent company level but there are some enterprises which do not have a functioning board of directors at any level. For example, in some international corporations, the British company does not have any functioning board but is controlled by an international holding company which may not even

¹ A company may be defined as an association formed for an agreed purpose, which constitutes a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and with such liability as is provided for in the Companies Acts.

be located in Britain. Companies of this type cannot describe the functioning of their boards of directors and in the present survey must either be omitted or analysed quite separately. Since their number would be too small to justify separate analysis, such companies have in fact been left out of the survey².

The definition of a board of directors is further complicated by the way in which the term director is used in British industry. The title of director can be misleading as it is often used to mean senior manager, ie as a courtesy title. Equally, the absence of the title is no guide; the Companies Act specifies that a director is any person occupying the position of director by whatever name called. Although the position and powers of a director will depend on the company's articles of association, in practice most companies use a form similar to the model articles in the Companies Act. These articles allow directors to exercise all such powers as are not, by the Act or by the articles, required to be exercised by the company in general meeting. Directors then are top managers with powers granted to them specifically by the company articles of association. In this context it makes sense to talk about directors 'in the sense of the Companies Act' and this was the definition adopted for the survey.

In some large companies, there is a three tier structure of subsidiary companies controlled by a divisional management group which in turn is responsible to a holding company. Sometimes this divisional management group is a company in its own right with a functioning board of directors controlling its subsidiaries which do not have functioning boards. (In such cases the study would have sought to interview members of the board of directors at this divisional management level). But in many more cases it was found that the divisional management group was not a board of directors in the sense described above (even though it was sometimes called a 'divisional board') in which cases an effort was made to interview the board of directors of the holding company.

Representing a company For the reasons explained above, it was decided that a company should be represented by the views and perspectives of specified role incumbents within it. Roles were identified:

- at board level
- at establishment management level
- at worker representative level

and this was achieved by interviewing in the head office and one industrial establishment of each company in the sample.

² The number of such omissions is given in the sampling report at Appendix A.

Types of company included in the survey The survey does not cover every part of industry. Very small firms have been excluded since their circumstances and problems in the field of industrial democracy are likely to be substantially different from larger companies. Service industries were excluded for two reasons; it was not possible to find a reliable sampling frame, and the exclusion of small companies would rule out the majority of firms in the service sector. The construction industry was left out because of the transitory nature of much of its workforce and the impossibility of producing an adequate frame of building sites. Agriculture was excluded on the basis that it contained very few companies as such and was again dominated by units employing relatively few workers. Finally, perhaps most important of all the exclusions, nationalised industries were deleted from the sampling frame. The problems of industrial democracy in the public sector raise special issues of political accountability and it was felt that any research in this area should be undertaken as a separate exercise.

To summarise then, the sample includes medium to large companies in manufacturing industry in the private sector which have a functioning board in Great Britain.

The sample and response rate

A description of the sample selection and the representativeness is given in detail at Appendix A, but a brief description is given here as a necessary preamble to the report.

A two-stage design was used. First a sample of employment exchange areas was taken. Within these areas, samples of industrial establishments with at least 200 employees were selected. A short self-completion form was posted to each of the selected establishments asking the name and address of the company which owned the establishment, together with a few details including whether that company had a board of directors¹. But it was not possible on a small self-completion form to spell out in detail a definition of what constitutes a functioning board of directors, and this omission did cause some misunderstandings. Moreover, although the form was addressed to the personnel officer, there was no way of controlling who actually filled it in. So in a number of cases the form was returned with inaccurate information about the location of the functioning board. Some 770 of these self-completion forms were sent out, of which 11 per cent were not returned by our closing date. The forms revealed that a further 11 per cent of establishments had closed down or where no longer large enough for inclusion, but 1 per cent comprised companies which had no board of directors in Great Britain.

¹ Copy of form at Appendix B.

The next part of the sampling exercise involved writing to the managing directors of the eligible companies identified from the self-completion forms. With the letter went a printed slip on which the managing director could signify his permission for the survey to go ahead in his company and give the name of a contact through which interviews could be arranged at the establishment level. Once again there was no way of controlling who would deal with our letter addressed to the managing director, and 'helpful' secretaries sometimes diverted the letter elsewhere in the company before the managing director had a chance to see it. Consequently the replies, or lack of them, in many cases had nothing to do with the managing director. Some 513 companies were written to in this way, of which 11 per cent did not reply in time for our closing date and a further 27 per cent declined to take part in the survey. All the eligible 'acceptances' (61 per cent of the companies written to at Managing Director level), together with those which had not replied (11 per cent), were allocated to interviewers. At the fieldwork stage further ineligible companies were identified, but of the 495 eligible companies identified, interviews were made in 296 of them, that is 60 per cent². Since nothing is known about the characteristics of those companies which did not take part in the survey, it has not been possible to check for non response bias.

The fieldwork for this survey was undertaken in the period March–May 1976, though 95 per cent of the interviews were completed by the end of April 1976. All personal interviews were conducted by fully trained interviewers of the Social Survey Division of OPCS. The interviews were made at the informants' places of work using the interview schedules shown in Appendix C.

Weighting The sampling method used for this survey gave companies a variable chance of selection which was related to the number of industrial establishments they owned. So for example, the probability of selection of company with three industrial establishments was three times greater than that of a single establishment company. However, if the survey sample was to be at all representative of the population from which it was selected, then this bias in the selection procedure had to be counteracted. This was achieved by weighting the results from each company in inverse proportion to its number of industrial establishments. Thus, if for example there are two companies, one with four establishments and one with two establishments, they

² The refusals at the fieldwork stage were mainly from companies which had not responded to the managing director letter, but some came from companies which had given permission to go ahead. This paradoxical situation was not caused by individuals changing their minds, but rather by one manager in a given company not accepting the validity of the permission previously given by another manager in that same company.

will carry weights of a quarter and a half respectively. The effect on the size distribution of companies within the sample is illustrated in Appendix A where the system of weighting is explained in more detail.

Defining roles within the company

The key roles within the company were selected on the advice of the Department of Employment Research and Planning Division. The aim was to select those roles which were likely to represent key positions in the decision making of the company at board level (directors), production unit level (managers) and employee representative level (senior stewards or representatives). But the definition of these roles had to be couched in terms of a series of alternative equivalents to deal with the great variety of possibilities which might be encountered in different companies. These definitions are given in some detail in Appendix A, but they are listed below by title.

At head office level board members were chosen:

- managing director
- industrial relations/personnel director
- finance director

and at establishment level management and union representatives:

- establishment manager
- production manager
- manager responsible for the largest white collar group
- personnel manager
- a foreman on the production side
- convenor (most senior union representative)
- another senior union representative
- a representative from a minority union

Role overlap and omission In some companies the selected establishment was also the address of the head office and the man identified as establishment manager was also the managing director. In these and other cases of overlap individuals were interviewed in respect of the most senior role they occupied. In some companies particular roles did not exist, so apart from non response problems it was not possible to secure an interview for every specified role in every company. Table 1 opposite shows the number of interviews achieved for each role in conjunction with the other roles.

Problems in interviewing role incumbents within companies In any company-based survey, the researcher has to come to terms with at least two major problems. The first of these arises at the stage of project design. The sheer complexity of modern industrial organisation makes the identification of comparable roles a hazardous exercise. Put simply, the responsibilities and experiences of a supervisor in Company A may

be substantially different from those associated with a nominally identical role in Company B. The second problem occurs when the researcher attempts to identify those variables which may be of use in explaining the behaviour and expectations of incumbents of different roles in the same company, and of similar roles in different companies. A brief glance at the relevant academic literature on this issue reveals a disturbing lack of consensus as to the definition and status of potentially crucial variables like, for example, company size¹. Without a reasonably coherent theory of organisations to rely on, the researcher has to devise other means of analysing and interpreting the behaviour of organisations and their members.

Not only is this difficult for the researcher but it presents problems for the survey respondents. After all, they will naturally tend to think of their day-to-day behaviour and attitudes in relation to the detailed structure and organisation of the company in which they work. This problem is a general one within the survey, but in cases where it seems important, further mention will be made of the matter in reporting the relevant results.

Interpretation of the survey results from the selected roles To recap, the sample is one of companies from which information and views have been tapped at various levels, that is at directorial levels, establishment management levels and employee representative levels. The survey has not been designed to yield a representative sample of all individuals in each of the role types². So for example, one cannot report that '26 per cent of foremen said . . .' since the survey is not necessarily representative of all foremen.

It will be clear from the description of the role selection that in some cases the survey includes the only individual in the specified role within the selected company (for example the one and only finance director). But in some other companies the survey will have taken a sample of one from a number of individuals in the specified role, within a sample of one from a number of establishments (for example a foreman in one establishment selected from all of the establishments in that company). In the latter example it would not have been feasible to take a representative sample of, say, foremen in each selected company without using up all the available resources for the survey on that role alone. So, for example, one cannot claim that '26 per

¹ For a useful summary and discussion of the main aspects of this question, see J. R. Kimberley, 'Organisation Age and the Structuralist Perspective: A Review, Critique and Proposal', *Administrative Science Quarterly* Vol. 21 (December 1976), pp. 564-582.

² Since the probability of any individual being selected is related to the number of other individuals in the same role and the number of other establishments in the same company.

Table 1 Number of interviews achieved at each sampled level within companies

	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Managing director	242										
Industrial relations/personnel director	122	143									
Finance director	139	85	157								
Establishment manager	116	78	84	153							
Industrial relations/personnel manager	118	55	83	96	152						
Middle manager (production)	207	121	133	132	131	244					
Middle manager (white collar)	150	92	98	99	105	168	182				
Foreman	212	124	140	142	143	232	170	257			
Most senior employee rep.	202	118	133	141	137	217	160	232	243		
Other senior employee rep.	136	87	97	92	97	154	115	160	162	167	
Minority union rep.	108	71	81	79	83	130	102	133	135	111	139
Total number of companies: 296											

cent of industrial relations managers in the sampled companies thought . . . since that would imply that these industrial relations managers were representative of all industrial relations managers in the companies in which they worked, which is not necessarily true.

What one can say, since individuals were selected by defining their roles in the establishment, would be for example, 'at production manager level in the selected establishments 26 per cent said ...'. For the sake of brevity in the main body of the report this will be reduced to: 'At (SAMPLE TYPE) level 26 per cent of companies reported . . .'.

The tables Unless otherwise stated, tables contain percentages based on column totals. These percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number; less than 0.5 per cent is registered as zero, whilst complete absence of answers is signified by a dash. This rounding off means that columns may add up to 99 or 101 rather than exactly 100 per cent. Some questions gave rise

to more than one answer per respondent and in such cases columns will obviously total more than 100 per cent. Since the data have been weighted, and the weights are not all integers, the exact totals would also be non-integers, but to avoid overburdening the tables these have also been rounded to the nearest whole number.

While the results quoted in the report represent best estimates of the measured variables available from the survey data, the figures are subject to a range of sampling error and measurement error. Some of the differences between sub groups reported in the survey may fall within the range of such error, which does not preclude their use in generating hypotheses from the data but makes them unreliable evidence for hypotheses held *ex ante*¹.

¹ Of course, statistical differences between groups only constitute reliable evidence of real differences if they do not fall within the possible range of statistical and measurement error. But even if some of the differences implied by the survey do fall within that range of error, they may still represent real differences in the population being measured.

2 A brief description of the survey participants

This chapter describes the companies participating in the survey and some characteristics of the sampled individuals.

This survey concentrates on attitudes and practices in the field of industrial democracy and within the limited time available in a survey interview it has been necessary to restrict the range of other company information sought from participating firms. But to set the main findings in context, this chapter will provide a brief general description of the companies included, their industrial establishments and the individuals interviewed within them.

The sampled companies

The survey is based on a sample of companies each represented by its head office and one of its establishments. At head office level information relating to the company as a whole was sought from directors, while at plant level informants were only expected to talk about the establishment in which they worked. Unfortunately in seven per cent of the sampled companies interviewers were unable to interview any directors during the fieldwork period and these companies are only represented at establishment level. Similarly in six per cent of companies interviews were conducted with directors but no interviewing took place at establishment level.

Subsidiary companies For the purposes of this survey a subsidiary company was defined as one in which another (parent) company had a controlling interest¹. More than seven out of ten companies in the sample were of this type and a quarter of these subsidiaries belonged to companies which in turn were part of a larger group.

All subsidiaries were asked about the head office of their parent organisation. To make the results more meaningful, interviewers were instructed to point out that the question referred to the office from which the organisation was controlled and not necessarily the office registered

for communications related to the Companies Acts. Table 2.1 shows that four fifths of these head offices were located in the United Kingdom. Three in every twenty were based outside the EEC, in most cases in the USA, and the remaining one in twenty were based elsewhere in the EEC. This means that only a small minority of the companies interviewed would be likely to have first-hand knowledge of current European models for employee directors.

Table 2.1 Location of parent companies controlling subsidiary companies in the sample

	All subsidiaries giving information at board level
Base (weighted)	137
Location of head office:	%
United Kingdom	80
elsewhere in EEC	5
outside the EEC	15
Total	100

Parent companies control their subsidiaries in a variety of ways. One of the most common is for the parent company to place its own nominees on the board of its subsidiary. Indeed, almost two thirds of the subsidiaries in the sample mentioned that some or all of their directors were selected by the parent company. Another common practice is to establish common membership of key figures on the parent company and subsidiary boards, which happened in almost three quarters of the subsidiaries interviewed. Most often these key figures were the managing director (45 per cent) or the chairman (47 per cent) and one in eight subsidiaries had a finance director from the main board².

Subsidiary companies were asked whether there were any issues on which they could not act without parent company approval and whether approval was needed in relation to specified actions³.

² See Table 1D in Appendix D.

³ Findings at the pilot stage suggested that financial supervision was probably the most important general control exercised over subsidiaries. However, the pilot results also showed that a general question on control by the parent company tended to yield answers at different levels of abstraction and it was difficult to be sure where given informants were describing different types of control or the same type of control in differing degrees of detail.

¹ The law defines a company as being a subsidiary of another if, but only if:

- (i) that other company—
 - (a) is a member of it and controls the composition of its board of directors; or
 - (b) holds more than half in nominal value of its equity share capital; or
- (ii) the first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is that other's subsidiary.

Only one in ten subsidiaries claimed that they did not have to seek main board approval for some issues and the remainder were asked in turn about each of the issues listed in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2 Issues on which subsidiary company board had to seek parent company approval before taking action

Base (weighted)	All subsidiaries giving information at board level	
	137	
Parent company approval needed to:	%	
acquire/dispose of major assets		
— Yes	98	
— No	2	
	100	
spend money in excess of a specified sum		
— Yes	93	
— No	7	
	100	
borrow money in excess of a specified sum		
— Yes	94	
— No	6	
	100	
appoint top executives		
— Yes	51	
— No	49	
	100	
make redundancy plans		
— Yes	35	
— No	65	
	100	

Answers in this table are from a closed question using key categories revealed by analysis of pilot results.

The last two control example categories listed in Table 2.2 are clearly not so common. Half of the subsidiaries had to clear top management appointments with the parent company and only just over a third had to gain approval for redundancy plans. Hence the issues which are more clearly in the personnel/industrial relations field are more commonly left to the subsidiary board, which may be the only level at which effective employee representation is introduced.

Size and industry One interesting measure of company variation, which is probably an indicator of potential organisational complexity as much as one of size, is the number of industrial establishments operated by the sampled companies. For although it was possible to identify a single head office for each company, the number of establishments varied considerably. Table 2.3 shows that over 70 per cent of sampled companies had only one large industrial unit, so for the majority there was no loss of information caused by interviewing at only one establishment. Indeed, for most of these companies

with only one industrial unit employing over 200 people, the factory and staff offices were both located at the same address. But it is equally clear that for the minority of companies with a number of factories the randomly selected establishment will not always be similar to the other company factories from among which it was sampled.

Table 2.3 Number of establishments employing 200 and over in sampled companies

Base (weighted)	All sampled companies	
	189	
No. of establishments:	%	
1	73	
2	15	
3-5	8	
6-10	2	
11-15	1	
16-20	0	
Over 20	1	
Total	100	

In fact, Table 2.3 while describing the sample does not necessarily reflect the distribution of all production and manufacturing companies. Like most industrial statistics, these figures are affected by the way in which the units are defined. Many of the large industrial groups of companies are represented in the sample by some of their member companies, so the number of very large enterprises appearing in the figures is thereby reduced. At the other end of the distribution, companies were excluded if they did not have at least one establishment involved in production and employing over 200 people, so the very small companies do not feature in Table 2.3.

Figure 1 illustrates the size distribution as indicated by the number employed in each sampled company. More than half the companies employed under 500, and three quarters of the sampled firms had less than 1,000 employees. In other words, the majority of companies are relatively small employers, while large numbers of the workforce are employed by a minority of very large companies. Thus results which the survey shows to be true for a large proportion of companies will not necessarily hold true for a large proportion of the workforce.

The large proportion of firms with only one large establishment means that the survey was bound to reveal a similar size distribution for companies at establishment level, as can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 1 Distribution of companies by size





Figure 2 Distribution of establishments by size



The industrial distribution of the sample has been limited by restricting the survey to manufacturing and production excluding nationalised industries. Moreover, as the sample has been weighted to give companies equal chances of contributing to the results (whatever their number of establishments), the industries with the largest number of companies, not necessarily employees, will predominate. Companies were asked about their 'main activity' as a basis for coding industry (by use of the Standard Industrial Classification) but five per cent were unable to name just one main activity which would have classified them unequivocally, and a further five per cent gave insufficient information.

Table 2.4. shows how the remainder were distributed and it can be seen that the number of companies in any one industry is too small to justify further analysis. However, one feature which does stand out is the high proportion (nearly a third) of companies in engineering, particularly mechanical engineering which accounts for over a fifth of the sample. Vehicle building, a relatively large employer of labour, accounts for one per cent, while clothing and footwear, which is a small employer, includes eight per cent of the companies.

Table 2.4 Distribution of companies by industry

	All companies giving information*
Base (weighted)	171
Industry (SIC):	%
Food, drink and tobacco	9
Coal and Petroleum	0
Chemical and allied	8
Metal manufacture	6
Mechanical engineering	23
Instrument engineering	1
Electrical engineering	9
Shipbuilding	2
Vehicles	1
Metal goods n.e.s.	5
Textiles	5
Leather goods and fur	0
Clothing and footwear	8
Brick, pottery, glass, etc.	5
Timber, furniture, etc.	3
Paper, printing, publishing	5
Other manufacturing	7
Service industries	2
Total	100

* Table excludes 9 companies in which description was not adequate for industrial coding and 9 in which the description did not fit uniquely into one category.

Although the sampling basis for establishments was that they were involved in the manufacturing or production process, this was not necessarily the major activity. Nevertheless one would expect blue collar workers to predominate in most establishments, and in 83 per cent of those giving information they were the largest group. In 13 per cent of establishments white collar

workers were in the majority and the numbers were about equal in the remaining 4 per cent.

Industrial relations and union membership More than nine in every ten of the sampled companies had recognised trades unions or staff associations,¹ the proportion increasing with company size. The list of unions mentioned by informants is summarised in Appendix D (Tables 2D and 3D in Appendix D); most companies had more than one union and about one in twenty had their own company staff association. Companies were asked about the level of union membership and the results are shown in Tables 67D and 68D in Appendix D.

The results for companies as a whole (Table 67D) show that in four out of five companies the majority of manual workers were organised and about half reported that the majority of their supervisors were in a union or staff association. However, among the white collar groups and managers there was a much lower level of organisation in the majority of sampled companies.

At establishment level the same picture can be seen in Table 68D; the majority of manual workers were organised in 90 per cent of the sampled factories and the same was true for supervisors in more than half the factories². But again the position is reversed for technical and clerical staff—a group among which unions have traditionally been slower in recruitment—and managers stand out particularly as the unorganised group.

The selected roles

Within each company interviews were sought with the incumbents of up to 11 specified roles as mentioned in Chapter 1, but the responsibilities of the individuals thereby selected are summarised below.

Responsibilities of the sampled directors The three director roles selected within the sampled companies were chosen in relation to their function on the board. In two thirds of the sampled companies the director who took responsibility for industrial relations or personnel combined this with other directorial responsibilities. One in twelve of the managing directors dealt with industrial relations/personnel matters themselves in board meetings and one in eight finance

¹ While not directly comparable with this survey, the work of Marsh et al in his study of the engineering industry showed that in 90% of large establishments there was some union organisation. See Marsh, Garcia and Evans: *Workplace Industrial Relations in Engineering*, 1971.

² Again, though the data is not directly comparable with this study, it is interesting to note that Price and Bain, 'Union Growth Revisited 1948-74 in Perspective', *BJIR* (November 1976), showed union membership in manufacturing establishments with at least 200 employees to be of the order of 89 per cent of employed.

directors covered this subject on the board. Further data on this subject was collected from all companies in the survey; but since these results include companies in which the industrial relations/personnel director was not interviewed, they will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3 on the function and operation of boards.

Responsibilities of individuals in selected management roles Selected managers were asked about the size of the department or section for which they had responsibility. Apart from the establishment managers, who by definition were responsible for the whole unit, the production managers controlled the largest number of employees with three quarters of them managing departments over 100 strong. In some establishments the manager responsible for industrial relations was also responsible for production, and in such cases he would have been interviewed in the former role. Mainly for this reason, a quarter of the industrial relations/personnel managers were responsible for over a hundred employees, but most of the remainder were sampled as personnel managers and were responsible for a small specialised personnel department.

Managers responsible for the largest number of white collar employees mentioned a wide range of job titles, which probably represents an even wider range of duties¹.

Many of these selected middle managers of the largest white collar group were called accountants or office managers but there were also a number of 'engineers' responsible for white collar staff in drawing offices. The majority were responsible for less than 50 staff, though one in eight had much larger departments. Some middle managers (white collar), like the 'engineers', were also responsible for a large number of blue collar workers and 12 per cent stated that more than half their staff were manual workers.

Union membership among white collar workers in general is lower than among blue collar workers, and so we found that personnel and middle managers (white collar) were less likely to have a union active among their own staff. On the other hand, foremen were selected from among the staff under the middle manager (production) and they would therefore encounter the same level of union activity as their managers in the same department. When asked about involvement in negotiations, however, four fifths of the industrial relations/personnel managers and production managers reported personal involvement compared with 44 per cent of other middle managers and only 36 per cent of foremen.

¹ For this reason no formal classification of job titles has been attempted.

The employee representatives The most senior employee representative turned out to be a blue-collar worker in seven cases out of eight among the sampled production units. Only one in ten of these representatives had any supervisory role in their full time job². Most commonly they belonged to the manual workers sections of the AUEW (34 per cent) or the TGWU (21 per cent). Other unions frequently mentioned were the GMWU and the textile and printing unions (see Table 4D in Appendix D).

Not surprisingly, the most senior representatives could claim more experience than those in the other sampled roles; just under a third had been representatives for over 10 years and more than a fifth had represented the same group of employees for over 10 years. Nearly two in five of them held office in their union branch, and almost one in five held office at district or regional committee level. Over half of the most senior stewards had to act on behalf of members of other unions than their own and their views would clearly have more influence than other representatives in their respective workplaces.

The other senior employee representatives were selected to represent the largest group of employees not covered by the first representative, so more than two thirds of incumbents were white collar workers, though in this case two in five had supervisory responsibilities. A quarter of the informants in this group belonged to the staff sections of the large manual workers' unions but 15 per cent were members of APEX and 31 per cent belonged to ASTMS. The other senior representatives had less experience as employee representatives than the most senior representatives. Almost half of them had been stewards for less than three years altogether and only one in ten could boast a long period of service (over 10 years). Almost a third held office in their own union branch but less than 10 per cent held any union position above that level. Again, compared with the most senior stewards this group worked for a much narrower range of employees; less than a fifth ever acted on behalf of members in other unions.

Minority union stewards were mainly blue collar workers like the most senior representatives. Thirty five per cent of them were from the AUEW and 14 per cent belonged to the electricians' union, while the remainder represented a wide variety of unions. Their level of experience was close to that of the other senior representatives but their responsibilities beyond the workplace in which they were sampled amount to less than either of the other two union roles. However, two in five minority union representatives

² It would be interesting to know if those with supervisory duties held different attitudes to industrial democracy but the number of such informants was too small to justify separate analysis.

did act on behalf of other unions' members, which makes them closer to the most senior stewards in potential influence.

The selected individuals

It has already been explained in Chapter 1 that individuals were selected as role incumbents within the sampled companies on the assumption that their views and perceptions revealed the essential characteristics of their employing companies. Nevertheless the informants were asked a few questions about themselves to investigate heterogeneity within and between role levels.

Characteristics The most common age group among sampled finance directors (35-45) was younger than the modal age for managing directors and industrial relations/personnel directors (46-55), which helps to explain the fewer years of experience already reported for the first group (see Table 66D in Appendix D). At establishment level the personnel managers include more young men in their ranks (one in four under 35) while the other middle management levels contained more older men, especially among production managers (one in every two over 45, and one in eight over 55).

On the whole, the employee representatives were younger than the sampled managers, particularly the minority union stewards with only one in twenty aged 56 or over.

Other surveys have shown that education can be a complex variable to measure. Questions on qualifications have to cover a very wide range of noncomparable items, some of which have been superseded, and it is more straightforward to ask about terminal age of full time education. The managing directors in sampled companies were more likely to have continued their full

time education beyond the age of 18 than the selected industrial relations/personnel directors and finance directors, which implies a greater likelihood of higher education. However, the directors with specialist responsibilities, particularly finance directors, could well have obtained professional qualifications which are not normally based on full time study courses.

The sampled establishment managers (some of whom were company directors) were similarly distributed to the sampled specialist directors, as were personnel managers. Among the selected management levels, production managers were most likely to have completed full time education before they were 16, though this group included one in five with higher education. The most noticeable difference in Table 2.5 arises at foreman level with 72 per cent having left school before the age of 16. Since most of these role incumbents would have been promoted from shop floor level, it is not surprising to see that they do not differ markedly from the blue collar employee representatives. Among the employee representative levels the 'other senior representatives' stand out with almost 45 per cent leaving full time education at 16 or later, but this group contains most of the white collar stewards.

In the case of companies at director level, informants were asked how long they had served on the board of their present company. Managing directors had the longest service with more than two in five claiming over 10 years (see Table 5D in Appendix D). Industrial relations/personnel directors came second with two in five having served for at least 5 years, and finance directors had the least experience.

A question on other board experience demonstrates once again the pre-eminence of managing directors with 78 per cent of them claiming other previous or current board positions. Sixty-one per cent of finance directors had had other board

Table 2.5 Age on completing full time education of sampled informants

	Directors			Managers in establishment				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Age full-time education completed	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Under 16	12	19	20	22	27	40	26	72	84	56	78
16	13	19	29	22	23	27	26	14	9	25	17
17-18	24	23	21	17	15	14	23	6	3	10	4
Over 18	50	37	30	38	35	19	25	6	3	9	1
Don't know/not answered	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

positions, compared with only 41 per cent of industrial relations/personnel directors.

Informants at company establishment level were asked about their length of service with the company and the results show a general similarity between role groups. The two levels with the longest service were foremen and convenors, while personnel managers were the only group in which more than half had been with their company for less than 10 years (see Table 6D in Appendix D).

All of the sampled employee representatives belonged to a trade union or staff association since that was one of the criteria used to select them, but selected managers were asked individually about personal membership of a union. At production manager level 15 per cent belonged to a union, but at the other selected management levels less than 10 per cent were in membership. Among the sampled foremen and supervisors, however, some three in five belonged to a union.

Summary

The survey is based on a sample of companies each represented by its head office and one of its establishments. Some 72 per cent of these companies were subsidiaries of larger concerns. Two thirds of the sampled subsidiaries were controlled by their parent companies through directors which the latter had placed on their board.

Nine tenths of the subsidiaries needed parent company approval for major board decisions.

Over 70 per cent of the sampled companies had only one establishment engaged in production; more than half employed less than 500 employees, and three quarters has less than 1000 workers. The industrial distribution of the sample shows about a third in some form of engineering but the other industrial categories are all rather small.

Nine in every ten of the sampled companies had recognised trades unions or staff associations, the proportion increasing with company size; and the level of union organisation within companies was greatest among manual workers and their supervisors.

Among the sampled informants, directors and establishment managers were older than other managers interviewed. On the whole, the sampled stewards were younger than their managers.

Among directors, the finance specialists were younger and less experienced, while managing directors were able to claim the most board experience. In the company establishments the two levels with the longest service were foremen and convenors, while industrial relations/personnel managers were the only group in which more than half had been with their company for less than 10 years.

3 Company board and boardroom Practice

This chapter reports directors' views of how their own boards function and concludes with some data on how boardroom practice is perceived elsewhere in the sampled companies.

The terms 'board' and 'director' are sometimes used more loosely in industry than they have been within this survey¹. As explained in Chapter 1, the present study has restricted itself to boards which comprise responsible directors as defined in company law and such restrictions must be kept in mind when reviewing the data which follow in this chapter. The description of board practice which follows is based on boards which may or may not top the hierarchies of the organisations to which they belong, and it will be shown that this too can be an important variable.

The size of the board Other studies have shown that organisational complexity tends to increase with company size² and this makes it difficult for a small board to cope with the range of matters which, in a large company, may come before

it. Thus one might expect board size to grow with company size, yet a board cannot grow too large if its members are all to contribute to discussions and decisions³. Figure 3 shows the association of average board size with company size and it can be seen that the growth rate starts to trail off dramatically at a company size of about 1500–2000 employees, though there is some increase in board size beyond that level⁴.

One approach to the size problem for larger boards is for the various board members to specialise in particular aspects of the company business. All companies were asked whether their board was one in which some or all members took executive responsibility for one area of company business. Non executive directors complicate the situation, so the question was restricted to 'full time directors'. But with


¹ This chapter raises a number of complex issues which are discussed in much greater detail in the light of material from the survey in C Brookes' *Boards of Directors in British Industry*, DE Research Papers, no. 7, (1979).

² BIM *Boards of Directors* (1972) and Gordon R A (1948), *Business Leadership in Large Corporations* The Brookings Institution, New York.

³ Of course the board can continue to grow if not every member is expected to contribute or if the board deliberately narrows the range of matters it is willing to consider. These possibilities will be reviewed later in the chapter.

⁴ Questions on board size and composition were only put to one director in each sampled company.

Figure 3 Average board size related to company size



that qualification 55 per cent of companies said that all executive members of their board specialised in particular policy areas, and a further 34 per cent claimed that some of their directors specialised in this way. Only one in ten company boards had no 'specialist' directors. Coming back to the size of the board, it does appear that those on which all executive members specialised tended to be a little larger, with an average of 6.9 members compared with 6.1 members for other boards¹. Table 3.1 also shows that the average proportion of executive directors on 'specialist' boards is a good deal higher than that on other boards.

Table 3.1 Size of board related to specialist and other boards

	Total	All specialist	Part/non specialist
Base (weighted)*	189	103	83
Size of board (Total no. of directors)	%	%	%
1	—	—	—
2-3	9	6	10
4	12	12	11
5	20	17	23
6	16	15	18
7	14	14	15
8	10	12	7
9	6	9	2
10	8	6	10
11 or more	6	8	3
Total	100	100	100
Average number of members	6.6	6.9	6.1
Average proportion of executive directors	64%	71%	55%

* In 3 companies the question on board specialisation was not answered.

Non executive directors Although the directors of a company are commonly employed as senior executives of the company, it is often argued that a board benefits from having some non executive members. It has been said in favour of the non executive role that 'a board composed solely of full-time executives can easily become introverted. Each member runs his own show and can easily fall into the habit of taking care not to criticise the performance of his colleagues'². It is argued that non executive directors can offer a detached view of managerial competence and bring a specialist area of expertise into the boardroom. Yet not all non executive directors are appointed for this purpose.

In effect, there are two kinds of non executive director. The first is the director who holds no executive position in the company on whose board he sits but is a senior manager in the parent company or a sister company in the same

group. These directors usually sit on the board to exercise oversight and guidance on behalf of the parent company and are not always thought of as non executive directors.

Almost 45 per cent of the total sample of companies had directors of this type. In the case of subsidiary companies, over 60 per cent had such directors who on average comprised about two fifths of their boards' membership.

The second kind of non executive director conforms more closely to the commonly understood idea of the role. He holds no executive position in the company, or its parent company, or associated companies in the same group. (Future reference to non executive directors within this report will relate to this second type of director.) Thirty five per cent of sampled companies had non executive directors of this second type who made up, on average, about a third of their boards. Table 3.2 shows the reasons they gave for maintaining such members on the board when asked the question:

'Why does.....(SAMPLED COMPANY) have non executive directors who hold no executive position elsewhere in your company or group?'

Since the base for percentages is small, the figures must be interpreted cautiously but it is clear that major shareholders or parent companies also make use of this kind of non executive director to safeguard their interests. The most commonly mentioned reason for recruiting non executive directors was their specialist knowledge and contracts, and it is quite likely that the retired executive was often retained for similar reasons³.

Table 3.2 Reasons for having non executive directors

	All companies with non exec directors
Base (weighted)	66
Reasons for non executives:*	%
Specialist knowledge/advice/contracts	40
Independent view/criticism	18
Relative/ on board for family reasons	16
Represents parent co./major shareholder	31
Retired executive director	16
Other reasons	10
All giving reasons	93
No reason/not answered	7
Total	100

* Some informants gave more than one reason, so total reasons add to more than 100%.

† Not a senior manager in parent company

³ It will be shown in Chapter 6 that many of the directors interviewed believed the main function of a worker director would be to communicate his specialist knowledge of shop floor views to the board.

¹ There was not sufficient evidence to be sure of any direct association of company size with the existence of 'specialist' boards.

² See 'The powerful case for part-time directors' Sir Maurice Dean in 'The Director' June 1976.

Some non executives are sought for their objective opinions, but this reason was mentioned no more frequently than other reasons such as family connections.

Non executive directors were slightly more likely to be found on boards whose executive directors did not all specialise in specific aspects of company business. But even on boards of this type, non executive directors still only accounted for about a third of the membership. Boards containing non executive directors were larger on average (7.1) than boards without them (6.3), and where the board combined specialisation of all executive directors with the addition of non executives (often as part-time specialist advisers) the average size rose to 8.0.

Frequency of the board meeting Company law mainly prescribes duties for directors as responsible individuals rather than as a corporate group and the function of boards can vary considerably from one company to another. For the board to act corporately, as opposed to simply accepting corporate responsibility for the actions of its members, it must meet. Irregular or infrequent board meetings imply a rather limited role in decision taking¹ and for this reason it is interesting to see that only a few per cent of the sampled company boards met more frequently than once a month (that is weekly or fortnightly) (see Table 3.3). The monthly meeting was clearly the most popular (mentioned by 46 per cent of managing directors) with quarterly meetings the second most common. On analysis, the category 'bi-monthly' has turned out to be ambiguous; it seems that some informants may have meant twice each month rather than the more usual interpretation of once in two months. Unfortunately interviewers were not briefed to check this response so the resulting figure may be misleading.

Table 3.3 Frequency of board meetings reported by managing directors

Managing directors	
Base (weighted)	173
Board meetings:	n/%
weekly	2
fortnightly	1
monthly	46
bi-monthly	8
quarterly	14
twice a year	5
yearly	3
when needed	7
other answers	15
Total	100

¹ It may well be that the more infrequently a board meets the more formal are its meetings, but the number of companies not having monthly meetings was insufficient for further analysis on this matter.

The 'other' category in Table 3.3 includes a high proportion of unusual though regular periods between meetings such as '8 times a year'.

Topics discussed by boards Another important indicator of the function of the board meeting is the range of topics discussed (see Table 3.4). To restrict the data to a common reference point, directors were asked to refer to the last board meeting they attended. Of course the memories of individual directors in the same company will vary, but it does seem reasonable to expect that they would be more inclined to remember or initially perceive things to which they personally attached greatest importance. Thus capital investment, future planning/budgets and cash flow and training position were recalled more often by the finance directors, who were less likely to mention discussion on industrial relations or training and recruitment matters. The industrial relations/personnel directors were less likely than other directors to recall discussion on overseas branches and subsidiaries, while managing directors were the least likely to mention discussion on sales and marketing.

Given the different memory levels of informants, it seems sensible to take the highest reported frequency for any topic as the best estimate of that topic's occurrence. Hence Table 3.4 indicates that nine in every ten boards discussed their training position, cash flow and profits at the last board meeting. But Table 3.4 also shows that nearly half the sampled boards discussed

Table 3.4 Topics discussed at last board meeting

	Managing directors	Industrial relations/personnel directors	Finance directors
Base (weighted)	173	93	106
Topics:	n/%	n/%	n/%
Cash flow/trading position/profits	80	81	90
Sales and marketing	56	66	64
Industrial relations/training/recruitment	51	50	41
Production/output	46	49	48
Capital investment	38	37	48
Future planning/budgets	35	35	43
Research and development	31	26	29
Last board minutes/internal board matters	17	18	23
Overseas branches/subsidiaries/other companies in group	23	13	19
Managing directors' and management reports	16	22	19
Pay and pensions	18	13	17
Plant/property maintenance	8	13	10
Government legislation	5	4	5
General economic situation	4	3	5
General day-to-day problems	3	3	1
Other	17	16	20
Total answers	448	449	482
All giving answers	99	100	99
No answer	1	0	1

production, half mentioned industrial relations or training, and about one in six discussed pay and pensions¹. So clearly, on this argument worker directors would stand a chance of encountering some familiar ground even in the earliest stages of their tenure².

The average size of boards reporting discussion on each of the coded topics was compared to see if larger boards tended to adapt to the problem of size by discussing a different range of subjects, but there was no reliable evidence to support this hypothesis.

Directors were asked which topic took up the most time at their last board meeting and again the current cash flow and general financial performance was mentioned most frequently by over a third of each type of sampled director. But almost a fifth mentioned production or industrial relations matters as the major topic of discussion (see Table 7D in Appendix D).

Since the fieldwork for this survey was conducted around the end of the fiscal year, it was decided to ask directors whether the topics discussed at the last board meeting made it rather unusual, for example, by a greater concentration on financial matters. Only one in eight selected managing directors felt that the meeting was unusual and this sub group was too small for further analysis.

Board involvement in policy making Notwithstanding these special considerations, one of the most important questions which is raised by the prospect of boardroom participation is that of board policy making. The extent to which the board involves itself in policy formulation is crucial, for if board meetings are not concerned with such matters they may be of little interest to employee representatives. Of course there is no reason, in principle, why board policy making should not change to accommodate the interests of worker directors, but where changes are required they will not happen easily unless current directors accept the need and desirability of them. Yet this is not an easy subject to ask questions about. Since completely open questions about such subjects tend to lead to diffuse answers at varying levels of abstraction which prove uncodeable, the key question on board style was presented to informants in a closed form. Directors were asked the question:

'Now I would like to talk to you about the way in which the board normally conducts its business. Can you look at this card and tell me which of the approaches comes closest to the way the..... (SAMPLED COMPANY) board usually operates?'

¹ The degree of discussion on pay matters may have been limited by the restrictions imposed by pay policy at the time of fieldwork.

² This is not to imply that worker directors would be incapable of discussing financial matters as well.

The list printed on the card to which the question refers was drawn up in consultation with industrial relations research advisers and piloted before use, but it still presented some problems in the field. Informants were usually willing to generalise about their board's style when specifically asked to do so, but some directors remarked that their approach in board meetings was subject to some variation in relation to the matters under discussion.

The question was designed to show the extent to which company boards took a positive role in generating policy initiatives or, at the other end of the spectrum, largely ratified decisions already taken outside the boardroom. But the answers may reveal more about informants' ideal models and perceptions than regular board procedures. It is clear from Table 3.5 that over half of the director informants thought that their boards normally generated policy, which implies a major initiating function involving considerable time and effort. One in six managing directors and more than one in five of the other sampled directors saw the board as a checking committee deciding whether or not to accept the suggested policy put before them. Around one in ten of each type of director felt that the board normally decided between a range of options put before them, but at least one in ten thought the board simply ratified decisions which had already been taken outside the boardroom.

Table 3.5 Board style

	Managing directors	Industrial relations/personnel directors	Finance directors
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
<i>Board Style:</i>	%	%	%
Formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	13	10	14
Decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	17	21	22
Evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	10	12	10
Generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	58	55	53
Not answered/can't say	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100

If, as suggested, the degree of involvement in company policy making that a board enjoys will be conditioned by the frequency of its meetings, one would expect to find less frequent meetings among those boards who ratify decisions already taken, or just retain a veto power over developed proposals which come before them. Table 3.6 demonstrates just such an association, with only 37 per cent of the less involved boards meeting at least once a month, compared with 55 per cent of the more involved boards.

Table 3.6 Board style analysed by frequency of meetings

Answers from managing directors	Board ratifies decisions already taken or retains veto on fixed proposals	Board evaluates options put before it, or generates its own policies
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	53	116
Frequency of board meetings:	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>
up to monthly	37	55
bi-monthly	13	7
quarterly	17	12
twice a year	4	5
yearly	2	3
other answers when needed	20	12
	7	6
Total	100	100

* Table excludes 3 cases in which the question on board style was not answered.

Table 3.7 Way in which board deals with specified items of business

	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
Way in which board deals with capital investment:	%	%	%
formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	11	8	13
decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	22	18	28
evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	8	17	9
generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	42	39	36
left to company executives	7	5	2
the matter is not decided within the company	3	6	3
none of these/matter has never arisen	6	7	9
not answered	1	—	—
	100	100	100
Way in which board deals with the contraction or closure of some part of the business:	%	%	%
formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	6	5	8
decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	11	16	14
evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	10	8	8
generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	35	39	38
left to company executives	9	12	6
the matter is not decided within the company	2	4	4
none of these/matter has never arisen	26	16	23
not answered	1	—	—
	100	100	100
Way in which board deals with a new product:	%	%	%
formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	9	11	11
decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	20	19	20
evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	9	9	10
generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	35	37	39
left to company executives	13	10	6
the matter is not decided within the company	2	2	2
none of these/matter has never arisen	11	11	11
not answered	1	1	—
	100	100	100
Way in which board deals with the internal organisation of the company:	%	%	%
formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	9	16	11
decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	13	7	15
evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	6	8	6
generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	42	47	43
left to company executives	21	14	14
the matter is not decided within the company	2	2	5
none of these/matter has never arisen	5	5	5
not answered	1	—	—
	100	100	100

An analysis of boards style by board size, however, showed no satisfactory evidence that larger boards adopted a different approach to boardroom business.

Setting these overall answers about style in context, interviewers asked directors how the board approached the following specific major issues on the last occasion on which they occurred:

- capital investment
- the contraction or closure of some part of the business
- a new product
- the internal organisation of the company

Because this question was more specific, a new card was used which included two extra options: that the matter was not decided in the company,

and that it was left to company executives to make a decision.

Of course there is no guarantee that the four issues chosen were representative of important board business; indeed the closures issue had never occurred within the experience of a sizeable minority. However, it is interesting to see how the proportion of respondents choosing the policy generation option drops when related to specific issues, in comparison with the 'in

general' answer. From Table 3.7 it can be seen that the aggregate figures for companies do not differ very much between the three director levels and the idea that the board generates policy remains the most common view for each specific issue.

On capital investment, the second most frequent answer from companies, at managing director level and at finance director level, was that boards decided on whether to accept a policy

Table 3.8 How board dealt with specified industrial relations matters (part 1)

	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	<i>173</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>106</i>
How boards dealt with health and safety matters:	%	%	%
formally ratified decisions arrived at elsewhere	12	9	12
decided whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	19	24	25
evaluated a number of options formulated elsewhere	7	11	9
generated policy drawing on own/other expertise	31	29	28
Board decided to leave issue to company executives	22	19	19
Issue not decided in company	1	2	1
None of these/issue never come before the board	10	7	6
Total	100	100	100
Board less involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	20	19	21
Board equally involved in this issue as other industrial relations matters	36	41	37
Board more involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	12	12	15
All who dealt with this issue in the board meeting	68	72	73
How boards dealt with redundancy matters:	%	%	%
formally ratified decisions arrived at elsewhere	8	7	6
decided whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	12	19	16
evaluated a number of options formulated elsewhere	6	5	12
generated policy drawing on own/other expertise	31	39	38
Board decided to leave issue to company executives	19	15	9
Issue not decided in company	1	1	1
None of these/issue never come before the board	23	14	18
Total	100	100	100
Board less involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	8	12	9
Board equally involved in this issue as other industrial relations matters	34	39	38
Board more involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	14	17	25
All who dealt with this issue in the board meeting	57	68	72
How boards dealt with major changes in production matters:	%	%	%
formally ratified decisions arrived at elsewhere	8	4	5
decided whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	13	16	24
evaluated a number of options formulated elsewhere	8	15	9
generated policy drawing on own/other expertise	29	28	33
Board decided to leave issue to company executive	26	21	17
Issue not decided in company	1	2	1
None of these/issue never come before the board	15	13	11
Total	100	100	100
Board less involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	11	14	12
Board equally involved in this issue as other industrial relations matters	36	37	34
Board more involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	10	12	23
All who dealt with this issue in the board meeting	58	63	70

* Informants' answers on the level of board involvement when dealing with each specific industrial relations matter were related to their 'general' answer on board style in industrial relations matters to see whether the 'general' answer applied to each of the specific matters raised.

already formulated elsewhere. But at industrial relations/personnel director level an equal number felt that the matter was decided by board evaluation of a number of options formulated elsewhere. When the subject of contraction or closure of some part of the business was raised, industrial relations/personnel directors were less inclined than other directors to think that the matter had not arisen in their company or that it was dealt with in some way which was not described on the card. Managing directors were the ones most likely to think that the board delegated to its senior executives on the last occasion it was faced with a decision on internal organisation, though here again the most common answer was in terms of the board generating its own policy.

The board dealing with industrial relations matters In addition to questions on specific industrial relations topics, directors were asked about industrial relations matters in general using the 'board style' card to ascertain whether board dealings in this subject area were more or less involved than board dealings in other areas. The results from all three directorial levels were remarkably similar and they suggest that well over

half of the sampled companies employ the same board style for industrial relations matters as they do 'in general'. But among those companies which differ, there was a tendency to become less involved when discussing industrial relations matters than when discussing most other topics (see Table 8D in Appendix D).

To see how far their answers about board style in industrial relations matters in general held true for particular issues, directors were asked about board involvement on the last occasion that some specified issues arose, these issues being: health and safety matters, redundancy, major changes in production methods, pay issues and pension schemes. (As with the list used for other areas of business, there is no way of knowing how typical these industrial relations issues were in the life of any particular company in the survey sample, nor how important they were on the last occasions they were raised.)

There was a considerable degree of similarity between companies sampled at the three director levels, as can be seen from Table 3.8. The most common answer for each issue, as for industrial relations matters in general, was that the board

Table 3.8 How board dealt with specified industrial relations matters (part 2)

	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
How boards dealt with pay issues:	%	%	%
formally ratified decisions arrived at elsewhere	11	9	7
decided whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	12	21	20
evaluated a number of options formulated elsewhere	6	12	9
generated policy drawing on own/other expertise	36	28	35
All who decided to leave issue to company executives	20	17	13
Issue not decided in company	5	7	7
None of these/issue never come before the board	10	6	9
Total	100	100	100
Board less involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	15	14	13
Board equally involved in this issue as other industrial relations matters	34	49	37
Board more involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	15	8	22
All who dealt with this issue in the board meeting	65	70	71
How board dealt with pension schemes:	%	%	%
formally ratified decisions arrived at elsewhere	16	18	22
decided whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	16	13	18
evaluated a number of options formulated elsewhere	13	12	10
generated policy drawing on own/other expertise	25	18	18
All who decided to leave issue to company executives	5	3	1
Issue not decided in company	18	26	18
None of these/issue never come before the board	7	9	13
Total	100	100	100
Board less involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	25	27	25
Board equally involved in this issue as other industrial relations matters	24	18	29
Board more involved in this issue than other industrial relations matters	20	15	14
All who dealt with this issue in the board meeting	70	61	69

* Informants' answers on the level of board involvement when dealing with each specific industrial relations matter were related to their 'general' answer on board style in industrial relations matters to see whether the 'general' answer applied to each of the specific matters raised.

decided on its own policy based on the expertise of its members and outside advisors.

On health and safety matters the sampled boards were less involved in formulating policy than they generally were in industrial relations matters and they showed a greater tendency to ratify decisions taken elsewhere or decide on whether to accept a single proposition put before them. In the area of pensions, about one in five companies did not deal with the issue, usually because they were subsidiaries which looked to their parent company on such matters. Those boards which did consider pension schemes were again more inclined to ratify or consider a single proposal prepared by their senior managers.

Those boards which did deal with pay issues were inclined to take a greater interest in policy generation than they generally did in industrial relations matters. And while redundancy was the one issue on the list which a substantial minority of boards had never had to cope with, those who had dealt with a redundancy thought that they became more involved in policy generation than they usually did in industrial relations matters.

The specialisation of directors has already been discussed in general terms, but as an indicator of the way boards dealt with industrial relations, companies were asked whether any of their specialist directors took special responsibility for industrial relations or personnel matters. When the companies for which this information was not obtained are excluded from the results, Table 3.9 opposite shows that the extent of board specialisation in the area is very limited, or rather diluted. Specialists in industrial relations alone were found in only 3 per cent of companies at board level, and specialists in personnel matters only were equally rare. In 2 per cent of the companies giving information there was a director who combined responsibility for industrial relations and personnel to the exclusion of all other areas, but elsewhere these specialisms were combined with other responsibilities.

One in eight of those companies giving information had industrial relations directors with other responsibilities which did not include personnel¹, and about one in twenty had directors responsible for personnel and other matters but excluding industrial relations. But by far the most common combination was industrial relations plus personnel plus something else. Table 3.10 shows the board responsibilities which were combined with industrial relations and personnel and it can be seen that more than one in seven were chairmen or managing directors who included this with all the other things for

Table 3.9 Industrial relations/personnel specialisation on the board

	All companies giving adequate information about directorial specialisation
Base (weighted)	173
Board has no specialists	0
Board has directors who take executive responsibility for:	10
industrial relations only	3
personnel matters only	2
personnel + industrial relations only	2
industrial relations + something else	13
personnel + something else	6
industrial relations + personnel + something else	54
Board has no industrial relations/personnel specialist	23

† These categories are not all mutually exclusive for any given company so answers will add to more than the percentage of companies with industrial relations/personnel specialist directors.

which they held executive responsibility, that is they were not practising industrial relations specialists. More than half of the industrial relations/personnel directors were also responsible for production and about one in five were in charge of financial matters and may have only given a small part of their time to industrial relations. Two in five were coded as 'other answers' and this group included a wide variety of situations, including two deputy managing directors and two who were responsible for personnel and everything else in one of the company establishments. In three cases directors mentioned that personnel responsibility was combined with training and in two others welfare matters were included.

Table 3.10 Other responsibilities combined with industrial relations by directors

	All companies with a director taking responsibility for industrial relations, personnel and other matters
Base (weighted)	93
Other areas of specialisation combined with executive responsibility for industrial relations and personnel matters:	0
works/manufacturing/production	52
finance	20
chairman/managing director	15
admin/company secretary	6
sales/distribution	6
technical/research and development	9
other responsibilities	40

NB some companies gave more than one answer so results add to more than 100 per cent.

Decision taking It has been shown that some directors said their boards did not really take decisions but merely ratified decisions already arrived at elsewhere and members of such boards were not asked about how decisions were

¹ It is possible that some informants understood the term 'industrial relations' to include the personnel function.

arrived at. But for other companies the sampled board members were asked how most decisions were made, using a card with options printed on it as listed on the left-hand side of Table 3.11 below:

Table 3.11 Methods of board decision taking

	Managing directors	Industrial relations/personnel directors	Finance directors
Base (weighted)*	150	84	91
Board decision taking:	%	%	%
Directors voted to reach a majority decision	4	5	3
Chairman summed up the arguments on both sides and then gave the board decision	6	5	6
Chairman noted that most directors favoured one solution, and asked the board to agree	15	24	22
General consensus view emerged which was obvious to all present	74	65	66
None of these/not answered	2	1	4
Total	100	100	100

* This question was not put to informants who felt that their board simply ratified decisions taken elsewhere.

Again, these options were developed from study of the pilot survey results in consultation with members of the DE Research and Planning Division, and nearly all informants found themselves able to select one of the possibilities listed.

Companies at each of the three director levels largely rejected the idea that their board voted on decisions (though all those that did described their board style as one of generating its own policies). The second option may be characterised as the strong chairman leading the board to a decision, and again only one in twenty at each director level thought this a reasonable description of their own board practice. The other two options stress consensus and account for 90 per cent of the answers¹.

Control mechanisms The importance of the board meeting itself will also be affected by the extent to which its proceedings have been planned beforehand. Some 43 per cent of managing directors said that the executive directors did have a 'pre-meeting' to discuss the agenda and this would obviously condition discussions at the main meeting (a further six per cent of sampled directors in the same companies

said that a pre-meeting took place, although the managing directors had not mentioned it). Those boards characterised by their managing directors as ratifiers of decisions already made elsewhere seemed more likely to hold pre-meetings, but the differences are rather small to serve as reliable evidence.

The extent to which key executive directors could manage the meeting would also be governed by the propensity of board members to raise issues without prior notice. But around 70 per cent of the companies reported that this would be unusual, implying a degree of rigidity in many board meetings.

Chairmen or managing directors may exercise some personal control over their board meetings by insisting on the right to see and approve all board papers. In case any directors were unaware of the practice within their company, or reluctant to admit it, a check was made to see if one director reported the practice when any others in the same company did not. Twenty four per cent of companies at managing director level reported a chairman's vetting procedure and in a further 8 per cent one of the other directors mentioned the practice. Relating this approach to board style, there is a greater tendency for boards which make decisions from material presented to them to have chairmen who controlled that material (see Table 9D in Appendix D).

One in eight companies operated all three control measures and more than one in seven combined preparatory meetings with chairman's vetting of board papers, but other combinations of the three measures were no more frequent than one might expect if they were unrelated.

Delegation to board committees The size of some company boards and the frequency of their meetings leaves directors with the problem of how to facilitate corporate decisions between board meetings. One in five boards contain no non executive directors and here the problem may be less difficult, though it can still occur. But in many companies a small number of executive directors occupy the senior management positions and it becomes feasible for this group to take decisions between main board meetings. Such decisions may be made individually after informal consultation, but for 51 per cent of the companies in the sample, the situation had led to the formation of an 'inner' or 'executive' board².

¹ It does appear from table 3.11 that companies at managing director level were more likely than were companies at the other directorial levels to stress consensus unprompted by the chairman rather than the chairman encouraging acceptance of the majority view. However, if the comparisons are made between any pair of levels, excluding companies not represented at both such levels, the difference becomes so small as to be completely unreliable as evidence.

² It was thought that some directors might be less willing to talk about their executive boards; so a check was made to see if one of the other directors in a given company mentioned the existence of an executive board when the managing director in that company had not. In fact this proved to be the case in only 3 per cent of companies, and these have been included in the 51 per cent of companies reported as mentioning an executive board.

The full boards of companies which also had executive boards were rather more likely to act as ratifiers; though even among this group such 'rubber-stamp' boards accounted for less than a fifth of the total. Companies with inner boards tended to be rather larger, with larger full boards meeting less often, and containing more executive directors. (See Tables 11D-14D in Appendix D).


Directors who mentioned their executive board were asked about its activities in terms of three key functions:

- overlooking the operation of the whole company
- submitting policy or operating recommendations to the full board of the sampled company
- making major policy decisions

Around nine in every ten directors in each of the sampled roles thought that their inner boards exercised the first two functions, but only just over three in five of the managing directors and industrial relations/personnel directors felt that the executive board made major policy decisions and this figure dropped to 44 per cent in the opinion of finance directors.

The complexity of management issues in a modern industrial company is obviously too

Figure 4 Co-existence of executive boards, board sub-committees and management committees just below board level in the same companies



Figures in the diagram only account for the space in which they occur. All possible combinations are accounted for individually and thus percentages add to 100%.

The diagram is based on 172 companies giving this information at managing director level.

great for everything to be discussed in detail around the boardroom table. So although a board may wish to retain the power of final decision on a given issue, it will often be found useful to set up a sub committee of the board to recommend a decision. In each company a director was asked about such sub committees and just over a third of the sample claimed to make use of them. Companies using this approach had an average of 2.7 such committees sitting at the time of the survey. Looking to the composition of these sub committees, only one in five companies had non executive directors on their committees, while over 90 per cent made use of non board members.

In some companies the board will wish to pass the detailed consideration of specialised issues to a management committee below board level for a recommended strategy. Clearly, such committees could exist at any point in the company hierarchy, but by asking about management committees just below the board level, interviewers discovered them in more than three in five firms. Companies with this type of management committee had an average of 2.8 such committees, and four out of five of them had committees containing board members.

Management committees can take many forms and the specific questions in the survey will not

have included them all, so the figures given above undoubtedly underestimate the use of such committees¹. (For example, the survey question referred to management committees which consider company business in order to make recommendations to the board, so committees which exist to exercise delegated powers on behalf of the board may have been missed.) Yet even the level of committee work reported in the survey has clear implications for any system of employee representation at board level.

Both board sub committees and management committees were more commonly found in companies with larger full boards, which included a higher proportion of ratifying boards.

Figure 4 shows the extent to which the three types of committee discussed (executive boards, sub committees and management committees) were found to co-exist in the same companies. Only one in seven managing directors reported all three committee approaches in their companies, and just under one in six reported none of the committees discussed.

Given the greater incidence of executive boards and management committees, these were naturally the most common combination. In fact they were found together slightly more often than their separate occurrence levels might lead one to expect, though the combination of both types only accounted for a third of the companies. Executive boards and board sub committees were found together a good deal more often than their separate frequencies might suggest.

Subsidiary boards It has already been reported in Chapter 2 that subsidiary company boards enjoy less autonomy than their independent counterparts but they also have other slightly different characteristics. The subsidiary companies in the survey sample constituted a high proportion of the larger companies and their average board size was larger at 6.6 members (compared with 5.7 members on other company boards, see Table 3.12). Thus, as one would expect, these subsidiaries with their larger boards had more executive directors than independent companies, met less often and were more inclined to make use of 'inner boards' and board sub committees. But the relative size of subsidiary boards did not explain all their distinctive features. Subsidiary boards were more likely than the independent ones to see themselves as evaluators of options or policy generators in industrial relations matters, though this did not hold for the way their boards functioned in general and they claimed to spend more board time on industrial relations matters. The executive directors of subsidiary boards were more

likely than their independent company equivalents to meet before the board meeting, and these subsidiary boards were mainly made up of executives from the company itself or its parent company.

Table 3.12 Comparison of the boards of subsidiary and independent companies

Based on answers from managing directors	Subsidiary company	Independent
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	125	48
Board meets:		
At least monthly	46	56
Less often	54	44
	100	100
Board sub committees:		
Yes	39	26
No	61	74
	100	100
Executive (inner) board:		
Yes	52	34
No	48	65
	100	100
Executive directors meet before to discuss agenda:		
Yes	45	37
No	55	63
	100	100
Way in which board normally operates:		
Ratifies decisions	16	6
Evaluates whether to accept proposal	14	26
Evaluates a number of proposals	9	12
Generates own policy	58	56
Not answered/varies	3	—
	100	100
Way in which board deals with industrial relations matters:		
Ratifies decisions	14	13
Decides whether to accept a proposal	18	33
Evaluates a number of proposals	16	9
Generates own policy	48	44
Not answered/varies	4	1
	100	100
Board time spent on industrial relations:		
Quite a lot	25	11
Not very much	70	89
Not answered/varies	4	—
	100	100
Average size of board	6.6	5.7
Average number of non executives	0.5	1.6
Average number of executives	4.7	4.3

Outside influences on the board The survey attempted to measure the influences of outside forces on the board as seen by the sampled directors. Four specific influences were mentioned to informants—market forces (characterised as big customers and suppliers); the management below board level; the company employees and their unions; and the money market (characterised as bankers and financiers)—and they were asked to say which had the greatest influence

¹ Some managing directors of subsidiary companies volunteered the view that their own boards functioned as management committees responsible to the board of their parent company.

on their board. Six per cent of the finance directors, and double that proportion among industrial relations/personnel directors, could not place one influence more highly than another, or felt that the best answer varied according to the issue before the board. However, those who could decide opted for market forces in the majority of cases, ranging from 55 per cent at managing director level to 62 per cent at finance director level. For all directors the company employees and their unions came a very poor second, with the company managers below board level as the least common choice of every directorial group. (See Table 19D in Appendix D).

When asked about the least important influence on the board, a little over half at each director level mentioned the money market, and around one in five industrial relations/personnel directors and finance directors opted for 'the management below board level'. Less than one in ten at every level mentioned market forces, and the least common choice was the company employees.

Those informants who were unwilling to make a single choice in the first question also tended, by and large, to experience difficulty in choosing a 'least influence'. The small sub group at each director level who accorded big customers and suppliers the least influence on the board, were rather more likely than others to opt for the money market as having the greatest influence. Otherwise informants' choice of 'greatest influence' seems to be a poor predictor of their

selection for 'least influence' (see Table 19D in Appendix D).

Preceptions of the board held by non directors working in the company establishments Clearly, the attitudes which were to be sought on the question of worker directors could be affected by informants' views and perceptions of their company board. Moreover, their attitude to senior management direction and their beliefs about the true power centres of their companies could be influenced by their understanding of what went on in the boardroom.

In the company establishments some of the sampled informants were board members themselves (especially in single establishment companies) and others sometimes attended board meetings, but those without such first hand experience were asked a series of questions about the board and its decision making.

Firstly these informants were asked about the sort of issues they thought were discussed in board meetings and at that stage it was clear that a number of them did not feel they could answer such a question. At establishment manager level this only accounted for some 5 per cent of companies, while at personnel manager level the figure was 10 per cent. Down at the foreman level 25 per cent claimed no knowledge at all and the employee representative levels ranged from around 20 per cent to over 30 per cent in the case of the other (mainly white collar) senior representatives. For the remainder who did feel they could answer, the results are shown in Table 3.13 below. Their

Table 3.13 What informant thinks is discussed at board meetings

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.	Managing director (for comparison)
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	60	81	151	114	133	127	74	68	173
Topics discussed:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Sales and marketing	47	45	48	49	45	43	43	46	56
Production/output	39	36	42	41	50	42	44	42	46
Wages/salaries/claims/pensions	18	20	18	25	15	20	16	13	18
Cash flow/trading position/profits	69	61	66	78	57	60	61	58	80
Capital expenditure/investment	65	75	62	55	43	52	61	56	38
Research and development	17	24	13	19	15	11	13	15	31
Plant/property maintenance	2	1	4	—	1	5	2	—	8
Forecasts/budgets/future planning	45	36	41	34	30	17	26	19	35
Industrial relations/training/recruitment	56	61	44	56	39	48	41	30	51
Management reports	19	11	14	9	7	8	10	10	16
Last board meeting minutes (internal board matters)	—	2	2	1	1	—	2	—	17
Overseas business	4	4	4	8	5	7	11	7	23
General day-to-day running of firm	4	4	7	4	9	7	5	11	3
General economic situation	3	3	3	5	1	2	0	2	4
Government legislation/acts, etc.	7	3	3	5	2	2	1	—	5
Other topics	16	19	16	25	10	13	13	8	17

* Table excludes those who said they had no idea of what happened in board meetings and also those who attended board meetings regularly.

answers have deliberately been coded to the same frame as was used for directors' reports of their meetings to facilitate direct comparisons; managing directors' answers are included in the table for the same reason. However, it should be remembered that managing directors were talking about the last board meeting, while the informants from the company establishments were talking about board meetings in general.

At all levels except that of middle manager (white collar) there was an underestimate of the number of boards discussing cash flow, trading position or profits. Every level underestimated the number of boards which discussed research and development and very few mentioned the internal board matters reported by one in six of the managing directors. Plant and property maintenance was mentioned by 8 per cent of managing directors but only 1 or 2 per cent of most establishment roles, and the highest mention of dealings with overseas branches and subsidiaries was 11 per cent among the sampled other senior employee representatives, compared with 23 per cent of managing directors.

All levels seemed to overestimate the likelihood of capital investment being discussed (that is they were more likely to mention this subject than were the managing directors). But since informants from the selected establishments were talking about board meetings in general, any apparent overestimation can be explained.

In general it seems that informants from the company establishments were inclined to mention a smaller range of items of board discussion than directors, but since it was a relatively unfamiliar topic to them compared with how such questions must have been taken by directors, some underestimation of the range of topics is only to be expected. The results in Table 3.13 show that most informants at every level do have a general idea of the sorts of issues which are discussed. What the results do not, and cannot, show is whether informants appreciate the level of complexity which board discussions sometimes reach.

Moving on to board style it was thought that the four option model going from ratification to policy generation was unnecessarily involved as a knowledge question for the full sample of informants. Instead, the question used concentrated on whether informants thought that the important decisions were taken outside the boardroom and ratified by the board¹, or whether the board had a more positive function. (This dichotomy was adopted in the belief that

a large proportion of companies would have ratificatory boards though the main survey results have turned out to be equivocal on this point.) The proportion of 'don't knows' to this question varied from 1 or 2 per cent among the sampled middle managers to 9 per cent among the other senior employee representatives, and this makes comparison of the substantive answers rather difficult. If, however, one is willing to assume that when the 'don't knows' make up their minds they will be distributed as the informants who have already made up theirs, then a tentative pattern emerges.

The results then show that answers from all the managerial levels vary within a few percentage points of two in five believing that the important decisions are taken outside the boardroom. But at the two senior representative levels almost half thought that important decisions were not taken but only ratified by the board; though only a third of the minority union stewards took that view. Nevertheless the differences between the role levels are not very large and could well be within the range of sampling/measurement error. The more important finding is probably the large minority who are cynical about the real powers of the company board.

One of the fears which is sometimes voiced about worker directors is that they would encourage voting in the boardroom, thereby damaging the consensus which was reported for most boards. It is known that decisions are often taken by voting at union meetings, and if worker directors think the same model appropriate in the boardroom then the fears may be justified.

Informants were asked whether they thought that the board usually made decisions by voting to find the majority view, but at almost every level only a minority believed this to be the case. Table 3.14 suggests that the conception of a voting model was least common at industrial relations/personnel manager level. At the employee representative levels there was a slightly higher proportion opting for the voting model, which becomes clearly noticeable among minority union stewards from whom this model was the most frequent answer.

The last of the questions on the board, put to informants at establishment level, were really designed to test knowledge rather than describe perceptions, and this creates its own difficulties. Knowledge questions have to be simple to avoid the basic problem of informants giving a wrong answer because they do not fully understand the question rather than because they lack the required knowledge. They may face the informant with a status problem if he has to admit to the interviewer that he does not know the answer and this can create embarrassment in the

¹ Of course 'decisions taken outside the boardroom' may still include for some informants the idea of an executive director taking decisions between board meetings.

Table 3.14 How informant thinks the board makes decisions

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	60	81	151	114	113	127	74	68
How informant thinks the board makes decisions:								
Votes to reach a majority decision	29	24	35	30	39	35	32	48
Comes to an agreement in some other way	61	64	57	65	49	52	35	40
Don't know	9	12	8	3	11	13	13	11
Not answered	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes those who said they had no idea of what happened in board meetings and also those who attended board meetings regularly.

interviewing situation. The range of such questions in the survey was, therefore, deliberately limited.

The first of these knowledge questions asked informants whether their own company, referred to by name, was owned by another company or was independent. Now if the few not 'not answered/don't know' cases are excluded, the answers may be reduced to two simple possibilities: either informants gave the correct answer or they did not. Moreover, since there were only two possible answers, then even if everyone guessed, there should still be about half giving the correct answer. Unfortunately the small number of informants at managerial levels to whom the question applied because they never attended board meetings themselves make the results for those levels subject to a higher degree of statistical error and the proportions have been rounded to the nearest 10 per cent in the table of results (Table 20D in Appendix D).

In fact more than three in every four respondents at all levels answered the question correctly. In most cases the wrong answers came from people who thought their company was in-

dependent when it was a subsidiary, particularly at the foreman and three steward levels.

The second knowledge question was simply to ask people whether they knew the name of their managing director, but this caused some confusion in subsidiary companies. Since the question followed one about ownership, and interviewers were not briefed to remind informants in subsidiary companies that the managing director of the subsidiary in which they worked was the one required, some gave the name of the parent company chief executive. Where possible, if either name was given, it was checked at the coding stage to see whether it was the name obtained by the interviewer (who had interviewed the managing director) or the name on correspondence which OPCS had entered into at the sampling stage. In Table 3.15 the companies for which this checking information was not secured have been omitted, and once again the small number of interviews at the personnel manager and middle manager levels make their proportions subject to a higher degree of possible error. Still, within these limitations, it is clear that at least eight in ten informants at each level could name the managing director of their own company (or its parent company).

Table 3.15 Informant knowledge of the name of the company managing director

	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	27	32	26	174	159	106	83
Whether informant knows the name of the managing director:							
Managing director of own company given correctly	70	60	60	73	69	73	66
Managing director of parent company given correctly	10	20	20	9	8	9	11
Managing director's name given incorrectly	10	20	10	8	12	9	12
Informant claimed no knowledge	0	10	10	10	11	9	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes companies for which this information was not available.

† Since the base is very small for this group, the percentages are shown rounded to the nearest 10 per cent to avoid implying a spurious degree of precision. The group is small because senior managers have been excluded when the head office was part of the establishment.

The last of the knowledge questions asked about the existence of an industrial relations director:

'In some companies each director takes responsibility for one aspect of the business, for example finance or production. Have you heard of a director in your company who takes special responsibility for industrial relations?'

Around seven in ten at personnel manager level and about six in ten at the middle manager levels answered the question correctly; but at the foreman and steward levels the proportion of correct answers is not much above the half who could be expected to give the right answer through guessing (see Table 21D in Appendix D). However, these findings may need to be treated with caution because some of the companies claiming to have such a director were referring to the managing director who always led discussions on industrial relations matters. The most common error occurred when informants said they had never heard that there was a director in their company who took special responsibility for industrial relations matters although the company directors had said that this was the case.

Summary

The size of company boards was found to increase with company size though the rate of growth declined at a size of about 1,500-2,000 employees. In 55 per cent of companies all executive directors specialised in particular areas of company business and this tendency was more common on larger boards. Just over a third of the sampled company boards had non executive directors, their most common *raison d'être* being their specialist knowledge and contacts.

When asked to recall the issues discussed at the last board meeting, the most frequently mentioned topics were cash flow/trading position (90 per cent), sales and marketing (66 per cent), industrial relations issues (51 per cent), production and output (49 per cent), capital expenditure (48 per cent).

Directors most commonly saw the board style of decision making as one of generating policy drawing on its own or outside expertise, but at the other end of the spectrum one in six managing directors saw the board involvement in decision making more as a checking committee deciding whether or not to accept the suggested policy put before them. More than half the sampled company boards met less than once a month, which may have limited their degree of involvement in decision making. Only 37 per cent of the less involved boards met at

least once a month compared with 55 per cent of those more involved in policy making.

For well over half the sampled companies the board style of decision making, in industrial relations matters specifically, tended to be the same as for most other matters, but where there was a difference boards reported less involvement in decisions on industrial relations matters.

Only 3 per cent of companies had a specialist industrial relations director without other responsibilities and a further 2 per cent had a specialist industrial relations and personnel director. But in 72 per cent of companies there was one director who normally took responsibility for industrial relations matters in board meetings.

According to managing directors, three quarters of the company boards normally relied on the emergence of a clear consensus in board meetings and voting on decisions was reported as common in only 4 per cent of boards.

Half of the sampled companies reported that their executive directors met before the formal board meetings to discuss the agenda and about seven in ten reported that it was usual for directors to give notice of any issues they wanted to raise in the main meeting. Chairmen or managing directors sometimes exercised personal control over their board meetings by insisting on the right to vet all board papers and this was reported by 24 per cent of companies at managing director level.

To facilitate corporate decision taking between full board meetings, half the sampled companies had formed more frequently, meeting inner boards of the main executive directors. Nine in every ten directors interviewed in companies with inner (executive) boards acknowledged that these boards took an oversight of the operations of the company and put policy recommendations to the full board; three in five managing directors agreed that the inner board made major policy decisions on its own. One in three sampled companies made use of board sub committees to consider specific issues and to recommend decisions to the full board, and such companies had an average of 2.7 of these committees sitting at the time of the survey. Only one in five companies using this system had non executive directors on their committees, while over 90 per cent made use of non board members. More than three in five companies made use of management committees just below board level to recommend strategy to the board, but in most cases these committees contained at least one director.

When asked to choose between a series of options describing key influences on company boards, market forces was the most common choice of directors as the greatest influence, and the money market was chosen most often as having the least influence.

Those sampled informants in the company establishments who had no direct experience of the boardroom were asked a series of questions on their perception of their company boards. These informants were asked which subjects were discussed at board meetings, and by and large they mentioned the same topics as directors. A question on board style of involvement in decision making showed that at least 40 per

cent of informants at all levels thought that important decisions tended to be taken outside the boardroom and only ratified at the board meeting. But when asked whether they thought the board voted to reach majority decisions, this was very much a minority view at almost every level.

The same informants were asked some questions on their knowledge of the company board. Three out of four informants at all levels knew whether their company was a subsidiary or independent. The majority could name the managing director of the company but most informants at steward levels did not know whether the company board had a director who took special responsibility for industrial relations.

4 Approaches to increasing participation: current practices

This chapter gives the survey findings on current practices in relation to information disclosure, collective bargaining and joint consultation with a report on communications and the role of stewards.

Any survey of current modes of participation must inevitably be selective for there exists an almost infinite variety of possibilities. Particular companies have experimented with different systems and the literature of industrial sociology has reported on many of the more noteworthy ones at some length¹. A general survey, however, is limited in the amount and types of information it can hope to cover and this survey has concentrated on the three most common approaches to be found, namely information disclosure, joint consultation machinery and collective bargaining. This means that other equally possible approaches such as co-partnership, elected works councils and equity participation have been excluded.

Information disclosure

It might be argued that the provision of information to employees is to industrial democracy what 'the people's right to know' is to political democracy. It is a *sine qua non* for industrial democracy without necessarily being a central issue within that area of discussion. Yet beyond the day-to-day working instructions given to employees, some companies have no clear policy for the dissemination of information and managers are free to tell their subordinates as little or as much as they choose, or know themselves. In some companies there is an informal understanding among the managers about what they may divulge but it is very difficult to identify such covert systems when the managers in a given company do not all have quite the same understanding of the system. So although the validity and usefulness of such informal systems is accepted, the survey has concentrated on formal arrangements².

At company level all selected directors were asked whether their company had a written policy which determined just which information was passed to employees or their representatives. The industrial relations/personnel directors, who might be thought of as the group most likely to know, mentioned a formal policy in 12 per cent of companies³.

At establishments, 13 per cent of the selected industrial relations/personnel managers mentioned a formal policy of disclosure while at foreman, most senior representative and minority union representative levels (the blue collar roles) a written policy was reported in about one in five industrial units. This may imply different reference groups; for example, in some establishments there was a written policy which only applied to blue collar workers (see Table 22D in Appendix D). Before going on to ask about any recent changes, interviewers asked informants how satisfied they were with the amount of information currently disclosed.

The four point scale in Table 4.1 was read out and the largest group at each level claimed to be fairly satisfied. Most job satisfaction surveys seem to find the majority of respondents fairly satisfied or something similar⁴ and in so far as job satisfaction is made up from satisfaction with component aspects (like availability of information) this survey finding is not unexpected. The more interesting finding is the proportion who find themselves not at all satisfied with the amount of information provided. Such an extreme view was taken by only a few per cent at each of the directorial and managerial levels but at the convenor level more than one in five were not at all satisfied and more than one in seven of the other steward levels felt this way.

All informants were asked whether there had been any alteration in the range of information disclosed over the past 12 months. If they said there had been a change, they were asked whether there had been an increase or decrease.

¹ See, for example, P. Brannen et al (1976), *The Worker Directors: a sociology of participation*, Hutchinson, London; C. Balfour (ed.) (1973), *Participation in industry*, Croom Helm, London; F. H. Blum (1969), *Work and Community: the Scott Bader Commonwealth and the quest for a new social order*, Routledge, London; P. Blumberg (1968) *Industrial Democracy: the sociology of participation*, Constable, London; A. Flanders et al (1968), *Experiment in Industrial Democracy: a study of the John Lewis Partnership*, Faber, London.

² Since the survey, ACAS have published a code of practice for formal agreements on information disclosure. ACAS (1977) *Code of Practice 2: Disclosure of information to trades unions for collective bargaining purposes*, London, HMSO.

³ The other two director roles reported less than this though the differences were not significant. See Table 22D in Appendix D.

⁴ See, for example, The General Household Survey conducted by OPCS.

Table 4.1 Satisfaction of informants at establishment level with the amount of information currently given to employees or their representatives

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Satisfaction with information:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	30	27	29	25	22	15	11	8
Fairly satisfied	53	53	56	56	54	40	43	48
Not very satisfied	15	18	12	13	18	22	31	28
Not at all satisfied	1	2	3	3	6	23	14	16
Don't know/not answered	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Around half of the informants in most role groups thought there had been a change which had led to an increase in the range of information disclosed. At both personnel director and personnel manager level there was a slightly greater tendency to report an increase though the differences in the data are not really large enough to constitute reliable evidence. At every selected level in the sampled companies the majority felt that this increase in the range of information disclosure had helped both management and employee representatives in their negotiations together. But at the other senior steward and foreman levels there was a greater inclination to see the change as advantaging employee representatives only. Few informants at any level thought the increase in information had helped neither side; and only at personnel and middle manager (white collar) levels were there many (6 per cent) who thought it too soon to make up their minds. (See Table 23D in Appendix D).

Disclosure for negotiating purposes Any information provision in a large company runs the risk of telling employees a great deal more than they wanted to know about some subjects and too little about others. Employees are more likely to show an interest in information which they think will have a bearing on their working lives, but such information may need to remain confidential for commercial reasons. Thus, employers may simply refuse disclosure or, as some do, pass information to employee representatives on a confidential basis for use in internal negotiations only.

According to industrial relations/personnel directors, half of the sampled companies with traded unions passed information to stewards on a confidential basis. This was made up of 10 per cent who claimed to pass such information frequently and 40 per cent for whom 'sometimes' was a more suitable answer. There was a tendency for this form of disclosure to be more common in large companies.

At the sampled company establishments, between one quarter and one third of those at

the managerial levels who claimed to know what was happening reported the disclosure of information in negotiations. Among the employee representatives levels this rose to almost half of the convenors and over 40 per cent of the others. Middle managers (white collar) and foremen have already been shown to take less part in negotiations and they were much more likely to give a 'don't know' answer on this subject.

To some extent the provision of confidential information for bargaining purposes may be encouraged by the level to which collective bargaining had developed in any company¹. In Table 4.2 it can be seen that the proportions of companies negotiating various issues according to the sampled convenors are higher in those establishments where information is provided; and Table 25D in Appendix D, based on answers from personnel managers, supports this finding².

Table 4.2 Range of bargaining by whether information provided in confidence for negotiating purposes

Answer given by 'most senior employee representatives'	Information passed in confidence for negotiating purposes only	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	78	81
Issues negotiated:	%	%
Capital investment	9	5
Major changes in production methods	75	58
Pay issues	95	90
Physical working conditions	92	83
Hours of work	91	69
Safety matters	89	81
Disciplinary procedures	94	88
Redundancy	92	78
Welfare matters	85	69

Moreover, in those establishments disclosing confidential information in this way there was a greater degree of satisfaction with the amount of information currently given to employees or

¹ The survey shows that both increase with company size.

² These data were collected before the disclosure provisions of the Employment Protection Act (1975) came into force, so respondents' answers would not reflect any changes brought about by that legislation.

their representatives, both at the management levels, apart from establishment managers, and at the steward levels. (See Table 26D in Appendix D).

Collective bargaining

Collective bargaining has long been at the centre of British industrial relations and many trades unions regard it as the best medium through which to extend industrial democracy. So any survey on employee participation must include in the current picture some reference to the range of bargaining. However, collective bargaining is a difficult subject to cover by survey methods; negotiations can take place separately for different sub groups of workers (for example, different occupations within the same industry, company or establishment) and negotiators on different sides often have varying reference groups. One way to reduce the problem is to make the negotiating unit the basis of the survey sample¹ but since different topics for the same group of workers may be covered at different levels even this complex method does not solve the problem altogether. In any case, given the much wider subject matter of the present survey it was not sensible to design it around the special problem of negotiations. Instead, it was decided to make the questions as open as possible to cover a wide range of situations.

In each company one of the directors (the industrial relations/personnel director where possible) was asked, in respect of specified topics (listed in Table 4.3) whether the company ever negotiated on a company-wide basis with any trades union or staff association covering any or all occupational groups or types of employee, but the question was restricted to intra-company bargaining. Issues negotiated on an industry-wide basis, for example wages council agreements or agreements with an employers' federation, would not be included. Moreover, while the system of asking informants about issues on a specified list does ensure that all the listed items are considered, it equally prevents the inclusion of other items not on the list.

Table 4.3 shows the range of bargaining revealed by the survey results and two issues in the list stand out. Capital investment appears to be outside the range of bargaining for nearly all companies and, secondly, negotiations over major changes in production methods is only mentioned by half of those contacted. Other results show that these issues are more likely to be thought of as areas of management prerogative, but the same cannot be said of welfare matters. The relatively low proportion of around two

thirds negotiating welfare matters is more likely explained in terms of employee disinclination to bring the machinery of collective bargaining to bear on issues such as canteen services and provision of sports facilities, which can be comparatively trivial.

Table 4.3 Whether specified issues were within the range of bargaining for company-wide negotiations

Answers from a responsible director, industrial relations/personnel director where possible)	All companies with TU/staff associations	No. of employees	
		Up to 500	Over 500
Base (weighted)*	171	84	84
Specified issues negotiated:†			
Capital investment	4	5	2
Major changes in production methods	52	56	47
Pay issues	88	89	86
Physical working conditions	77	82	73
Hours of work	76	79	73
Safety matters	74	80	68
Disciplinary procedures	82	83	80
Redundancy	77	76	78
Welfare matters	68	73	65
All giving answers	92	91	92
Not answered/don't know	8	9	8

* Size breakdown excludes 4 cases in which company size was not given

† Answers will add to more than 100 per cent.

All the other issues seemed to be negotiated by at least three quarters of those companies giving information. There is an almost totally consistent inclination for larger companies to negotiate a little less at company level than their smaller counterparts which only employ 500 or less. This could be due in part to the larger companies undertaking more bargaining at plant level and less at company level. Since a slightly higher proportion of the larger companies in the sample were subsidiaries, the difference could also be due to negotiations at parent company level which might not be mentioned in answer to the survey question.

The board approach to industrial relations, as indicated by the time spent on such matters and the board style in dealing with these matters (see page 35), seems to have had no effect on the range of bargaining.

In Table 4.4 the specified issues are cross analysed with each other to show whether negotiations on particular issues were inclined to be mentioned in association with others. Those reporting negotiations on a given issue are treated as separate analysis groups shown in a column labelled accordingly, and the proportion of that group also negotiating each other issue is shown in that column. It can be seen that the proportions for each issue are roughly the same in each analysis group. In other words, the chance of any given issue being negotiated in a company appears to be largely independent

¹ The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys conducted for the Department of Employment in 1972 and 1973 by Dr S Parker (published by HMSO in 1974 and 1975) did this by using the concept of the "Industrial Relations Situation".

Table 4.4 Concurrence of subjects negotiated at company-wide level

Answer from a responsible director (industrial relations/personnel specialist where possible)	Subjects negotiated at company-wide level								
	Capital investment	Major change in prod. methods	Pay issues	Physical working conditions	Hours of work	Safety matters	Discipline matters	Redundancy	Welfare matters
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	7	88	150	132	130	127	139	131	117
Subjects negotiated at company-wide level:	*	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Capital investment		6	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Major changes in production methods		100	58	63	61	61	61	58	63
Pay issues		98	100	98	99	99	97	96	98
Physical working conditions		94	86	100	88	92	88	85	94
Hours of work		90	86	87	100	88	85	85	89
Safety matters		88	83	88	85	100	85	83	93
Disciplinary procedures		95	90	93	91	94	100	90	95
Redundancy		87	84	85	86	86	84	100	87
Welfare matters		83	76	83	80	86	80	78	100

* Base too small for percentages

of the chance that any other particular issue will be negotiated.

At establishment level the personnel manager, or another manager, and the employee representatives were asked about the range of bargaining. As at company level, the question was very open:

'Does the management at this establishment negotiate with a trades union or staff association on any matter connected with.....(SPECIFIED ISSUE)?'

Table 4.5 shows the results for establishments having a trades union or staff association with which to negotiate. In some establishments no information was secured from a manager and those 'not asked' cases have been excluded

Table 4.5 Issues negotiated with trades union/staff association at establishment level

	Managers	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	148*	161	108	84
Issues negotiated:	%	%	%	%
Capital investment	7	7	8	4
Major changes in production methods	62	66	46	42
Pay issues	94	93	91	91
Physical working conditions	90	86	85	81
Hours of work	81	80	76	68
Safety matters	85	84	76	85
Disciplinary procedures	89	90	87	84
Redundancy	89	85	85	81
Welfare matters	74	77	69	75
None of these	1	0	2	1

* Interviewers were told to ask this question of the industrial relations/Personnel Manager or the Establishment Manager. If neither of these were available then the information was to be sought from the Middle Manager (Production) but if he too, was unavailable or the company did not recognise any union or staff association the question was not asked at management level.

from Table 4.5 (since they only occurred in the 'Managers' column, their inclusion would have distorted comparisons with the other columns).

An analysis of managers' answers on the proportion of their workers who were unionised, by the range of bargaining, shows a tendency for that range to be greater in establishments where all manual workers belonged to a trades union (see Table 27D in Appendix D)

Table 4.6 makes use of the answers given for company-wide negotiations on each issue compared with those relating to plant level negotiations, to show whether each issue is covered at some level within the sampled companies. The answers from the most senior employee representative level were taken as the source for establishment data in order to maximise the number of companies included in the table¹.

Table 4.6 Issues negotiated at company-wide level or establishment level or both

		All companies giving information about negotiations at company-wide level and at establishment level (most senior employee rep.)
<i>Base (weighted)</i>		140
Issues negotiated at one or both levels:	%	
Capital investment	11	
Major changes in production methods	86	
Pay issues	99	
Physical working conditions	97	
Hours of work	99	
Safety matters	93	
Disciplinary procedures	99	
Redundancy	96	
Welfare matters	94	

¹ It can be seen from Table 4.5 (earlier in this chapter) that the answers on this topic given at managerial level were very much of the same order as those given by the most senior representative level.

With the exception of 'capital investment' it seems that the listed issues were negotiated at one of these two levels in the vast majority of companies. Even 'major changes in production methods', which was mentioned by somewhat over half the companies in relation to company-wide negotiations and about two-thirds in the establishments, reaches 86 per cent when both information sources are combined.

Non negotiable issues The high level of mentions for most issues listed in Tables 4.3 and 4.5 is not surprising given their obvious direct connection with the working lives of employees, and it is perhaps more important to concentrate on the issues which are not regarded as negotiable. So the representative director from each company was asked an open ended question on whether there were any issues the company felt it inappropriate to negotiate about. Two thirds of the companies said that there were issues over which they wished to retain their management prerogative and the issues are listed below in Table 4.7. The only commonly mentioned item not within the list in Table 4.3 is the discussion on new products and the future planning/strategy of the company (which is something that worker directors would inevitably become involved in). Some of the other listed issues could represent a challenge to the position of managers, for example, salaries and appointment/promotion of managers and directors—5 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Pensions are sometimes dealt with on a group basis so that member companies could not negotiate separate provisions, which may explain the 5 per cent mention of that issue.

In the sampled establishments only half the managers thought there were issues inappropriate for negotiations and even less were of that opinion at the employee representative levels. Capital investment was again the most commonly mentioned issue, particularly among the managerial levels, with new products/future planning coming a poor second.

It would be more interesting to know whether there were issues over which the management were guarding their prerogative while stewards were seeking to negotiate. An attempt was made to investigate this at establishment level but the answers led the researchers to think that some stewards misunderstood the question. It appears that some of the issues mentioned may have been open to negotiation, but as the results of those negotiations had not led to an agreed settlement some stewards may not have regarded them as *bona fide* negotiations. (In particular, the references to pay and hours suggest this.) Yet, with this proviso, the answers do illuminate some areas of potential conflict (see Table 4.8) though the figures are too small to estimate their relative importance.

Role of lay representatives in negotiations At company-wide level three in five firms usually conducted their negotiations with shop stewards only and about half as many usually involved full time officials as well. Only 6 per cent usually dealt with full time officials alone and this sub group is too small for further investigation of the reasons.

At establishment level companies were asked about the role of lay and paid officials in respect

Table 4.7 Issues believed to be inappropriate for negotiation at company-wide/plant level

	Company-wide level		Establishment level		
	Directors	Managers	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	168	148	161	108	84
Issues believed inappropriate for negotiations at company-wide/plant level:					
Capital investment	41	39	22	20	18
New products/future planning	29	14	11	11	6
Changes in production methods	5	6	4	4	2
Redundancy	3	1	1	1	2
Pay matters	5	4	7	7	4
Salaries of managers/directors	5	2	1	2	2
Appointment/promotion of managers	7	1	2	5	6
Working hours/holidays	3	2	2	5	1
Pensions	5	2	3	2	—
Health and safety	1	1	1	1	—
Everything/most things (not specified)	1	1	—	2	0
Other answers	19	7	11	8	10
All claiming that some issues are inappropriate for negotiations	65	50	42	42	31
No inappropriate issues	35	50	58	58	69
Total	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes those who did not answer the question plus 10 per cent of companies without recognised unions (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.8 Management prerogative and issues which the unions wish to negotiate in company establishments

	Managers	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	<i>168</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>84</i>
No issues which the management feel inappropriate for negotiation	<i>44</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>69</i>
No issue which management feel inappropriate but unions wish to negotiate	37	27	27	18
Issues which unions wish to negotiate but management think inappropriate*	19	15	15	13
	100	100	100	100
Issues* were:				
Pay	1	5	7	1
Pensions	1	2	3	0
Holidays	1	1	0	4
Capital investment	0	2	0	1
Disclosure of information	1	2	2	0
Sick pay	0	2	1	0
Hours	—	1	0	1
Increased participation	2	2	0	1
Other answers	1	1	3	4
Not answered	12	1	—	—

* Some informants mentioned more than one issue.

of each negotiating issue, and the results show the predominant role of stewards. The figures from establishments show a remarkable degree of consistency with over 90 per cent at every level claiming that all issues were negotiated with the shop steward alone or together with the full time official. For nearly all issues it was reported that over 70 per cent of company establishments usually negotiated with shop stewards only. However, there were two notable exceptions, pay issues and redundancy matters. Although even with these issues over 50 per cent of the establishments usually dealt with shop stewards, around a third also dealt with the full time official.

Comparing answers from directors at company-wide level and managers in the sampled company establishments, it appears that stewards are involved in negotiations at one or both of these levels in 98 per cent of the companies with recognised unions.

Contact between stewards and full time union officials Although the survey did not include full time union officials, informants at each of the employee representative levels were asked about the degree of contact they had maintained with these officials. Two questions were asked, one about whether the representative had been in contact with an official about a problem related to his own factory, and one about visits.

Only one in ten of the most senior representatives had not had any contact with their union official in the previous 12 months (excluding purely social meetings) compared with one in five of the other senior employee representatives.

Minority union representatives seem to have had the least support from officials with only 24 per cent having been in contact at least five times in the year compared with over 40 per cent of the most senior employee representatives (see Table 28D in Appendix D).

The other measure of support from full time officials was based on how often one of them had visited the informant, and once again the 'most senior representatives' emerge as the best supported group. Only one in ten informants at this level had not been visited in the past year and more than six in ten had had at least two visits. Table 4.9 shows that the other steward levels had enjoyed a good deal less support with about a third not receiving any visits over the previous 12 months.

Table 4.9 Number of times lay officials visited by full time paid union officials during the past year

	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	<i>143</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>70</i>
No. of visits from full time official in past 12 months:	%	%	%
None	11	32	32
One	23	24	30
2-4	36	24	28
5 or more	28	17	11
Can't recall	1	3	—
Total	100	100	100

* Table excludes those who have been union representatives for less than 12 months.

The results for companies interviewed at most senior employee representative level show that increased support from full time officials does not seem to be associated with an enhanced range of bargaining, though the figures say nothing about the relative levels of success in bargaining (see Table 29D in Appendix D). Moreover, it may be that officials concentrate on visiting the stewards in weak bargaining situations who most need their help in increasing the range of bargaining.

Joint consultation

Joint consultative machinery¹ first became common in Britain during the inter-war period as a means of encouraging discussion and co-operation over matters which were generally thought to be outside the scope of collective bargaining. Such machinery has usually involved a formally constituted committee comprising representatives of management and employees, meeting as a discussion group rather than as a negotiating body. During the second world war this approach led to the formation of Joint Production Committees, which again were not intended as negotiating bodies but rather as a forum for all sides to contribute their views on how to increase productivity for the war effort. After the war, the government sought to encourage the establishment of Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) in every company but other influences were working in a contrary direction.

The development of plant bargaining, with the growing influence of shop stewards, led to a gradual increase in the negotiated issues, and in some companies the JCCs were taken over by union representatives who gradually turned them into mainly negotiating meetings. In other companies JCCs fell into disrepute because stewards only brought issues to joint consultation when they could not obtain negotiating rights or when the matter in hand was relatively trivial. Managers sometimes found the formal consultation machinery too ponderous and inconclusive for anything but small issues. Thus, the JCCs often fell into disrepute on both sides.

Yet in spite of these problems, some companies have been able to agree a useful range of topics for discussion through joint consultation machinery and recent interest in JCCs as a medium for the extension of industrial democracy has given the whole concept a new lease of life. Some employers now see the JCC as the non bargaining body for participative discussion, for they believe worker participation to be

quite separate from negotiations². Bargaining, they argue, 'is the proper process for deciding the share of proceeds to be allocated to pay and other employment costs; participation is the means of enlisting employee co-operation in creating the proceeds to be shared'³.

So in principle (if not always in practice) joint consultation is designed to deal with issues outside the range of collective bargaining. Of course joint consultation could imply particular managers telephoning particular shop stewards to seek an off-the-cuff view on a particular problem, but this survey has concentrated only on formal established machinery for consultation on committees⁴.

Companies were asked whether they had any formally constituted joint consultative committees in the company which meet regularly to discuss matters of concern to either party. There was no insistence that this should be the sole purpose of such committees, nor that they should actually be called joint consultative committees. Committees set up to deal with health and safety following the Health and Safety at Work Act were specifically excluded, but some other special purpose committees were not omitted (including one which only dealt with pensions).

Joint consultation at company level Three quarters of the companies had JCCs somewhere in their organisation⁵ but only half had such committees at company-wide level. Among those with company-wide committees, only 54 per cent had any trades union based JCCs so formal union involvement in joint consultation machinery at that level is clearly limited (although the employee representatives would probably be union members). Moreover, two in every five of these companies still retained the traditional distinction between white and blue collar workers in their JCCs, that is, they had two separate committees.

Table 4.10 gives some indication of the range of discussion within JCCs and is based on a closed question asking if each of the listed topics were ever raised. Physical working conditions comes high on the list (91 per cent) though this may include some trivial issues of the type that gave JCCs a bad reputation. Likewise 'welfare matters', which tends to include items relating

² See Chapter 5.

³ CBI Statement reported in the Financial Times 20.2.76.

⁴ This is not to imply that informal ad hoc methods of consultation are of no value, but by their very nature they are difficult for people to describe in a uniform way which could be recorded in a survey.

⁵ This is probably an underestimate since some directors would not know about plant or department level committees in their company.

¹ For a general discussion about joint consultation see, for example, H A Clegg (1976), *The system of industrial relations in Britain*, 3rd edition, Blackwell, Oxford.

Table 4.10 Issues raised in joint consultative committees at company-wide level

Answers from a director (industrial relations/personnel director where possible)	All companies with company-wide JCCs
Base (weighted)	95
Issues raised:	%
Physical working conditions	91
Hours of work	74
Major changes in production methods	77
Safety matters	89
Capital investment	56
Redundancy	65
Disciplinary procedures	71
Welfare matters	94
Company trading position	87
Not answered	2

to staff canteens and the like¹ which can often cover very trivial issues. But the discussion of major changes in production methods (77 per cent) and capital investment (56 per cent) is a sign of some employee participation in issues normally excluded from the range of collective bargaining. (Indeed, those companies which discuss investment in their JCC were more likely to have mentioned it as an issue which was inappropriate for negotiation.) The 89 per cent mentioning safety matters is partly due to the use of existing JCCs to meet the requirement for consultation on this subject by the Health and Safety at Work Act.

An examination of the consultation issues together, to see how far particular matters are raised in common with other matters, shows a remarkable lack of associated issues. In other words, the chance that any one issue had been raised seems to be independent of the chance that any other particular issue had arisen, save only a propensity for both capital investment and production methods to have been raised in the same JCC.

The director asked about joint consultative committees within each company was also asked about the way in which the committee(s) in his company normally functioned. Interviewers showed a card listing four possible responses:

- management pass information to employees
- management receive information from employees
- management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
- management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision.

Some directors pointed out that their JCC might function in different ways to deal with different

topics, but when asked to generalise, 55 per cent said their committee was for joint discussion prior to management decision. Nineteen per cent felt that their JCC was normally used simply for exchange of information, which implies a rather limited interpretation of consultation, particularly for seven out of 19 per cent who mainly used the committee just to pass information to their employees.

In some cases, directors mentioned that their joint consultative committee comprised the same members as their negotiating committee or even that one committee exercised both roles according to the topic under discussion. Hence, some of the 22 per cent of directors, who said that both sides of the JCC discussed matters and come to joint decisions, were alluding to these multi-function committees. However, there were undoubtedly some informants who thought that their company's view of consultation did extend to some joint decision making, though the results of this question do represent only one director's perception of what was happening in each company.

Perhaps it is more interesting to see how the directors interviewed felt their joint consultative committees should function. Table 4.11 shows that more than half feel that joint consultation should involve joint discussion while retaining the management responsibility for decision making. But in comparison with their description

Table 4.11 Directors' views of what does happen and what should happen at company-wide JCCs

	All companies with company- wide JCCs
Base (weighted)	95
Directors' views of the way in which matters are dealt with in JCC:	%
Management pass information to employees	7
Management receive information from employees	12
Management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	55
Management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	22
Not answered/don't know	3
Total	100
Directors' views of the way in which the com- pany-wide JCC should function:	%
Management pass information to employees	3
Management receive information from employees	9
Management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	54
Management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	31
Not answered/don't know	3
Total	100

¹ At the pilot stage of the survey it was discovered that the term 'welfare matters' was too vague, so the example of canteen/recreational facilities was given to informants.

of current practice, almost half as many again would like to see some joint decision making within the consultative machinery.

Joint consultation at establishment level In the company establishments, informants were asked about the existence of plant based joint consultative committees, again ruling out those which only dealt with health and safety matters. The proportion of informants who thought they had such committees varied from 79 per cent at personnel manager level to 61 per cent among the selected minority union stewards. Of course personnel officers would be more likely to know just what consultative machinery existed in their establishments but they might be inclined to include marginal committees which barely measured up to any real definition of consultation. Equally, minority union stewards may have restricted their answers to JCCs covering their own reference group within their establishments. In any case all of these answers could have included JCCs which covered only a small minority of the employees, for example, a spray shop consultative committee, or JCCs which only covered a very narrow area, for example the works canteen consultative committee.

To avoid minority group JCCs, interviewers went on to ask about committees which covered all the manual and/or non manual employees in the plant. At least two in five of the informants at nearly all levels reported such establishment-wide JCCs with around half of the personnel managers giving this answer. About one in five others reported JCCs covering all manual workers. And in the vast majority of establishments (well over 90 per cent) where there were one or more joint consultative committees, one committee covered all employees or at least all manual workers (see Table 30D in Appendix D).

When those with establishment-wide JCCs were asked whether all or some of the employee representatives were chosen through the trades union or staff association, around half of the informants at each level thought that they were. But when asked whether they were members of the JCC with the widest coverage in their establishment, most of those at convenor level and more than half of the other employee representative levels claimed to be members. So by one means or another, leading trades union lay officials seem to be members of these JCCs.

Although it is sometimes suggested that JCCs in many companies have died in all but name and only meet when specific issues are raised, 80 to 90 per cent of informants at all levels reporting JCCs in this survey reported that their JCC met at regular intervals.

When asked about how the establishment-based JCCs worked, around one in five at nearly all levels saw them as opportunities for exchange of information between management and employees. At most senior employee representative and minority union representative levels the most common answer referred to joint decision making (and negotiating) but at all other levels joint discussion was the most common perception of the JCC (Table 4.12).

The same informants were asked how they thought JCCs ought to function at establishments and again the most common answer from the managerial levels was in terms of joint discussion prior to a management decision, accounting for at least half of the answers (except at personnel manager level). However, the great majority of sampled stewards (over 70 per cent) and foremen hoped to see some joint decision making (see Table 4.12).

Comparisons between company-wide and establishment-based machinery To investigate the extent to which lack of joint consultation machinery at company-wide level was 'compensated for' by JCCs at plant level, comparisons were made between these two levels in the sampled companies.

Taking first the question on the existence of JCCs, the results show that the companies with any consultative committee covering the whole company were more likely than others to have JCCs at establishment level as well. Comparing the director's answers with those of the industrial relations/personnel manager (chosen as the person most likely to know) one finds only 5 per cent of companies in which there was a company-wide JCC without none covering the establishment.

A similar comparison was made of the extent to which both manual and non-manual workers were represented on these JCCs at company-wide and plant level. But in this case the industrial relations/personnel manager answers showed the situation company-wide to be independent of the situation in the company establishments.

Comparison between the subjects discussed at JCCs at company level and plant level shows that the majority of companies with committees allowed almost every discussion topic on the questionnaire list to be discussed at one of the two levels. According to the selected industrial relations/personnel managers, only hours of work and redundancy fell appreciably short of being discussed in nearly all companies with consultation machinery. The sampled convenors also thought that capital investment and disciplinary matters fell well short of being discussed

Table 4.12 Informants' views on what does happen and what should happen at their establishment level JCCs.

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	55	70	119	86	109	100	66	50
Way in which most issues are dealt with at plant/factory level JCC:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management pass information to employees	5	11	8	10	14	13	16	16
Management receive information from employees	12	9	11	9	12	12	8	5
Management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	52	48	53	53	44	30	41	32
Management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	28	30	27	23	23	42	32	44
Not answered/don't know	2	1	0	4	7	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
What should happen at plant/factory level JCC:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management pass information to employees	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	—
Management receive information from employees	7	4	5	4	2	8	—	5
Management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	59	45	49	61	40	17	21	25
Management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	30	49	43	33	54	74	76	71
Not answered/don't know	1	—	0	0	2	—	1	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

at one JCC in every company, but otherwise confirmed the picture given by personnel managers (see Table 31D in Appendix D).

Answers on how JCCs dealt with most issues at company-wide level were compared with those given by the sampled industrial relations/personnel managers at establishment level. In both cases results show that over two thirds of the companies with consultation machinery had a JCC in which management and employees discuss a matter before management decides, at company or plant or both levels. According to the sampled directors and industrial relations/personnel managers, two in five companies with JCCs had some joint decision making in a committee at company-wide or establishment level, while among sampled convenors this proportion rose to nearly three in five (see Tables 32D/33D in Appendix D).

Consultation and bargaining Although in principle joint consultation was developed as a means of promoting dialogue on issues outside the range of bargaining, current practice does not seem to distinguish the two approaches so clearly. Negotiators sometimes try one approach when the other has already been tried and failed, or might introduce an issue into both arenas to increase the likelihood of a settlement. So for those companies with company-wide JCCs, a comparison was made between issues raised in

joint consultation and those open to negotiation. Yet the results must be interpreted cautiously since half the sample did not have JCCs at company level and may have offered consultation or some alternative approach, for example, works councils, at other levels.

Perhaps it is more interesting to know which issues were raised in the JCC but did not fall within the range of bargaining. Once again there is the possibility that issues not negotiated at company level may be bargained for at a different level, but there is no reason to suppose that this caveat applies particularly to the three predominant issues in Table 4.13 below.

In relation to 'welfare matters' it might be argued that joint consultation is often quite acceptable to both parties, and management would do their best within available resources to accommodate employee wishes. But the other two dominant issues are less likely to be explained in this way. It has already been shown that capital investment and, to a lesser extent, changes in production methods are issues over which management prefer to retain their prerogative. By conceding joint consultation on these subjects rather than collective bargaining, that prerogative is maintained.

Given that the results have shown that some JCCs go beyond the 'joint discussion prior to

Table 4.13 Issues covered in JCCs at company-wide level but not negotiated.

Answers from a responsible director (the industrial relations/personnel director where possible)	All companies with company-wide collective bargaining and company-wide JCCs	Those companies with company-wide collective bargaining and company-wide JCCs in which management and employees discuss a matter before management makes a decision
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	82	45
Issues which are raised in company-wide JCCs but not negotiated on a company-wide basis:		
Capital investment	52	60
Major changes in production methods	26	27
Physical working conditions	10	13
Hours of work	4	11
Safety matters	9	11
Disciplinary matters	5	2
Redundancy	2	2
Welfare matters	20	20

a management decision' approach which is normally associated with joint consultation, the data were recalculated to exclude all JCCs which deviated from this model. However, the exercise made no material difference to the results.

When the equivalent data for companies at plant level is examined, the same picture emerges. Both at industrial relations/personnel manager and convenor levels (the two levels most likely to know), welfare matters, capital investment and major changes in production methods are again the most common issues to be raised in JCCs but excluded from the range of bargaining, though among the sampled convenors these issues do not stand out so dramatically (Table 4.14).

Table 4.14 Issues covered in JCCs at plant level but not negotiated

	Company establishments with collective bargaining and JCCs at plant level	
	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Most senior employee rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	41	84
Issues which are raised in the plant level JCC but not negotiated at plant level:		
Capital investment	51	22
Production methods	22	14
Working conditions	10	7
Hours	2	10
Safety	10	7
Discipline	2	5
Redundancy	5	5
Welfare matters	27	15

Other forms of communication

How management learn of employee views All sampled directors were asked what was the main method by which the board learned the views of company employees, but many informants felt unable to restrict themselves to a single

method. Table 4.15 shows that, at each director level, at least half of the company boards most commonly mentioned formal meetings between management and employee representatives, including works councils and JCCs. Some directors simply referred to the shop stewards without mention of formal meetings, particularly industrial relations/personnel directors with whom one might expect more informal communications. Indeed there was a tendency for smaller firms to mention informal communications of this type more often than large companies. However, it is quite likely that some informants giving this answer had both formal and informal meetings in mind so there may be grounds for considering these two answers together. Since the two answers were coded in a mutually exclusive way, they can be added together and this shows that more than three in five company boards regarded trades union machinery as a main method of communication. And mention of unions in general was more common among larger companies.

Yet Table 4.15 also shows that boards rely heavily on indirect information through the

Table 4.15 Main methods by which the board learns the views of company employees

	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
How board learns employee views:*			
Formal meeting with employee representatives	50	55	57
Via trades union/stewards (no mention of formal meetings)	13	21	16
Via management chain/personnel department	43	40	49
Personal contact with employees	35	38	30
Other answers	5	2	4

* Some informants mentioned more than one method.

management chain. At all director levels, two in five boards mentioned such sources as the company personnel department, supervisors' reports and 'grapevine' or hearsay information. Perhaps more interesting still, 30 per cent or more of each director group said that they relied on personal contacts with employees. Such answers as 'face to face situations', 'walking round and chatting to people' and 'if anyone's got anything to say they come and say it' were coded into this group of answers. Thus, there is still a strong informal element in the boards' information sources.

In company establishments similar questions on communications were asked in the more restricted context of the 'main' method by which top managers in these establishments learn the views of their employees. Again, though not to the same extent as directors, some informants found it difficult to give just one main method.

Each of the sampled steward levels were more inclined to mention the role of stewards than were the management levels, while the latter more commonly stressed the role of the management chain or personal contacts (see Table 35D in Appendix D).

Access to management for employee representatives Where the access of employee representatives to top managers is restricted and institutionalised it will tend to restrict the flow of information between the two levels. At each of the three representative levels informants were asked whether they could contact the most senior manager of their establishment, and at least five in six of each group claimed that they could (see Table 4.16). Companies were as likely to grant access to senior management at 'other senior steward' level (mainly white collar representatives) as at 'most senior steward' level—over a third in both cases. But where formal direct access was not allowed, the sampled convenors and minority union stewards (both mainly blue collar representatives) were much more likely to have an unofficial arrangement for direct contact with senior management.

Table 4.16 Employee representative access to senior management

	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	161	108	84
Access to senior manager in the establishment:	%	%	%
No access	10	16	11
Direct access (formal)	35	36	29
Direct access (unofficial)	33	19	32
Through lower management	22	29	29
Total	100	100	100

Recent industrial relations in the sampled companies In each company a senior director was asked about the general state of industrial relations in his company. Since national industry-wide strikes are not usually related to the situation in any one company, the directors were asked: 'Apart from national strikes, how often have strikes occurred in in the past 12 months?' Informants were offered the range of answer categories shown in Table 2.7 to ensure that their responses could be added together with a common dimension.

Table 4.17 Strikes in sampled companies in past 12 months*

	All sampled companies
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	189
Strikes in company:	n
Frequently	0
Seldom	10
Once only	14
Not at all	71
Don't know/not answered	4
Total	100

* excluding national strikes

However, it seems likely that few companies would want to think or admit that they frequently suffered stoppages, and there might be a bias in favour of the 'seldom' category. Almost one in four companies had faced at least one strike in the 12 months prior to fieldwork¹, the proportion increasing with size of company so there was a substantial minority for whom industrial relations occasionally reached crisis point (though some of these strikes may have been of a very minor nature).

Interviewers went on to ask specifically about other forms of industrial pressure and some 48 per cent of companies reported one of the four forms checked in the survey. Overtime bans had affected over a third of the companies in the past year and were the most common form of industrial action. Threats of strike action had been encountered by 23 per cent of directors while 'go slow' action or 'working to rule' situations had arisen in a quarter of the companies.

Finally another form of industrial action was identified, far less defined than the categories already mentioned, which may be summed up as general awkwardness in relations with management. Again, approximately one in four companies had experienced these 'periods of non co-operation'.

At establishment level questions on the recent industrial relations history were put to the industrial relations/personnel manager or, if this were not possible, to another responsible manager.

¹ The period covered by the survey was relatively strike free compared with previous years in the recent past. On the other hand this survey excluded small companies and the service industries, which may have enhanced the proportion with strike experience.

One in five of the sampled establishments had experienced some form of strike in the past year and just over half had experienced other forms of industrial action. Twenty seven per cent had been threatened with strikes; 30 per cent had suffered overtime bans, 20 per cent go-slow action and 31 per cent had experienced periods of non co-operation.

Summary

This chapter has concentrated on the three most common media for the extension of employee participation: information disclosure, joint consultation machinery and collective bargaining. About one in eight companies had a formal policy covering which information should be made available to their employees. When asked how satisfied they were with the amount of information made available, the majority at each level were at least fairly satisfied, but at convenor level more than one in five were not at all satisfied.

According to industrial relations/personnel directors, half of the sampled companies with trades unions passed information to stewards on a confidential basis for use in negotiations. In the sampled company establishments between a quarter and one third of those at managerial levels who claimed to know reported a similar practice and half of the convenors mentioned such information.

Just over half of the sampled companies had joint consultative committees at company-wide level and two in five of those companies maintained the traditional distinction between white and blue collar workers, with two separate committees. When asked about the way in which their JCC functioned, some directors pointed out that this was often determined by the subject under discussion; but when asked to generalise most of them said their committee was for joint discussion prior to management decisions or for exchange of information.

The remainder mentioned joint decision making, though some of these were referring to multi-purpose committees. In comparison with their description of current practice, almost half as many again would like to see some joint decision making within the consultative machinery.

In the sampled establishments two in five companies had a JCC covering all employees. Only half of these committees were union based but in most establishments the convenor was a member of the JCC.

The sampled managerial levels tended to see current practice and the ideal situation in terms of joint discussion leaving decisions to management, while the sampled stewards were inclined

to see both, but particularly the ideal, as a matter of joint decision making (and collective bargaining).

Those companies with JCCs at company level were more likely than others to have JCCs in their sampled establishments as well.

To gain comparable results on the range of bargaining, companies were asked about negotiations in terms of a list of specific issues. The range of these negotiated issues at company-wide level and within the sampled establishments were broadly similar, and a comparison of whether any given topic was covered at one of the two levels showed that only capital investment was rarely covered at either level. When asked whether any issues were not negotiable, the most common answers related to capital investment and, to a lesser extent, new product planning at both company and establishment level.

Comparison of the issues open to joint consultation, but not covered by collective bargaining, show a relatively high mention of capital investment, suggesting that management may sometimes offer the limited concession of consultation when they are not willing to sacrifice their prerogative to collective bargaining. Otherwise, with the exception of pay issues, the issues covered in JCCs tend to overlap with those covered by negotiating machinery. The role of stewards in all these negotiations was clear, with 98 per cent of unionised companies negotiating at least some issues with these lay officials.

When asked how the board learned the views of company employees, more than three in five companies mentioned the trades union machinery. But the results also show considerable reliance on indirect information fed up the management chain and supervisors' reports supplemented by the 'grapevine'. In the company establishments a similar picture emerged with the sampled managers and stewards each showing a propensity to stress their own function in communications. At each of the three steward levels informants were asked whether they could contact the most senior manager in their factory, and at least five in six at each level claimed that they could. Convenors seem to have had most contact with full time paid officials of their union whilst minority union stewards had least contact and support.

Over 70 per cent of the companies had not suffered any strikes in the 12 months prior to fieldwork though almost half had faced some form of industrial action like threats to strike (mentioned by 23 per cent), overtime bans (36 per cent), go-slow action (25 per cent) or non co-operation (27 per cent).

5 Views and perceptions of industrial relations, decision making and the level of participation

This chapter reviews informant attitudes to industrial relations and goes on to report opinions on participation. Informant understanding of current decision making is covered with special reference to the role of the board.

Attitudes to industrial relations

All informants were asked to give their opinion of industrial relations in the company/establishment on a three point scale. Over half of the companies at each of the selected managerial levels felt that industrial relations were very good (see Table 38D in Appendix D). Among industrial relations/personnel directors and managing directors there was also a majority answering 'very good' though finance directors were evenly divided between 'very good' and 'fairly good'. The 'not very good' option was chosen by only a very small minority of these roles but among the employee representatives, at each level one in eight had a low opinion of industrial relations in their plant. At these shop steward levels, the majority could only say that relations were fairly good and it is tempting to ascribe such a result simply to differing perceptions likely at different levels within companies.

Concepts of industrial relations Some industrial relations specialists have suggested that most views on management/employee relations fit one of two basic models. The first one may be characterised as the consensus model which holds that although management and employees may have occasional misunderstandings it is in the best interest of both to co-operate in promoting the common good. The other view can be

referred to as the conflict model, which maintains that although there must be some co-operation, the interests of the two sides are basically different. Table 5.1 shows that although there is no black and white division between companies at the managerial levels and employee representative levels, the former are very much more likely to favour the consensus model. At managing director level more than four out of five companies saw industrial relations in consensus terms, while at the steward levels opinions were more or less equally divided between the two views. Moreover, with the exception of the sampled production managers, those who thought the conflict model appropriate were more likely to see industrial relations in the plant as only 'fairly good'. (see Table 5.2).

The meaning of worker participation

In effect the present study is centred around attitudes to worker participation but that very term is open to numerous interpretations. Clearly, it would be useful to know just what informants understood by the term (insofar as this could affect their opinions on the subject) but the pilot stage showed that a simple open question produced answers at so many different levels of abstraction that the results were uncodeable. Thus the researcher either has to give up the attempt or adopt a compromise—and in this

Table 5.1 Industrial relations ethos

	Director			Managers in establishment					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel (production) manager	Middle manager (white collar)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Management and workers' interests are:	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$	$\frac{0}{0}$
The same	86	72	80	70	64	62	61	55	51	53	44
Different	13	26	19	30	36	36	38	45	48	46	55
Don't know/not answered	1	2	1	—	—	2	1	—	1	1	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5.2(i) Opinion of industrial relations in sampled companies by informants' personal model of industrial relations

Conceptual model of industrial relations:	Managing director		Industrial relations/ personnel director		Finance director	
	Consensus	Conflict	Consensus	Conflict	Consensus	Conflict
Base (weighted)	148	22*	66	25*	85	21*
Industrial relations in company thought:						
Very good	59	51	67	48	50	30
Fairly good	38	49	32	52	45	61
Not very good	1	—	—	1	2	5
Don't know/not answered	2	—	1	—	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Percentages on this small base should be interpreted with caution.

Table 5.2(ii) Opinion of industrial relations in sampled establishments by informants' personal model of industrial relations

Conceptual model of industrial relations:	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus	Con-sensus
Base (weighted)	55	23*	58	33*	106	61	76	48*	97	80	77	73	55	47*	36*	45*
Industrial relations in establishment thought:																
Very good	62	53	56	46	47	55	57	47	46	33	47	21	36	16	28	22
Fairly good	29	41	40	52	44	37	32	42	42	49	39	60	56	59	63	60
Not very good	4	2	2	1	3	2	4	5	4	13	9	15	7	23	6	15
Don't know/not answered	4	4	2	0	6	5	7	6	8	5	6	5	2	2	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Percentages on this small base should be interpreted with caution.

project a compromise has been tried. From some of the answers obtained at the pilot stage, and with the advice of industrial relations research specialists in the Department of Employment, a list was produced to represent the range of views on worker participation in terms of the relative roles of the two groups, management and workers, in decision making. Informants were invited to choose the item on the list which best represented their view of what worker participation meant to people in general. The list did include the option 'none of these' but it is still inevitable that some informants will feel constrained to choose one of the positive options given. In this way one is effectively limiting the range of answers given and this should be borne in mind when examining the results. The list shown in Table 5.3 opposite was offered to informants printed on a card (see Appendix C for specimen). Answers A and B were meant to represent very cautious views, C was to convey the joint consultation approach, while D approximated to employees joining in the decision making process¹. Answer E was included to cover what might be seen alternatively as a situation without management or with management abdication. But within this range of

answers there is an important threshold between options A-C, which all firmly retain the management prerogative to make unilateral decisions, and option D which allows employees to join in the decision making process.

In general, informants opted for a single answer though some found that they wanted to select C and D to represent different circumstances. The question was designed to find out what informants believed to be the generally held view of participation. The question was avoided by 1 per cent who said that they could not answer for other people, but the remainder are included in the table.

At all levels the most common perception of the generally held view of worker participation was joint decision making, chosen by at least half of most groups. Joint discussion was the second most common choice, at all levels, while management decision making which just 'took account' of employee views came third. It might be argued that the last two choices can be very similar at the margin of their definition, but even when their scores are added together they still rank second compared with 'joint decision making'.

¹ Informants who wanted to refer to collective bargaining generally used answer D - joint decision making.

Table 5.3 Informant's view of what people mean by the term 'worker participation'

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
What people in general mean by 'worker participation':	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
A Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	2	0	1	5	4	2	2	6	8	9	11
B Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	14	8	8	5	7	11	7	19	16	11	14
C Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	26	32	26	17	21	27	21	26	16	26	23
D Joint decision making between management and workers	50	53	59	67	62	55	63	45	55	54	47
E Workers alone make the decisions	2	4	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	0	1
F None of these	3	1	2	4	1	1	1	1	2	—	4
Not answered/don't know	3	0	2	1	3	1	4	2	1	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

However, when company views were sought on what participation should involve, there was some movement (see Table 5.4). Among each of the director roles the modal group became joint discussion, as it did at establishment

manager and middle manager (white collar) level. The selected personnel managers were equally split, but at all other levels the majority felt that participation should involve joint decision making. Many of the selected stewards in

Table 5.4 Informant's view on what worker participation should involve

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
What 'worker participation' should mean:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
A Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	5	3	5	1	1	3	6	5	0	1	3
B Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	25	17	17	20	6	22	14	16	4	6	7
C Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	51	55	56	51	42	36	56	31	13	19	16
D Joint decision making between management and workers	13	21	19	25	50	38	23	46	77	70	71
E Workers alone make the decisions	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	0	4	5	2
F None of these	4	3	2	3	0	1	—	1	2	0	0
Not answered/don't know	1	—	1	0	—	—	—	0	0	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5.5 Informant opinion of what worker participation should involve compared with perception of the general view

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Informants' ideal form of worker participation compared with perception of general view:											
Informants' ideal is more radical	8	10	11	9	18	19	10	30	35	36	43
Informants' ideal is more traditional	44	46	56	48	28	41	51	28	9	9	9
Informants' ideal same as his perception of general view	35	38	26	39	50	37	34	40	52	52	39
Not answered/don't know	13	4	7	5	4	3	5	3	4	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

particular opted for this choice even when they thought people in general were less radically inclined. This shows up more clearly in direct comparison of informants' own views with their perceptions of what people in general thought. At the three director levels the majority of those giving the same answer to both questions mentioned joint discussion in both cases. Yet in the selected establishments the majority of those giving the same answer on both occasions agreed on joint decision making.

Within each of the managerial levels, the commonest response among those giving different answers to the two questions was that people in general viewed worker participation as joint decision making but they believed it should be based on joint discussion. However, the equivalent group among the steward levels mentioned joint discussion as the general view but joint decision making as their own ideal (see Table 39D in Appendix D). If one considers the answer categories as points on a traditional-radical views continuum, then these findings can be summarised by a comparison of whether informants' own views of the ideal situation were more traditional or more radical than their perception of how people in general think of participation¹. Table 5.5 makes this comparison, and it seems that at the sampled managerial levels companies may be more traditional in their views than they believe the general public to be, whereas at the employee representative levels they think themselves more radical.

Of course these measures are not objective statements of the true relative positions of the

¹ Of course this only relates to their attitudes to worker participation which may be no guide to how they act in relation to this subject or what they might feel about industrial relations in general.

selected informants, but they do suggest something about perceptions which may affect answers to the more specific questions on decision making.

Views of decision making at company level

In each company the sampled directors were asked about their perception of current decision making at company level. However, it was felt that a single generalised reply would not be very meaningful or realistic for informants, so each was asked to consider a list of issues to cover a range of matters commonly raised in industrial relations, with special reference to issues which might become even more important in the context of increasing participation. In fact, they were the same issues referred to in the questions on the range of bargaining, namely:

- capital investment
- major changes in production methods
- pay issues
- physical working conditions
- hours of work
- safety matters
- disciplinary procedures
- redundancy
- welfare matters

The list had been prepared after careful study of the pilot survey material and in consultation with experienced staff in the Department of Employment Research and Planning Division, yet it did present some problems.

Some informants wanted to add together issues which were raised separately, but one could reasonably take the answer relating to an aggregation as an answer applicable to its constituent parts. However, there were other informants who wished to give different answers for different aspects of the same issue. Perhaps this sometimes reflected the lack of any consistent

approach to decision making situations, where expediency was the guiding principle, while in other cases informants said that the stated issue was dealt with separately for different aspects. Interviewers would have asked such respondents to generalise, but when this did not seem feasible to informants, two or more answers in respect of the same issue had to be accepted. Such cases amounted to 6 per cent of directors interviewed and, since the ambiguity of their answers would make the overall results difficult to interpret, they were excluded from the analysis. In some cases a given issue, for example redundancy, had never arisen and directors felt unable to say how decisions would be made.

Informants were asked to give their answers in terms of the same participation scale as was used to obtain their views on worker participation, but this time the scale contained an extra answer: that the issue was not dealt with at company level.

Comparing the director groups is difficult since most of the individual differences in the figures are too small to serve as evidence of real differences, and one cannot be sure of the overall trends which do appear to arise (see Tables 5.6-5.8). Although all director groups inclined towards the first three answer categories, which represent the retention of the management prerogative approach in current decision making, finance directors seemed the most inclined to give such answers for the majority of issues, while managing directors were more inclined than others to mention joint decision making. Again, when asked how decisions should be made, the sampled finance directors seemed more inclined to opt for approaches which retain the management prerogative than their fellow directors.

Certainly these trends are anything but clear and dramatic, and it is perhaps more important to concentrate on the relative similarity of view between companies at these director levels.

Table 5.6 Perception of actual decision making and opinion on ideal decision making approach (companies at managing director level)

Companies at managing director level	Capital investment		Major changes in production methods		Pay		Physical working conditions		Hours of work		Safety matters		Disciplinary procedures		Redundancy		Welfare matters	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)*	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173	160	173
Way in which decisions are taken ideally should be taken:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	45	25	12	5	3	2	2	1	8	4	1	1	9	6	12	7	4	1
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	33	38	45	30	21	14	21	8	15	11	9	5	20	16	19	16	13	5
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	13	28	32	46	31	40	38	41	33	35	34	30	38	39	41	48	43	37
Joint decision making between management and workers	—	6	6	18	36	42	35	49	36	46	53	63	30	37	18	26	40	55
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	—	0	—	—	—	1	1
Matter not decided in company	6	2	1	—	5	1	—	—	5	2	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
None of these/ matter never arisen	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	2	2	10	3	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Some informants gave more than one answer when asked about how decisions were currently made, and these informants were excluded from the table.

Capital investment represents a traditional management prerogative and, in spite of growing union interest in the subject, four out of five companies at each of the director levels described their current practice as 'management alone decides' or 'management makes the decision, but takes account of workers' views' (see Tables 5.6-5.8). One in three industrial relations/personnel directors and finance directors were willing to consider joint discussion as the ideal situation, but practically none mentioned joint decision making.

Although it is sometimes suggested that major changes in production methods in British industry tend to be negotiated, the survey shows that over half of each director group went no further than 'management takes account of workers' views' in their description of current practice. The modal preference in the ideal situation was for joint discussion, mentioned by almost half of each director group, with less than a fifth going as far as joint decision making.

Pay rates, like capital investment, were sometimes fixed outside the company, or, for some details such as piecework rates, at plant level. But in those companies which fixed their own pay levels (albeit within the constraints of national and local levels) a more participative approach was evident in current practice. At least a third of the companies at each director level described their present situation in terms of joint discussion, and a third of the managing directors and personnel directors described it as joint decision making. The ideal situation was more often seen as joint decision making (up to 40 per cent among managing directors and personnel directors) but the change from the current approach was not as great as that for investment and production methods. The answers in respect of 'hours of work' were very similar to those given for pay, since these two issues are often dealt with together.

The other issues covered were generally dealt with within the sampled companies. The current

Table 5.7 Perception of actual decision making and opinion on ideal decision making approach (companies at finance director level)

Companies at finance director level	Capital investment		Major changes in production methods		Pay		Physical working conditions		Hours of work		Safety matters		Disciplinary procedures		Redundancy		Welfare matters	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)*	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106	101	106
Way in which decisions are taken/ideally should be taken:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	51	24	16	7	7	4	2	—	3	3	3	1	16	8	17	8	5	1
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	27	37	38	27	15	15	27	13	19	14	12	11	27	16	25	21	17	9
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	11	34	32	55	40	49	38	45	35	45	53	35	27	46	35	47	47	39
Joint decision making between management and workers	—	2	3	8	24	29	27	39	27	36	27	46	22	28	12	22	25	48
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	0	—	1	1	1
Matter not decided in company	5	1	2	—	6	1	—	—	6	—	1	1	0	—	—	—	0	—
None of these/matter never arisen	5	2	9	4	7	2	6	2	9	2	4	5	8	2	10	2	5	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Some informants gave more than one answer when asked about how decisions were currently made, and these informants were excluded from the table

Table 5.8 Perception of actual decision making and opinion on ideal decision making approach (Companies at industrial relations/personnel director level)

Companies at industrial relations personnel director level	Capital investment		Major changes in production methods		Pay		Physical working conditions		Hours of work		Safety matters		Disciplinary procedures		Redundancy		Welfare matters	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)*	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87	93
Way in which decisions are taken ideally should be taken:	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	54	26	19	5	5	3	2	—	3	3	1	—	14	5	11	6	7	2
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	30	34	43	28	17	13	25	11	19	10	12	5	22	18	18	16	11	8
Joint discussion and then management makes the decision	5	35	27	49	36	39	46	38	30	31	32	31	29	29	40	49	38	28
Joint decision making between management and workers	—	3	5	18	35	39	26	50	33	45	52	62	32	47	23	27	42	60
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2
Matter not decided in company	8	3	2	—	4	3	—	—	13	6	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—
None of these/ matter never arisen	3	0	4	—	3	2	2	1	2	4	2	0	1	0	8	1	1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Some informants gave more than one answer when asked about how decisions were currently made, and these informants were excluded from the table

situation was most often described in terms of joint decision except in the case of hours, and safety (in which current practice has been affected by recent legislation). The most common view of the 'ideal situation' was usually joint decision making, with the exception of disciplinary procedures and redundancy matters where there was a little less willingness to give up the management prerogative.

Decision making at establishment level Within company establishments the questions on decision making were restricted to decisions at establishment level. Here the differences between the sampled roles are much more pronounced, particularly those between the managerial levels and employee representative levels. But many of the differences are not large enough to constitute statistical evidence individually and the summary below is limited to overall trends which seem important. (The volume of data is

considerable and most of the relevant tables have been consigned to Appendix D, Tables 40D-48D, so as to avoid overburdening the text.)

On capital investment all levels reported that current decision making remained a management prerogative. However, in describing the ideal situation, the majority of each managerial level went no further than 'management takes account of workers' views', while among the steward levels joint discussion or joint decision making predominated.

In some of the sampled establishments decisions on pay issues, like capital investment, were reported to be taken outside the company, (up to 10 per cent according to sampled establishment managers) sometimes on an industry-wide basis and sometimes by direction from a parent company. For the rest, at all managerial levels

except that of establishment manager, the most common answer (though mentioned by less than half) for current practice was joint decision making. At the three employee representative levels over half of each group mentioned joint decisions, which for most respondents was probably equated with collective bargaining. This remained the case when respondents were asked about the ideal situation, but the change in the proportions opting for joint decision making was much greater among the employee representative levels than among the managerial ones.

A similar situation applies to hours of work and working conditions which are often discussed with pay issues.

The current situation with regard to major changes in production methods was thought to be one of management prerogative by the majority of all sampled levels, but the steward levels were more likely to describe current practice as the extreme of 'management alone decides'.

On safety matters there seemed to be more consensus between the sampled levels (most commonly on joint decision making), possibly due to the clarification of model practice by the Health and Safety at Work Act. But there was also a similar distribution of answers at each level on current decision making practice for disciplinary procedures. In both cases employee representative levels were most inclined to opt for joint decision making in the ideal situation. Welfare matters followed a similar pattern, as did redundancy issues but in the latter case many respondents were giving a hypothetical view because they had no experience of the situation.

For all issues except investment and pay it is noticeable that companies at convenor level were consistently more likely than other employee representative levels to mention joint decisions (or collective bargaining) as the current method of decision making. Once again the

differences are small in some cases and fall within the range of error which can occur on opinion surveys so they may arise by chance, but their consistency does make them interesting. The result may be due to convenors' superior knowledge of the full range of bargaining which does take place in the sampled establishments.

Views on current decision making at board level

In the company establishments informants at each level were asked about their knowledge and perception of the company board to set in context their understanding of current decision making at board level. To avoid putting informants in an awkward position the questions were only asked of those who thought they knew something of what happened at board meetings. A small number of informants at senior management level in selected establishments attended board meetings from time to time and these too were excluded from the knowledge and perception questions

A question about the effect of 'what generally happens at board meetings on what happens at this plant/factory' showed remarkable similarity between the various levels interviewed. Between 80 and 90 per cent of all groups felt that boardroom decisions and discussions did have an important effect on life in their establishments. Most of the remainder opted for 'little effect' and only a few people at any level felt that the board had no effect on what happened in their factory.

There was less uniformity between the various levels when asked about outside influences and pressures on the board (see Table 5.9). The largest group at every level felt that market forces (big customers and suppliers) had the most influence. But while the second most frequently chosen answer was the money market (bankers

Table 5.9 Informant's view of the factor with the most influence over the company board

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	60	81	151	114	133	127	74	68
Most influence on the board:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Big customers and suppliers	41	50	53	43	49	44	47	48
The managers here	20	15	13	24	10	6	7	7
Bankers and financiers	24	24	24	22	31	38	40	44
Company employees & their union(s)	2	2	4	9	5	7	7	1
All equally important/de-								
pends on issue	5	5	3	2	1	0	—	—
Other answers	2	4	2	2	4	2	1	0
Don't know/not answered	2	3	1	2	1	4	1	2

* Informants who said that they had no idea what happened in board meetings were not asked this question so they have been excluded from the table, as have those senior managers who sometimes attend board meetings.

and financiers), this response was more common at the employee representative levels, where it accounted for the majority of other answers, than at the managerial levels where the influence of managers themselves was also thought important.

The influence of company employees or their unions did not score highly at any of the sampled levels in the selected companies. A small minority refused to choose any one of the four options suggested in the question, giving all four equal weight. (Among the 'other' answers the most common one was 'the government'.)

At each level in selected establishments informants were asked about the influence of people at their level on the company board. The managerial levels were asked about the influence of managers like themselves and invited to select an option from a card:

- the board would not be influenced
- the board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of managers' views
- the board would usually do what managers wanted.

One or two managers at each level felt that the board would be influenced before making up its mind, but would not go back on a decision it had already made (see Table 5.10). However, at least three quarters of those at each of the managerial levels chose the second option. Understandably, the supervisory/foreman level were less inclined to think they could influence the board and those of establishment manager level were most inclined to think the board would do what they wanted.

A similar question was put to informants at the worker representative levels but in relation to 'union or staff association views' (see Table 5.11). As with the managers, the majority of each worker representative role thought that the board would change its mind to take account of their views. Very few expected the board

would usually do what the union or staff association wanted.

Table 5.11 Union/staff association: believed influence on board decisions

	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	127	74	68
Influence of unions on the board:	%	%	%
The board would not be influenced	25	20	31
The board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of union or staff association views	71	77	63
The board would usually do what the union or staff association wanted	3	2	5
Board would be influenced provided that they had not made a decision	3	2	5
Don't know/not answered	1	1	1

* Informants who said that they had no idea what happened in board meetings were not asked this question so they have been excluded from the table, as have those senior managers who sometimes attend board meetings.

Summary

Over half of the companies at each of the selected managerial levels felt that industrial relations were very good. The 'not very good' option was chosen by only a very small minority of these roles, but among the employee representatives, at each level one in eight had a low opinion of industrial relations in their plant. At the managerial level there was a tendency to think that the interests of management and employees were basically the same, while about half of the senior employee representatives held the view that the interests of the two sides were basically different.

Informants were invited to choose from a range of options ranging from 'management alone makes the decisions' through to 'employees decide' to indicate how they thought people in

Table 5.10 Managerial level: believed influence on board decisions

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	60	81	151	114	133
Influence of managers on the board:	%	%	%	%	%
The board would not be influenced	8	12	18	14	32
The board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of managers' views	78	79	77	76	61
The board would usually do what managers wanted	12	7	5	5	5
Board would be influenced provided that they had not made a decision	1	0	—	2	1
Don't know/not answered	1	2	—	3	1

* Informants who said that they had no idea what happened in board meetings were not asked this question so they have been excluded from the table, as have those senior managers who sometimes attend board meetings

general conceived worker participation. The most common choice was the option which involved joint decision making, while the option which involved joint discussion prior to a management decision was the second choice of all sampled levels. However, when views were sought on what informants felt worker participation should involve, the most common answer from directors was the joint discussion option. The majority of the selected stewards, on the other hand, felt that participation should involve joint decision making.

When informants were asked to describe current and ideal approaches to decision making in specific areas, four in five at each director level described current decisions on capital investment as a matter of unilateral management decision. One in three industrial relations/personnel directors and finance directors gave joint discussion as the ideal way of dealing with this subject, but practically none mentioned joint decision making. Over half of each director group went no further than the option 'management takes account of workers' views' in describing current decision making on major changes in production methods, but the ideal approach was seen as joint discussion by the majority of directors. For pay and hours of work, around a third at each director level described current practice in terms of joint discussion and a further third of the managing directors opted for joint decision making, but there was a small movement towards joint decision making when talking about how decisions should be made. For most other issues current decision making was most often described as a matter of joint discussion and the ideal decision

was usually seen in terms of joint decision making.

In the company establishments, current decision making on capital investment was described by all levels as a matter of management prerogative, but the ideal situation envisaged by stewards as a matter of joint discussion. Current practice on pay issues was described most often as joint decision making, but increasing support for that option for the ideal situation was much more likely among the sampled stewards than among their managers. When major changes in production methods were mentioned current practice was clearly based in unilateral management decisions with the sampled stewards particularly inclined to that view. But on other issues there was more consensus over current decision making, with the stewards being most inclined to opt for joint decisions in the ideal situation.

Those informants at establishment level who did not attend board meetings, but thought they knew something of what transpired, were asked about the effect of board deliberations on what happened at the establishment and 80 to 90 per cent of all groups thought there was an important effect. There was less consensus between the various levels when asked about outside influences on the board, but the most common answer was big customers and suppliers (market forces). When presented with a series of options to describe the influence of managers like themselves on the board, the most common choice was that the board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of managerial views. And when the sampled stewards were asked a similar question they thought the board would attempt to take account of union views.

6 Views on worker directors

This chapter gives the results of the opinion questions on worker directors which accounted for a substantial proportion of each interview.

General view of worker directors

Thus far the report has dealt with a range of existing methods for worker participation, but the survey also covered a method relatively new and untried in the private sector of British industry, namely worker directors. The current interest in board level participation required this subject to be explored in some depth, which precluded the equally lengthy exploration of other possibilities. Yet this limitation does raise problems of interpretation for the opinion data which follow. In effect, informants were invited to give their views on one method of extending worker participation without any implied alternative other than the *status quo*.

Other research has shown that employees are interested in increased participation but that, within their current view of the industrial and social structure in which they work, they place it low on their list of priorities, with worker directors as such even lower¹. But since the present survey mentioned no alternative means of extending worker participation, it is not possible to assess whether those in favour of worker directors would regard that approach as the best or most feasible means of extending employee influence on company decision making. Again, in the absence of anything said to the contrary, there was the implication that worker directors could co-exist with any other situation which informants might also favour.

On the other hand, people who were against worker directors were presented with no alternative but the *status quo* which will tend to be more attractive to some people. Thus there may have been a tendency for opinions to polarise.

Yet in spite of these problems it was thought useful to ask a series of questions on worker directors as a first sounding of opinion prior to the publication of the Bullock report and any discussion or action which might follow from it. Before asking informants any detailed questions it was useful to know, and of course they

were keen to say, whether or not they favoured worker directors. This in turn raised problems of definition, since many possibilities existed and there was no general agreement on an ideal model, so worker directors were defined minimally as 'representatives of employees who would sit on company boards of directors'.

The majority of companies at the director levels were against the introduction of worker directors, ranging from 58 per cent among finance directors to 68 per cent of managing directors (see Table 6.1). At managing director and industrial relations/personnel director levels, companies in favour of worker directors were inclined to have established a wider range of bargaining issues. In the sampled company establishments, at least three in five at the managerial levels were also against boardroom representation, whilst at the employee representative levels the situation was reversed with over two thirds in favour. Those of the sampled convenors who were against worker directors were more likely to be members of unions which had declared themselves against this approach at national level. Yet those at other senior representative and minority union representative levels were as likely to disagree with their own union's view (if indeed they knew it) as they were to support it (see Table 49D in Appendix D). However, those of the sampled employee representatives who held office in their union at branch level or higher were rather more likely to oppose worker director schemes (see Table 50D in Appendix D).

It might reasonably be argued that those who see little hope of reconciling the aims of management and workers (the conflict model) would be more likely to oppose the introduction of worker directors. This proved to be the case (see Table 6.1), and it will be seen from the results which follow that many of the anticipated benefits mentioned by supporters of a worker director scheme, for example, better communications, more employee involvement, were those which were consistent with the consensus model of industrial relations. Informants whose ideal view of worker participation involved joint decision

¹ 'Participation: the Shop Floor View', Harvie Ramsay, *BJIR*, Vol XIV, No. 2. ORC Survey *What about the Workers*, 1975, Dragonfly Publications.

Table 6.1 Whether in favour or against worker directors related to conception of industrial relations

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	169	89	106	75	89	167	122	177	160	107	83
Concept of industrial relations held by those in favour of worker directors:											
Consensus	25	24	35	28	21	26	24	36	36	36	35
Conflict	5	6	6	8	15	9	16	28	34	27	38
Don't know/not answered	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	4	6	4
Concept of industrial relations held by those against worker directors:											
Consensus	60	47	44	43	43	36	37	18	12	14	9
Conflict	9	21	13	21	22	28	23	17	12	17	15
Don't know/not answered	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes those who gave no opinion on worker directors

making and the abandonment of the management prerogative were also more inclined to favour worker directors (see Table 52D in Appendix D).

These findings have important repercussions on other results in this chapter, since many informants went on to give their preference for one form of worker director scheme rather than another against a background preference for *no worker director scheme at all*. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that companies which oppose worker director schemes would oppose other extensions of employee participation. So for the remainder of this chapter, where the distribution of answers differs substantially between those who did and those who did not favour worker directors, this will be mentioned in the commentary on the results.

To gain some insight into the idea of worker directors, as informants perceived it and reacted to it, they were asked what worker directors would do. In order to secure a codeable range of answers, a card was shown to informants, detailing the concepts revealed at the pilot stage, and these answers are listed in Table 6.2. (Informants were invited to choose more than one answer if they wished.)

At the sampled director levels the view that worker directors would communicate shop floor opinion to the board remained the most common, but negative views were more likely than among the roles at company establishments. Only a third of the managing directors felt that the presence of worker directors would make it difficult for the board to function effectively and

less than one in ten of each director group expected worker directors to contribute nothing (see Table 6.2).

The most popular answer in the sampled establishments, chosen by at least two in five of each role group, was that worker directors would communicate employees' views and problems to the board. The next on the list was that worker directors would actively promote and safeguard the rights of employees, but this time there was more variation between levels. Most of the managerial levels varied around a quarter giving this view, while some 44 per cent of the sampled convenors took this line. Something over a tenth of all the sampled managers saw worker directors as communicators of the board views back to the shop floor.

Looking at the more negative views in Table 6.2, only a small minority of employee representatives thought worker directors would 'contribute nothing to the board' or would 'make it difficult for the board to function effectively', while at least one in five of each managerial level opted for one of these opinions. Those informants who thought the worker directors would interfere with the effective functioning of the board were almost all against worker directors. Those in favour were more likely to stress the benefits in communications (see Table 53D in Appendix D).

Of course the contribution which worker directors could make to company boards would sometimes be affected by their numbers. Some research on early worker director schemes in

Table 6.2 Views on how worker directors would function on the board

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Views on what worker directors would do*:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communicate board views to company employees	10	9	11	12	11	11	10	14	8	19	12
Communicate employee views and problems to the board	36	34	40	40	40	44	39	52	45	43	49
Actively promote and safeguard the rights of company employees	14	24	24	24	26	21	25	17	44	29	30
Contribute nothing to the board	9	8	10	6	5	7	5	3	3	3	4
Make it difficult for the board to function effectively	32	22	18	24	21	19	27	14	4	7	5
None of these	10	8	7	4	5	4	1	3	2	6	3
Don't know/not answered	2	2	0	2	—	0	0	—	1	1	—

* Some informants gave more than one answer so the column totals will add to more than 100 per cent

Norway¹ suggests that when there are only one or two worker directors on a unitary board there is a tendency for them to become alienated from the workers they attempt to represent. However, the experience of the German private sector, where worker directors account for a much larger proportion of board members, suggests that a larger group will tend to act together and support a common 'worker director' view².

¹ F. Emery and E. Thorsrud, *Form and Content in Industrial Democracy*, Tavistock (1969).

² E. Batstone and P. O. Davies, *Industrial Democracy—European Experience: Two reports*, HMSO (1976), see p 26.

Informants at all levels were asked about the proportion of worker directors they favoured, if such a scheme were ever introduced in their own companies. Table 6.3 shows that a sizeable minority of the sampled stewards, rising to 39 per cent at the most senior employee representative level, favoured parity of representation on the board as the only way to ensure full participation. However, 90 per cent or more at the directorial and managerial levels favoured something less than half, and the first preference among sampled establishment managers and production managers was for only one worker

Table 6.3 Views on the right proportion of worker directors on the board

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Views on worker directors' proportion of board:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
More than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total board	1	1	—	1	0	—	2	1	3	4	4
or exactly $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total board	0	1	1	5	5	8	2	18	39	25	20
or less than $\frac{1}{2}$ the board	51	52	57	43	53	42	52	46	41	48	59
or should there be only 1 worker director?	43	41	36	49	40	48	41	33	16	22	17
Don't know/not answered	4	5	5	2	2	2	3	3	1	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

director. Comparison of the three director levels once again shows finance directors to be a little less negative in their views but the difference is too small to be sure of its importance.

The selection of worker directors

Definition of constituency The acceptability of worker directors as employee representatives must be to some extent conditional on who chooses them and how they are chosen. The first question which this raises is whether worker directors should be elected by those they are to represent. All informants were asked whether these representatives should be elected or chosen in some other way. Unfortunately, however, a few informants put a different construction on the question and said worker directors should be elected on the board in the same way as other directors are elected to the board. However, these have been excluded from the results and the figures still show that between 60 and 70 per cent of each directorial and managerial level felt that any worker directors should be elected (see Table 6.4). At the employee representative

levels more than three quarters of the informants supported election, rising to 85 per cent among the most senior representatives.

Those in favour of appointing worker directors, by some means other than election were a relatively small group for further analysis. When asked who should choose the worker directors, the managerial and directorial levels were most inclined to suggest a management/board choice or a joint decision by management and unions. On the other hand, the selected employee representatives were more inclined to favour a union choice, either by lay officials within the company or by full time union officers.

Although the majority preferred worker directors to be elected, between an eighth and a quarter of that majority at each of the directorial and managerial levels wanted to disenfranchise some company employees (Table 6.5). At most senior representative level this desire to exclude particular groups rose to 49 per cent of those interviewed and among the sampled representatives generally there was greater desire to restrict voting rights.

Table 6.4 Views on how worker directors should be appointed

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
How worker directors should be appointed:											
Elected	63	61	71	63	66	67	70	76	85	76	76
Appointed in other way	33	32	26	33	33	30	28	23	15	24	24
Don't know/not answered	4	6	3	4	1	3	1	2	1	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
If appointed in some other way—who should choose:											
Management/board	7	4	8	4	5	8	9	7	1	2	1
Union/staff association reps.	5	6	5	6	7	4	6	3	6	6	5
Full-time union officers	3	—	—	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	4
Joint decision, management/union	8	9	6	10	3	6	4	5	2	4	6
Chosen by employees	3	—	2	1	2	3	2	4	2	4	6
Neutral referee	0	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	—
Put up by union and approved by management	3	3	2	4	2	1	2	1	1	—	1
Management, after consultation	2	1	1	3	2	0	—	—	—	4	0
Some other way	3	9	4	3	4	6	2	—	1	2	1
Not answered/don't know	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Total	33	32	26	33	33	30	28	23	15	24	24

Table 6.5 Whether everyone employed by the company should be allowed to vote in worker director elections

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	108	57	75	49	60	114	88	135	136	82	64
Whether everyone should vote in election of worker director:											
Everyone vote	75	82	82	81	77	75	80	71	48	63	58
Some excluded	24	16	12	17	22	24	15	27	49	37	40
Not answered/don't know	1	2	6	2	1	1	5	1	2	—	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Suggested exclusions†											
Director/the board	5	5	8	4	2	3	1	9	6	2	5
Management	7	7	5	10	15	10	12	15	35	23	25
Those without qualifying period of service	3	2	0	—	2	1	1	3	—	1	—
A union	1	0	1	—	3	2	—	1	8	12	8
Other exclusions	9	5	0	4	3	11	2	6	14	6	8

* Based on all who thought worker directors should be elected

† Some informants suggested more than one exclusion so the total of exclusions will be greater than the proportion of informants suggesting those exclusions

Table 6.5 shows that the most likely group to be singled out for disenfranchisement among nearly all of the sampled roles were the managers. Employee representatives were more likely than other informants to mention the exclusion of non union employees, and the bulk of 'other answers' from these respondents were suggestions that voting should be restricted to the shop floor. The sampled production managers, too, gave quite a range of 'other answers' to this question, many of them suggesting that the shop floor employees below supervisor level should be excluded, though some saw a need to exclude supervisors.

Source of candidates There was a general agreement at all selected levels that worker directors, however selected, should come exclusively from among current company employees. Of the 5 per cent or so at each level who were willing to consider worker directors from outside, many chose the option of full time union officials but the diversity among the small group who gave other answers is too great to summarise.

The sampled directors and managers (with the exception of those at production manager level) were generally less inclined to exclude any type of employee from standing for election to the board, though well over half of the sampled convenors were ready to suggest candidate qualifications. A card was shown identifying categories of employees which might be felt to be ineligible and it can be seen from Table 6.6 that there

is a considerable degree of consistency between companies at the selected directorial and managerial levels. At the employee representative levels there was a greater willingness than at management and director levels to exclude managers and foremen/supervisors from eligibility though senior managers were ruled out by at least a fifth of nearly all sampled levels. The most common reason for wishing to exclude senior managers was their close alignment with the board which destroyed their credibility as representatives of any other viewpoint. Other managers too were commonly ruled out for this reason or for their remoteness from the shop floor.

Substantial minorities rejected the unskilled manual workers at all sampled levels, partly owing to their lack of experience and training for such a position, but most commonly because of their supposed lack of motivation or intelligence.

All informants were invited to suppose that worker directors would come from a group for which there was a union or staff association and were asked whether such directors should be chosen from among existing representatives or from alternative sources. Not surprisingly, the sampled stewards were most likely to prefer all worker directors to come from among existing union representatives, but the majority of companies at all levels thought that some or all worker directors should be chosen from existing representatives (see Table 54D in Appendix D).

Table 6.6 Whether all employees should be eligible to become worker directors, and if not which group should be excluded

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	168	91	103	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether any group felt to be ineligible:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
No, all should be eligible as worker directors	65	63	69	64	63	47	60	48	43	47	52
Yes, some groups ineligible	35	37	31	36	37	53	40	51	57	52	48
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Groups felt to be ineligible:†											
Senior managers	21	22	20	23	18	28	23	26	42	37	35
Other managers	18	14	13	15	16	18	18	17	34	26	24
Foremen/supervisors	10	9	4	12	10	11	12	7	25	7	14
Clerical staff	12	11	13	8	12	21	16	20	15	14	7
Skilled manual	6	3	8	1	5	9	9	6	1	6	4
Unskilled manual	21	18	14	15	21	31	20	29	17	23	21
Scientific and technical	7	5	3	4	3	10	8	8	6	2	4

* Table excludes those informants who did not answer the relevant questions

† Most informants who believed that some employees should be ineligible mentioned more than one group, so the total answers on ineligible groups sum to more than the proportion of informants mentioning such groups

Moreover, the majority of these informants at all levels believed that such worker directors should be allowed to keep their union position.

Around a quarter of the informants at most levels preferred to avoid union representatives (declining to one in ten at convenor level) although close to half of these dissenters were willing to allow worker directors to take up office in their unions (see Table 55D in Appendix D).

Now although the various aspects of worker director selection have been reviewed separately

in the foregoing paragraphs, any proposals for worker directors must put together a package of possibilities. If the most popular answers from each question are linked together, this package or model is that worker directors should be elected from among existing company employees, some or all of whom should be existing union representatives. Table 6.7 shows that the model was most popular with the employee representative levels in general and the convenor level in particular, but even among the managerial levels close to half of those interviewed accepted this approach.

Table 6.7 Views of informants on the selection of worker directors as a model

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
All who think that worker directors should be elected from among existing company employees, some or all of whom should be existing union representatives	37	37	45	47	45	47	48	44	71	57	65
All giving other combinations of views	63	63	55	53	55	53	52	56	29	43	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The duties of worker directors

Collective responsibility If a board is to insist on the collective responsibility of its members, it must maintain a degree of confidentiality relating to its discussions and ensure that all directors support its final decisions.

At the three director levels well over four-fifths of the companies expected worker directors to be bound by the normal rules of boardroom confidentiality. In the sampled establishments at least three quarters of each of the managerial levels believed in the same restriction; yet among the sampled steward levels less than half held this view and there was strong minority support, rising to 40 per cent of the convenors, for the idea that worker directors should be free to discuss board matters with other employees. (Table 6.8). The sampled stewards were also more inclined than directors or managers to suggest a modified confidentiality ruling which only applied to some board matters and left others free for open discussion. Those in favour of worker directors were more inclined to give a qualified answer on confidentiality than those against.

When asked whether worker directors should be bound to support board decisions, a majority of companies at all directorial and managerial levels (rising to 74 per cent at personnel director level) felt that this should indeed be the rule¹.

It is not easy to understand how this could happen, if a worker director were expected to support a decision which neither he nor his constituency could see to be in the best interests of employees and still retain his credibility as

an employee representative, yet it does demonstrate the strong belief in collective responsibility.

At the employee representative level there was a large majority advocating that worker directors should always be free to oppose any board decision, though that majority was noticeably less among the other (mainly white collar) senior representatives.

Accountability to constituency Given that the majority of companies at all levels preferred any worker directors to be elected, the latter would be accountable at the end of their terms of office when they have to stand for re-election. But should the electors be able to demand a worker director's resignation at any time if they lose confidence in him, as shareholders, at least in theory, can dismiss ordinary directors?

Close to two thirds at each of the director levels felt that worker directors should keep their positions until their term of office ended and the selected managers at establishment level agreed in similar proportions. At the employee representative levels, however, just over half were ready to demand the instant resignation of any worker director in whom employees had lost confidence.

Another aspect of accountability is the duty of the representative to report back to his constituency and to explain board decisions, so informants were asked if they thought worker directors should have this obligation. Table 6.9 shows that companies at all levels gave more support for reporting back than opposition to it, though the degree of support ranged from just over half, at managing director level, to over

¹ See Table 56D in Appendix D

Table 6.8 Whether worker directors should be free to discuss board matters with other employees

	Directors				Managers				Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should be free to discuss board matters:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bound by rules of boardroom confidentiality	90	87	86	84	74	77	80	57	35	49	36
Free to discuss with other employees	3	4	5	5	12	11	12	25	40	32	36
Bound on some matters, free to discuss others	5	8	8	10	14	12	8	18	25	19	28
Not answered/don't know	3	—	1	0	—	—	0	1	1	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6.9 Whether worker directors should report back to employees on board decisions and the reasons behind them

	Directors		Managers						Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should report and explain board decisions to employees:											
Yes	53	52	61	54	58	71	61	76	91	81	80
No	25	34	18	31	18	16	15	9	3	7	13
Only with board approval	19	13	19	12	23	12	22	15	6	11	7
Other answers	—	—	1	2	1	1	1	—	1	1	—
Not answered/don't know	3	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

90 per cent at convenor level. Those in favour of worker directors at each level were much more likely to favour a report back, though at most levels even the majority of those against worker directors opted for reporting back. Total objection to reporting back was most likely at industrial relations/personnel director or establishment manager level; and those levels which were generally less enthusiastic were more inclined to give a qualified answer such as 'provided the information is not confidential' or 'only with board approval' (see Table 6.9). These last answers raise the inherent conflict between full reporting back and the maintenance of collective responsibility of the board so, as one might expect, those in favour of binding worker directors by the normal rules of boardroom confidentiality were significantly less likely to favour the idea of worker directors reporting back to other employees.

A traditional fear for any employee representative is that he will lose touch with the workers on the shop floor. Thus, when informants were asked whether worker directors should spend all their time on this task or should also continue to do their regular job, at least three quarters of the companies at any given level felt that worker directors should not give up their normal occupation. How this would work in practice would depend on the frequency of board meetings and the volume of board papers to be studied, together with the level of duties associated with any board committees. But the extent to which a worker director could meaningfully participate in board level decision making must be conditional on the time he has available to undertake board duties. In other words, the more involved he becomes in his directorial duties the less he is able to continue, even on a part time basis, with his regular occupation.

This raises the question whether worker directors should be paid directors' fees for their services on the board. In some companies, where all the directors are full time executives, no separate fees are paid to existing board members and for such companies fees for worker directors might seem incongruous. Nevertheless, if worker directors are required to undertake board level work, it might be argued that some form of additional remuneration is required.

In fact, almost half of the companies at managing director level advocated fees or some other form of payment, compared with one in three at finance director level. In the selected company establishments, at all levels except that of minority union representative, over half of the informants favoured some form of remuneration, though the support for fees as such was lower than at director level (see Table 58D in Appendix D).

Whether worker directors were to be selected via the existing trades union machinery or not, the high proportion of unionised employees would mean that many would be union members. In a multi-union company there must be a risk that such worker directors would see a conflict between the interests of their own union members and those of the company workforce as a whole. Thus, all employee representatives were asked whether a worker director should represent his own union members or the workforce as a whole. About three quarters of the companies at each steward level thought that the worker director should represent the workforce as a whole and up to 10 per cent felt that they could not, or would not, answer the question. But this still leaves a sizeable minority who saw the first loyalty of a worker director to his own union members (see Table 57D in Appendix D).

Problems and effects of a worker director scheme

Problems for the board in coping with worker directors Worker directors may come to the board with their own perceptions of its role or an intention to change that role to their advantage, and the reaction of company management must be conditioned to some extent by the way in which they think such new directors would act in the boardroom. One of the biggest fears of some critics has been that worker directors would try to introduce bargaining into the boardroom. Only 30 per cent at each director level envisaged this innovation, rising to around 40 per cent at the managerial levels and up to 55 per cent among most senior employee representatives (see Table 59D in Appendix D). So if one assumes that current employee representatives are the best judges of how future representatives would seek to act, then the probability of this situation arising is greater than companies at director level have realised. Those employee representatives in favour of worker directors were the ones most likely to foresee collective bargaining in the boardroom, but this is surely a natural reaction from men without

board experience for whom bargaining and negotiations are the familiar medium for industrial relations.

Whether or not worker directors would in fact bring bargaining into the boardroom can only be a matter for conjecture, but such expectations are bound to colour the views of informants as to how the board would cope with employee representation. To illustrate the two extreme possibilities: existing directors could take worker directors into their confidence in all decisions made in and out of the boardroom and agree to delegate certain board powers to their new colleagues. At the other end of the spectrum, existing board members could organise company decision taking so that it largely bypasses the formal board meeting and could thus ensure that worker directors have no access to the real centres of decision making.

Informants were asked whether they thought the introduction of worker directors would affect what is discussed at board meetings. Two thirds at each director level did expect some change, with slightly higher proportions at most non board levels. Table 6.10 shows that about 6 per

Table 6.10 Views on the effect of worker directors on what is discussed at board meetings

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether presence of worker directors would affect what is discussed at board meetings:											
Yes	66	68	68	74	83	71	69	68	71	67	70
No	34	32	31	25	17	28	30	30	29	32	30
Not answered/don't know	1	—	1	—	—	1	1	1	—	1	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Expected effects:*											
Inhibit discussion/matters would be discussed elsewhere	43	45	43	45	47	36	47	42	42	44	30
Improve decision making/generally beneficial	3	5	5	15	15	11	6	16	20	17	29
Would depend on calibre of worker director	5	3	4	4	2	2	3	1	1	3	1
Problems of loyalties/allegiances	6	6	7	5	5	9	3	4	7	3	5
Would be matters worker director couldn't understand	8	3	5	6	4	5	7	2	1	1	2
There would be INITIAL cautiousness etc.	5	11	10	10	23	11	10	7	7	6	7
Other effects	5	2	5	3	5	8	6	6	2	4	2

* Some informants mentioned more than one effect, so the effects answers will add to more than the proportion of informants expecting an effect.

cent of the sampled directors feared some conflict brought about through bargaining, and between 5 and 10 per cent at most levels thought that any problems would be ironed out after an initial adjustment period. But the most common answer, given by at least two in five at nearly all the sampled directorial and managerial levels, particularly from informants who were against worker directors, was that decisions would be made and contentious issues discussed outside the boardroom in meetings which excluded employee representatives. Many companies at the three steward levels also expected this reaction to worker directors; though more than one in five of the selected most senior representatives and minority union representatives (mainly those in favour of worker directors) thought that

the innovation would help both sides to understand each other's problems and improve decision making generally.

A follow-up question on whether the presence of worker directors would change the ways in which matters are dealt with in the board meeting produced slightly smaller numbers with this view than the proportions expecting a change in the matters discussed (see Table 6.11) and once again some of the reasons for holding this opinion showed a pessimistic view of worker director schemes. In particular, those managing directors who vetted board papers were more likely than other managing directors to expect worker directors to cause changes. The most

Table 6.11 Views on the effect of worker directors on the way in which matters are dealt with in board meetings

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether presence of worker directors would change ways in which matters are dealt with in board meetings:											
Yes	55	49	46	48	64	62	62	59	61	65	59
No	42	50	51	49	35	36	37	38	39	34	41
Not answered/don't know	3	2	3	3	1	2	1	3	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Expected change:*											
Inhibit discussion/some things would be discussed elsewhere	27	25	16	21	25	15	26	11	10	11	8
More notice would be taken of employee interests etc	4	4	2	12	11	12	14	19	19	20	24
Would lead to conflict in discussions	3	4	2	1	3	2	3	3	4	2	4
Decisions would be based on wider/better information	2	1	2	8	7	12	6	14	17	16	18
Decisions would be made outside boardroom	12	6	12	8	12	13	14	4	3	3	2
Would need to explain things more fully	10	4	9	8	7	8	7	2	4	3	1
Would slow down decision making	3	2	4	3	2	4	3	1	2	2	—
Would speed up decision making etc	—	1	1	—	2	1	3	2	4	6	2
Make decisions more open and democratic	1	—	1	1	3	3	2	6	9	5	7
Make meeting more formal	6	6	8	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	—
Don't know/would depend on person etc	1	—	2	—	2	4	2	3	1	4	5
Other changes	4	4	3	1	5	5	3	7	5	7	5

* Some informants expected more than one change so the total number of changes will add to more than the proportion of informants expecting changes

common response from companies at the director levels was that discussion would become inhibited and some subjects might cease to come before the board. One in eight of the managing directors and finance directors expected that decisions would cease to be made in the boardroom and a similar proportion thought the discussion would have to take account of worker directors' lack of knowledge by explaining things more fully.

At the sampled managerial levels there was a substantial minority (up to one in seven) who thought that more notice would be taken of employee interests, and at the steward levels at least one in five, mainly those in favour of worker directors, took this view. But the sampled stewards, again mainly those in favour of worker directors, were much more likely than their managers to expect that decisions would be based on a better flow of information from the shop floor. Companies in which there was a more open approach to information (as indicated by the practice of passing information to the unions for negotiating purposes) were less likely to expect a tendency to take decisions outside the boardroom.

Problems of worker directors in coping with the board If boards would have problems in adjusting to the presence of worker directors, then there can be little doubt that worker directors would have their own problems of adjustment. Based on answers given at the pilot stage, a card

was produced to be presented to informants with the spoken preamble, 'Some people think that worker directors would always find it difficult to join in general board discussion. My card lists a number of views about this. Can you say which comes closest to your own view?'

Companies sampled at employee representative levels showed the greatest optimism with close to half expecting that training would soon give worker directors the necessary expertise, this view being much more common at every level among those in favour of the innovation. At least one in eight at every level chose the more grudging concession that, with training, worker directors might eventually cope (Table 6.12).

Around half of those at the managerial and directorial levels (the bulk of them having declared themselves against worker directors) felt that these new representatives would always find some subjects difficult, though as one director pointed out, the increasing specialisation of existing directors means that many of them find some subjects difficult.

Rights and powers of worker directors It is apparent from the results presented so far that companies at the directorial and selected managerial levels were inclined to expect worker directors to be bound by the same conventions as other directors; but should employee representatives also be given the same rights and powers? There

Table 6.12 Whether worker directors would find difficulty in joining in board discussions

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors would have difficulty joining in board discussions:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Would have no difficulty	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	4	7	8	7
With training they would soon pick up the necessary expertise	24	16	21	18	30	23	22	39	48	44	47
With training they might eventually cope	15	19	15	9	13	12	18	14	15	15	17
Would always find some subjects difficult	46	55	51	63	50	57	51	40	27	29	26
Would never understand the issues involved	4	6	4	1	3	3	3	2	1	3	—
None of these	2	3	2	4	—	1	1	—	1	1	3
Not answered/don't know	3	1	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

might be some issues in which employee representatives on the board would not have any interest, but all informants were asked whether there were any issues over which worker directors should be excluded from the discussion. Between two thirds and three quarters of companies at directorial and managerial levels were willing to see worker directors discuss any issues and the proportion rose to over four fifths at the steward levels (Table 6.13).

The restricted issues, mentioned by those not in favour of allowing worker directors to discuss everything, are shown in Table 6.13. Many of these answers did not mention specific issues but made general statements about issues which worker directors did not have the training or experience to understand, or issues which were confidential. The most common specific issue was financial and accounting matters, with capital expenditure and company takeovers generally running second.

Given the importance of board and senior management committees which has already been shown in Chapter 3, the issue arises of whether worker directors should, in principle, sit on these bodies. Around two thirds of the directors thought that they should, as did a similar proportion at most of the sampled managerial levels. Five in six companies at each of the steward levels thought that worker directors should sit on these committees. Thus the number of informants who went on to give reasons for excluding them from committees was rather small. The most common reason given for the exclusion of worker directors was their lack of the special knowledge or experience required of committee members, but the second most common reason was that they should not get involved in management decisions or undermine the managers' right to manage.

Current directors and senior managers often sit on joint employee-management bodies such as joint negotiating or consultative committees.

Table 6.13 Views on whether there are issues which worker directors should not discuss

	Directors		Managers					Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether there are any issues which worker directors should not discuss:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Should discuss any issue	76	82	79	75	77	68	66	67	82	83	88
Should be excluded from some issues	21	17	20	23	23	31	33	32	18	17	12
Not answered/don't know	3	1	1	1	—	1	1	1	—	—	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
If should be excluded from some—which issues should they not discuss:*											
Finance/accounts	4	4	4	12	4	14	10	17	6	8	4
Capital expenditure/company takeovers	2	3	4	5	3	6	7	4	2	6	1
Salaries/pensions of top management	3	4	3	5	3	4	7	1	—	1	1
Shareholdings/dividends	3	2	1	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—
Appointment/employment of senior staff	4	1	5	—	1	3	6	1	1	1	4
Redundancy/closures	2	1	—	1	1	3	—	—	1	1	—
Issues they could not understand	6	3	3	6	5	5	7	11	4	4	4
Anything which doesn't concern the workers	1	—	2	3	1	2	1	2	11	3	2
Pay/wages/staff salaries	4	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	—	—
Other issues	3	8	5	4	7	7	7	4	4	3	5
Not answered/don't know	—	—	1	0	—	0	1	0	—	—	—

* Some informants mentioned more than one issue.

But should worker directors with their curiously hybrid status have any role on these committees? Once again companies at each of the directorial and managerial levels showed a similar proportion in favour of around 70 per cent, while the steward levels, especially convenors, had well over 80 per cent who thought worker directors should have a position on these committees.

This high level of support was unexpected by the researchers and it leaves some difficulty of interpretation. Since no further questions were asked about just what role worker directors should have on employer-management committees, it remains possible that some informants envisaged their presence alongside existing employee representatives while others thought in terms of one replacing the other. To consider views on worker directors' duties as a model, Table 6.14 was produced to show those in favour of such employee representatives discussing all issues which come before the board and sitting on board and management committees and sitting on employee-management joint committees. About two in five of each managerial level were in favour of this package compared with around two thirds of the stewards sampled at each level.

Effects on employees associated with worker director schemes By making employees part of the decision making process through their representatives on the board, it might be argued that they have an obligation to accept board decisions, however unworkable such a proposition might be in practice. Although the majority of companies could see that this would not be feasible, at least two in five at each directorial level thought that employees should be bound to accept board decisions and half of the middle

managers (production) took this view. Only one in five most senior representatives foresaw such an obligation which, for them, was a strong argument against worker directors (see Table 6.0D in Appendix D).

Looking to the more positive effects on employees, informants were asked to consider whether board level representation would increase employees' sense of involvement with their company. Just over two in five managing directors and industrial relations/personnel directors thought that the existence of worker directors would increase this feeling of involvement, rising to half of the finance directors. At establishment level as many as two thirds of the sampled middle managers (production) expected greater employee sense of involvement and this rose to four in five at each of the steward levels. Those in favour of a worker director scheme were much more likely to expect an increase in feelings of involvement than those against the innovation (Table 6.15).

Among the sampled directors, finance directors were most inclined to expect an increase in union influence with just over half of them taking this view. With the exception of the middle manager (white collar) level, around half of the sampled managers expected an increase in the power of trades unions. At most senior employee representative level just over half expected worker directors to make no difference to union power, and more than three in five minority union representatives shared this view.

Those informants in favour of worker director schemes were generally more inclined to foresee no difference in union power as a result, though the sampled convenors in favour of the change

Table 6.14 Model for powers which should be granted to worker directors

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Those who think worker directors should sit as such on joint employee-management committees, should sit on board sub-committees and should be able to discuss any issues which come before the board	42	46	43	40	41	41	41	42	67	64	68
Those with other views	58	54	57	60	59	59	59	58	33	36	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

were more likely to expect an increase than those against (see Table 61D in Appendix D). At managerial and directorial levels, informants with the conflict view of industrial relations were much more likely to foresee an increase in union power with the advent of worker directors, but among the sampled stewards the overall view of industrial relations seemed to have no effect on this variable.

For existing managers perhaps the greatest threat from worker directors lies in the risk that their managerial authority may be undermined.

At establishment manager and personnel manager level one in four thought their own authority would be affected, declining to only 13 per cent at sampled foreman level. And when those informants were asked about the way in which their authority would be affected, the fear that it would be undermined accounted for most answers, particularly among those who had declared themselves against worker directors (Table 6.16).

Advantages and disadvantages of worker directors

By leaving the general questions on advantages and disadvantages of worker directors to the end of the section on this subject, informants had

been led through some of the main issues and arguments in the foregoing questions. So it is reasonable to expect that a more considered answer will have been given, though it may include some arguments which informants would not have thought of prior to the interview.

The disadvantages are shown in Table 6.17 and the distribution of the 'no disadvantages' can be seen to reflect the informants' overall view of worker directors reported at the beginning of this chapter in Table 6.1. Among companies at the three director levels the most common fear was that worker directors would inhibit discussion, leading to more decisions being made outside the boardroom. One middle manager suggested that 'the chairman would become more autonomous than before. He would take more decisions on his own'. In the selected company establishments the sampled managers' most frequently expressed fear was that worker directors would lack the necessary knowledge and experience to make good decisions in the boardroom.

Between one in six and one in seven at each directorial and managerial level expected an essential conflict in board discussions between the long term interests of the company and the short term interests of the employees, though far fewer informants at the steward levels foresaw this conflict. However, the sampled stewards

Table 6.15 Whether existence of worker directors would increase employees' feelings of involvement, related to overall view of worker directors

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	169	89	106	75	89	167	122	177	160	107	83
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Whether the existence of worker directors would increase employees' feelings of involvement with the company											
Views of those in favour of worker directors:											
Yes	20	21	29	28	26	31	30	55	66	61	71
No/make no difference	11	9	11	8	8	5	9	10	7	9	5
Don't know/not answered	—	1	1	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
Views of those against worker directors:											
Yes	22	20	24	25	28	35	30	23	18	19	13
No/make no difference	46	47	34	39	36	28	30	12	9	11	11
Don't know/not answered	2	1	1	—	1	2	—	1	1	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes informants who did not say whether or not they favoured worker directors

Table 6.16 Whether worker directors would affect managerial authority

Attitude to worker directors	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	27	48	31	58	60	107	49	73	115	62
Whether worker directors would affect the authority of managers/ supervisors:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	15	31	23	28	5	28	9	19	10	21
No	85	68	77	72	95	72	91	81	90	79
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6.17 Disadvantages of having worker directors on the board

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Disadvantages of having worker directors on the board: ^a	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
No disadvantages/ can't see any	9	6	11	6	14	22	15	42	44	34	41
Worker director would lack experience/ training/ knowledge to make good decisions	23	23	18	26	30	22	26	12	12	21	12
Worker director's presence would inhibit discussion/ decisions would be made elsewhere	26	29	36	22	23	17	25	6	6	11	10
Conflict between interests of company and employees	15	17	15	17	16	15	22	8	5	8	5
Would upset efficiency/flexibility of board	26	21	25	21	18	21	32	6	4	8	3
Worker director would have personal conflict of interests	17	23	20	23	27	16	16	11	27	21	27
Dual representation of workers/reduce power of unions	1	4	0	7	7	4	1	1	5	6	3
Would undermine line management	3	4	1	12	9	10	6	5	0	—	8
Could lead to election of militants	5	10	5	6	10	7	7	5	0	4	1
Existing directors would outvote worker director	0	3	—	6	3	1	1	2	3	3	6
Problems of ensuring fair representation	2	2	2	4	2	3	3	5	3	2	3
Would introduce trivial matters on board	3	2	2	—	3	1	2	1	—	—	1
Other disadvantages	13	13	23	15	12	12	11	15	11	8	8
Not answered/don't know	2	0	—	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

^a Since a number of informants mentioned at least two disadvantages, column totals add to more than 100%.

were more likely than most other levels to predict a personal conflict of interests for worker directors. As one convenor put it, 'If things weren't worked out right, the worker directors would get called all sorts of things. He would be accused of being a trouble maker on both sides'. Some respondents saw the conflict in terms of worker directors being associated with board decisions which may be in the interests of the company but not of its current employees. Indeed, early experience of some worker director schemes on unitary boards suggests that employees do sometimes feel their representatives have 'sold out' to the management¹. A minority union representative expressed the problem in this way: 'If you're going to be a worker director—and you're like me—you can't go in your smock like this and you need a briefcase—what changes a man? . . . it would bring about a psychological reaction from the other workers if they see me in a good suit and knowing you'd have directors' fees—but if you went in your smock you'd be at a psychological disadvantage'.

The problem of dual representation is one that the Trades Union Congress has spelt out in some detail². It is simply that if worker directors are not the same individuals who act as stewards or full time officials of the unions, then management will be faced with two separate groups both claiming to represent company employees. The sampled establishment managers and personnel managers were most likely to see this as a problem, but even among these two levels it was only mentioned by 7 per cent.

Up to a quarter of those at director level were worried that worker directors would upset the efficiency or flexibility of the board, delaying decisions while subjects were explained to worker directors or issues were deferred for representatives to seek the views of the workforce. At establishments a similar proportion of the managerial levels held this opinion which was shared by only a small minority of the sampled foremen and stewards.

Concern over the possible election of trades union militants and politically motivated men as worker directors was most commonly mentioned by industrial relations/personnel directors or the sampled personnel managers (10 per cent in each case). One middle manager explained it in terms of apathy among union members: 'Main (disadvantage) would be the type of person elected as worker director. It would be the more militant element because of the general apathy in the trade unions'.

The range of 'other answers' was considerable and included some 14 informants who gave answers which amounted to 'don't know'. Otherwise there were not enough answers on any theme to justify additional categories but some of the ideas expressed can be illustrated by quotations.

It was suggested by some that problems would only arise in the short to medium term. An establishment manager said: 'Only one (disadvantage) and that's a relatively transient one of learning to manage the company with a somewhat different directorial constitution'. One of the sampled foremen thought it might take a little longer for employees to adjust: 'At first there may be mistrust from the workers' point of view, it may take a few years for workers to get used to the idea—they don't like changes'.

Some informants were worried about worker directors misinterpreting what they heard at board meetings and, as one foreman warned: 'It would depend how they interpreted what they they were told—you don't want a scaremonger passing wild stories. They would have to relate the facts accurately'. Companies at management level sometimes showed a concern for loss of production and increased costs by worker directors leaving the shop floor on board business. A middle manager summed up the problem as: 'More expenses—more wages to pay, so you don't want too many worker directors . . . and even less with directors' fees'. Looked at from a different perspective, one establishment manager thought that directors' fees could have a corrupting influence: 'If you're going to elect a director every three or five years with directors' fees, they'd be reliant on the money. So to get the workers' vote next time, even though the decision may be the wrong one, they'll make it to keep their position intact and secure'.

Turning to the advantages which might result from having one or more worker directors on the company board, the distribution of the 'no advantage' answers again reflects the overall view which respondents held on this subject, and managing directors seemed particularly hostile with more than two in five seeing no possible advantages (see Table 6.18). The most common view, given by only a quarter of the managing directors but at least two in five at all other levels, was that representation on the board would make employees feel more involved in the company, which would lead to better understanding between management and workers (the vast majority of the informants taking this view being those who were in favour of worker directors).

At least one in six companies at each director level and one in eight at most managerial levels hoped that worker directors would give

¹ Campbell Balfour, ed. *Participation in Industry*, Croom Helm, London (1973).

² *Industrial Democracy*, TUC (1973).

employees a better understanding of the problems faced by the board and the reasons for its decisions. Among the sampled stewards this view was even more popular, accounting for almost two in five of the most senior employee representatives.

The idea that worker directors could tell the board how its decisions were affecting the men on the shop floor was most popular among the sampled foremen and convenors (mentioned by at least a third), but even among managing directors at least one in six could see this advantage. But the suggestion that worker directors would simply provide another viewpoint in board discussion was only made by 6 per cent of the managing directors. Yet this extra viewpoint concept was seen as an advantage by almost one in five companies at finance director level and one in five at convenor level.

Worker directors on supervisory boards

Although the formal two tier board structure has been well established in some other European countries for many years, the British system has always been based on the single (or unitary) board for each company. However, public

discussion about worker directors has prompted some commentators to suggest that employee representation would work best within a two tier system. EEC proposals for the eventual harmonisation of European company law (the draft Fifth Directive) have also suggested the two tier model and although these plans have had to be postponed for the foreseeable future¹ the model is still advocated by some as a solution to the worker director problem.

It is not the function of this report to give a detailed explanation of the two tier model², but to summarise, the working example most often quoted is that which exists in West Germany. In principle, the German scheme provides that the day-to-day management and control of the company is vested in a management board of top executive directors. Above this the company has a supervisory board which appoints and can dismiss members of the management board. The

¹ EEC Commission 1975 Green Paper on *Employee Participation and Company Structure* already quoted.

² For a good description of how worker directors function with the two tier system in Germany, see 'Industrial Democracy and worker representation at board level' by Eric Batstone in *Industrial Democracy—European Experience: two reports for the ID Committee HMSO*, and D. Marsden (1978) *Industrial democracy and industrial control*, Dept. of Employment, London.

Table 6.18 Advantages of worker directors

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Advantages of having worker directors on board:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
No advantages	42	29	24	27	20	21	21	10	6	8	9
Would give workers more/quicker information	8	9	9	16	14	17	16	30	39	30	33
Would give workers better understanding of problems/reasons for decisions	16	16	20	13	10	15	18	9	8	12	14
Would make workers feel more involved/better understanding of industrial relations	25	38	43	40	45	47	46	45	46	54	45
Would make it easier to get policies accepted/more co-operation	3	7	5	2	10	6	3	4	1	1	4
Would give workers' views on board	16	21	15	8	21	23	18	36	33	29	29
Beneficial to board by providing different point of view/improve board decisions	6	9	18	13	15	11	14	11	20	16	21
Other advantages	9	8	5	2	3	1	2	6	3	4	2
Not answered/don't know	2	0	1	1	0	0	—	1	—	1	—

supervisory board reviews the annual accounts and can call for progress or explanatory reports on any matter of interest. It can veto any strategy which the management proposes but it does not issue management orders. German supervisory boards usually meet once a quarter and tend to be reactive rather than innovative bodies, but those that advocate the two tier system for Britain usually envisage a less passive role, in which the supervisory board would lay down policy and strategy for the management board to put into effect.

Although this may seem quite a strange innovation for British companies, it could be argued that the two tier structure has some parallels in the system of executive boards and management committees. Half of the sampled companies had executive boards responsible to the main board and undoubtedly some of these had delegated powers from the main board which acted in a supervisory capacity.

Nevertheless, such parallels as do exist in current practice cannot be pushed too far, and in seeking opinions about worker directors on supervisory boards, interviewers had to explain the two tier system. For this purpose informants were shown a diagram illustrating the relative roles of the two tiers while interviewers read out an explanation of the two tier system. (Figure 5 below is a reduced facsimile of an A4 size diagram and the explanation is printed on the schedule shown in Appendix C.)

Up to 5 per cent at each level in the sampled companies could not or would not say whether they favoured worker directors on supervisory boards. Of the remainder, more than three in five of all directors were against worker directors on supervisory boards in their company (see Table 6.19). The majority at each of the management levels sampled in establishments were also against this proposal, and only among the sampled employee representatives was there a majority (around two thirds) in favour.


Around two in every three companies at each sampled level (except the foreman level where it was four out of five) held the same view about worker directors on supervisory boards as they did for employee representation on the more familiar unitary boards. All managerial and directorial levels showed a slightly higher proportion in favour of worker directors on supervisory boards, and against them on unitary boards, than the other way round, though the differences are too small to guarantee the statistical reliability of this result. The most senior employee representative level was also marginally more likely to support worker directors on supervisory boards, but among the sampled minority union representatives, those who held different views on the two types of board structure preferred representation on unitary boards.

It was not feasible to ask a series of detailed questions about the functioning of worker directors on supervisory boards, but the level of representation was raised in terms of its effects on industrial relations.

Table 6.19 Views of informants about worker directors on supervisory boards, related to their views about worker directors on unitary boards

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Views on worker directors on supervisory boards:											
In favour	36	32	36	40	47	38	52	52	67	64	68
Against	59	65	59	56	53	60	46	46	33	35	30
Not answered/don't know	5	3	5	4	—	2	2	2	1	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
All who held the same view about worker directors on unitary boards	69	71	63	67	66	62	69	66	82	68	66
All in favour of worker directors on unitary boards but not on supervisory boards	12	14	17	14	11	18	12	22	11	13	21
All in favour of worker directors on supervisory boards but not on unitary boards	18	15	20	21	24	21	19	11	8	18	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 5 Card shown to illustrate two tier board structure



S1082

Over 80 per cent of all director and manager levels preferred to see a supervisory board with less than half worker directors, if such a scheme were introduced. Even among the sampled employee representatives only the most senior representatives were in favour (by a bare majority) of supervisory boards containing 50 per cent worker directors, although there was greater support for equal representation among stewards as a whole.

Faced with the option of equal representation, only one in seven finance directors and even fewer of the other directors thought this would improve industrial relations. The most common

expectation of managing directors and finance directors was that parity representation would make no difference, while industrial relations/personnel directors were a little more likely to expect a worsening of industrial relations (see Table 6.20). At all of the sampled managerial levels the most common view again was that the innovation would make no difference, while the foreman and three steward levels in particular expected improved industrial relations. However, as the table shows, the response of informants to this question was very much a function of their overall view about worker directors on supervisory boards.

Table 6.20 Views on parity and minority employee representation on supervisory boards

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)*	165	91	101	76	91	167	123	174	159	106	82
Views on parity representation of those who favour worker directors on supervisory boards:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Would improve industrial relations	9	7	7	4	22	15	22	30	52	43	46
Would worsen industrial relations	11	12	10	11	9	7	8	9	6	7	5
Would make no difference	16	13	19	25	16	15	16	14	8	14	18
Don't know/not answered	1	—	3	1	—	2	—	—	1	2	—
Views on parity representation of those who do not favour worker directors on supervisory boards:											
Would improve industrial relations	4	2	8	5	8	5	6	9	12	10	6
Would worsen industrial relations	25	35	25	30	21	26	19	12	6	11	12
Would make no difference	28	26	29	22	21	28	27	24	14	14	13
Don't know/not answered	5	2	1	—	3	2	2	2	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Views on minority representation of those who favour worker directors on supervisory boards:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Would improve industrial relations	13	16	16	11	24	11	24	24	28	29	35
Would worsen industrial relations	5	4	3	5	2	4	2	5	16	11	7
Would make no difference	20	12	19	26	20	22	20	24	23	23	28
Don't know/not answered	1	—	2	1	1	3	—	1	1	3	—
Views on minority representation of those who do not favour worker directors on supervisory boards:											
Would improve industrial relations	5	3	6	9	8	8	9	10	6	6	9
Would worsen industrial relations	19	21	21	14	18	20	11	8	6	7	7
Would make no difference	32	40	35	34	26	31	32	26	20	23	15
Don't know/not answered	6	2	—	—	2	1	2	2	1	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes informants who did not answer the question on attitude to worker directors on supervisory boards

A second question, about the effects of reserving less than half of the supervisory board places for worker directors, showed a somewhat higher proportion at all levels who would expect this to make no difference to industrial relations.

Among the directors, the proportion fearing worsened industrial relations declined when con-

sidering minority rather than parity representation.

This was also true, by and large, for the sampled managerial levels. However, the proportion at these levels expecting an improvement in industrial relations went down, and the proportion expecting no difference went up, when discussing minority rather than parity representation.

Summary

There are major problems associated with asking questions about a subject outside the experience of informants¹ but it was felt worthwhile to ask some questions on the prospects for a worker director scheme. The majority of companies at the director levels were against the introduction of worker directors. In the company establishments at least three in five at the managerial levels were also against boardroom representation, while at the worker representative levels over two thirds were in favour. Those who saw the basic interests of management and workers as different were most likely to oppose the introduction of worker directors. When asked to choose from a series of options about what worker directors would do, the view that worker directors would pass shop floor opinion to the board was most common. At the worker representative levels the second most common view was that they would look after the rights of employees. The sampled directors were more likely than the employee representatives to feel that worker directors would make it difficult for the board to function.

A sizeable minority of the sampled stewards favoured parity of representation on the board as the only way to ensure full participation. Between 60 and 70 per cent of each directorial and managerial level felt that any worker directors should be elected, rising to 85 per cent of the convenors. Up to a quarter of the managers and directors and almost half the convenors wanted to exclude some company employees, most commonly management. There was general agreement at all selected levels that worker directors, however selected, should come exclusively from among company employees. At the employee representative levels there was the greatest willingness to exclude some employees from standing as worker directors, particularly senior managers. Substantial minorities at all sampled levels were ready to exclude unskilled manual workers. But the majority at all levels thought that some or all worker directors should be chosen from existing representatives.

At the three directorial levels well over four fifths of the companies expected worker directors to be bound by the normal rules of boardroom confidentiality. The majority of managers held the same view but among the worker representatives there was strong minority support for the idea that worker directors should be free to discuss board matters with other employees. A majority of companies at all the directorial and managerial levels felt that they should be bound to support board decisions.

Close to two thirds at each director level felt that worker directors should hold their position until their term of office ends but just over half of the worker representatives were ready to demand the instant resignation of any worker director who lost the employees' confidence. More than half at every level thought that these directors should report back to their constituencies to explain board decisions and most thought that they should continue with their normal occupation.

Some 30 per cent at each director level envisaged that worker directors would try to introduce bargaining into the boardroom rising to around 40 per cent at the managerial levels and up to 55 per cent among convenors. Two thirds at each director level expected that the introduction of worker directors would affect what was discussed at board meetings. The most common reason for this view was the belief that decisions would be made and contentious issues discussed outside the boardroom in meetings which excluded employee representatives.

The sampled worker representatives, particularly those in favour of the innovation, tended to think that with training worker directors would soon acquire the necessary expertise. But around half of those at the managerial and directorial levels felt that these new representatives would always find some subjects difficult. Between two thirds and three quarters of companies at directorial and managerial levels, rising to four fifths of the selected stewards, were willing to see worker directors discuss any issues.

When asked whether worker directors should sit on board and senior management committees, around two thirds of the directors and more at other levels thought that they should, and the majority also felt that they should sit on joint management-employee committees.

Although the majority of companies could see that this would not be feasible, at least two in five at each directorial level thought that employees should be bound to accept board decisions if they were represented on the board. Only one in five convenors envisaged such an obligation which, for them, was a strong argument against worker directors.

Just over two in five managing directors thought that the existence of worker directors would increase employees' feelings of involvement with the company, and up to four in five sampled stewards took this view. The directorial and managerial levels were inclined to expect the introduction of worker directors to increase trades union power, while the majority view among the sampled stewards was that union power would not be affected. A minority of the sampled

¹ See for example: Conrad Jameson (1973) *Survey research for the social services* MRS/AMSO, London.

managers in the company establishments feared that worker directors would undermine their authority.

When asked about the disadvantages of worker directors, companies at the directorial levels most commonly claimed that the innovation would lead to more decisions being made outside the boardroom. In the selected company establishments the sampled managers most frequently expressed the fear that worker directors would lack the necessary knowledge and experience to make good board decisions. Stewards were more likely than other levels to mention a personal conflict of interests for worker directors, while the directors and managers were more likely to be worried about delay in decision making. Concern over the possible election of trades union militants and politically motivated men was most commonly mentioned by personnel directors and personnel managers.

The most common view of the advantages of worker directors was that board level representation would make employees feel more involved in their company. A minority, largest among the stewards, hoped that they would give employees a better understanding of the problems faced by the board and stewards most commonly mentioned the advantage that worker directors would explain shop floor views to the board.

Around two in every three companies at each sampled level held the same view about worker directors on supervisory boards as they did for the more familiar unitary boards. Over 80 per cent of all directorial and managerial levels preferred to see a supervisory board with less than half worker directors, if such a scheme were ever introduced, and only among the sampled convenors was there a majority in favour of supervisory boards containing 50 per cent worker directors.

7 Intra-company role comparisons

This chapter attempts some intra-company analysis of the sampled roles. It begins with an explanation of the nature and problems of such analysis. Survey results are then analysed in the same order as they have been presented in the foregoing inter-company analysis. The chapter ends with an appraisal of the approach in the light of the findings which it has generated.

The survey report has concentrated thus far on comparing companies sampled at various levels to show differences and similarities between those companies. As expected, the results have shown that companies represented at one level can produce rather different answers from companies sampled at another level. But does this represent a propensity for particular levels in a firm to disagree because they perceive the same 'facts' differently, which is what one might reasonably expect, or does it simply represent a propensity for people at the levels being compared to disagree on the subject area in question, irrespective of whether or not they work in the same company? By comparing pairs of informants in the same companies this chapter will demonstrate the extent to which a given pair of sampled levels in the same companies show a greater propensity to agree or disagree than informants at those levels in different companies. In other words, the analysis is looking for an expected company effect on informant answers.

The analysis approach The comparison of responses to a particular question given by any pair of role incumbents in the same company suggests two logical possibilities: that the pair both give the same answer or different answers. When all companies are considered together there are two logical extremes—that the role incumbents 'agree'¹ on the answer to a particular question in every one of the sampled companies, or in none of those companies. Possible proportions of agreement/disagreement cover the entire range between these two extremes. But between these two extremes there also exists the logical possibility that being in the same company has no effect on the answers given by the two levels, that is, that such 'agreement' as there is could be accounted for by chance. This situation is usually described by stating that the answers from incumbents of one role are *independent* of the answers given by incumbents of another role with which they are being compared. Figure 6 shows an example of such independence as an

illustration. Suppose that the proportion of managing directors in favour of worker directors (y), in companies where the finance director is also in favour, is the same as the proportion of managing directors in favour of worker directors in companies where the finance director is against (y again) as in Figure 6. In such circumstances the answers of managing directors would be described as *independent* of the answers of finance directors. In other words, any result like that illustrated by Figure 6 may be taken as evidence that a managing director and a finance director in the same company would be no more likely to agree than a managing director and a finance director from different companies.

Figure 6 Illustration of independence in role comparisons

	Finance directors	
	against worker directors	in favour of worker directors
Managing directors:	%	%
Against worker directors	x	x
In favour of worker directors	y	y

Although the survey results may not coincide exactly with the independence model illustrated in Figure 6, small deviations from that model would not be sufficient to constitute reliable evidence of intra-company 'agreement'. So as a guide to the reliability of any apparent inclination towards intra-company consensus between specified levels, the extent of agreement which could be expected in the absence of an in-company effect has been *calculated* and compared with the extent of agreement found in the survey results¹.

Expectations and problems of intra-company role comparisons Before analysing the survey findings from these comparisons it is worth considering the nature of the results which might

¹ This 'agreement' is not a deliberate action by informants, since they were not told which answers their colleagues had given. It is merely a convenient way of stating that the two-role incumbents in a given company gave the same answer.

¹ It should perhaps be stressed at this point that the 'expected' proportion of companies in which agreement would be found in the absence of an in-company effect is not 'expected' in the sense of an anticipation or belief held before the survey results were available. Rather, it is a mathematical function of those survey results quite uninfluenced by the views of the researcher. (This analysis approach is the same as that used in the Workplace Industrial Relations surveys, quoted earlier.)

be anticipated and the associated problems of interpretation. Perhaps the most important point to bear in mind is that it is quite unrealistic to expect total agreement between a given pair of role incumbents in every sampled company, even on factual questions, and there are many reasons why this might be so.

The basis on which informants were selected at each role level has been described in Chapter 1 but it is useful to recall at this point that the selection procedure may make some role comparisons difficult to interpret. Some of the roles are not unique within the selected companies but only within the selected establishments of those companies, for example, the establishment manager role. Moreover, some roles are not even unique within the sampled establishments, for instance, the foreman role, and although in such cases the final selection was always made by random methods to ensure objectivity, a sample of one takes no account of variance. To put it another way, there is always a chance that, for example, the agreement of a sampled foreman with the most senior employee representative in a given company establishment might have been a disagreement had a different foreman been selected.

On opinion questions, one might anticipate some disagreement between different role incumbents in the same company in spite of a common working environment, and the problem will be to identify whether that difference of view between roles is sufficiently common to demonstrate a propensity for intra-company disagreement.

Other questions, such as 'do industrial relations take up most of the time, quite a lot of the time or not very much of the time at your board meeting?', relate to factual matters but require a judgement or view from informants, and may thus be treated as opinion questions.

Questions which are directly seeking factual answers, such as those about whether the company has joint consultative committees or which issues are within the range of collective bargaining, can still lead to conflicting answers from people at different levels in the same company, informants may have different (unstated) definitions of key concepts. Some informants may describe current practice in terms of the normal situation while others may be more concerned about the most recent example which may have been exceptional. So the 'factual' questions can be affected by the unstated views and ideas of informants, just as the opinion questions are in a more overt way. All this was anticipated at the survey design stage; indeed, disagreement on apparently factual questions for the above reasons is of interest in any industrial relations

research. But unfortunately 'disagreement' between different role incumbents in the same company can also occur for other reasons.

One of these other reasons is that different informants within the same company may interpret part of a question differently. For example, informants in a company where the stewards are negotiating an agreement for guaranteed overtime might say 'yes' to a question on 'hours of work'; or 'no' to that but 'yes' to a question on pay negotiations. Two informants in the same company may give different answers simply because one of them does not know that a particular practice is occurring within the company, while the other may be directly involved in it. Sometimes informants, though asked about the situation in the establishment as a whole, may have answered in terms of their own reference group.

The selection of comparisons to be made The total number of possible paired role comparisons within this survey is well over 4½ thousand and the comparisons reported in this chapter are only a selection, based on a series of hypotheses about sampled levels between which intra-company agreement or disagreement was anticipated. Thus, the findings which follow are believed to be meaningful, yet for all the reasons mentioned above, such findings must be interpreted cautiously.

The findings will be presented under broad subject headings following a similar order of topics to that found in the rest of the report.

Comparisons between directors on the functioning of the board The first question on which directors' answers could be compared was about the frequency of board meetings and here, as one might have anticipated, the general level of agreement within companies was very high.

Intra-company analysis on the extent of board involvement in policy making (board style) also shows strong evidence that sampled directors tended to give similar answers. Since the first two answer categories for this question (Q23 on directors schedule) were rather close in meaning, both implying little more than a veto role for the board, these were merged for the intra-company analysis. Likewise, the second two categories were merged for the same reason and the results in Table 7.1 below show that all the sampled director roles were inclined to agree on board style of involvement in decision making, with the highest agreement between managing directors and industrial relations/personnel directors, though even here there was disagreement in one company in five.

Table 7.1 Board style (directors intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
Directors compared:	%	%	No.
Managing director and industrial relations/ personnel director	79	59	78
Managing director and finance director	66	55	94
Finance and industrial relations/personnel director	69	54	52

A similar question on board style in relation to industrial relations matters, however, showed no evidence of a propensity among directors in the same company to give the same answer. Similarly, a question on the amount of board time given over to industrial relations matters showed no special inclination towards intra-company consensus.

Comparison between directors in the same company on the way in which decisions were arrived at (Q24 in directors schedule) showed that there was agreement in about half of the sampled companies. But this extent of agreement is no more than could be 'expected' from any group of directors, given the high proportions opting for the same answer.

The question on external influences which might affect the board (Q30a in directors schedule) revealed no special inclination for the industrial relations/personnel director to agree with either of his boardroom colleagues. But when the 'market forces' answer, which accounted for more than half of each group's responses, was compared against all other answers there appeared to be some evidence of agreement between managing directors and finance directors (see Table 63D in Appendix D).

Questions on control mechanisms on the board, of the type shown in Table 7.2 below, all gave rise to a noticeable degree of intra-company consensus.

In 79 per cent and 73 per cent of companies respectively, managing directors concurred with their industrial relations/personnel directors and finance directors on whether it was usual to give notice before raising any issue at board meetings. Likewise, on the question of whether the chairman or managing director vetted board papers there was evidence of a tendency for managing directors' answers to coincide with their finance directors (in 71 per cent of companies) and their industrial relations/personnel directors (in 72 per cent of companies). Directors agreed on whether pre-board meetings of executive directors took place in about two thirds of the sampled companies.

Comparisons in company establishments on joint consultation and collective bargaining Comparing the two sampled levels most likely to know about joint consultative machinery in their establishment, 85 per cent of the sampled industrial relations/personnel managers and convenors agreed on whether there were any JCCs in their factory.

Table 7.2 Board control mechanisms (directors' intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
Agreement on whether directors give notice of issues they will raise in the boardroom:	%	%	No.
Managing director and industrial relations/ personnel director	79	63	77
Managing director and finance director	73	61	89
Agreement on whether the managing director/chairman vets papers:	%	%	No.
Managing director and industrial relations/ personnel director	72	61	81
Managing director and finance director	71	61	95
Agreement on whether executive directors hold pre-board meeting to discuss agenda:	%	%	No.
Managing director and industrial relations/ personnel director	64	50	81
Managing director and finance director	66	51	94

Table 7.3 Existence of joint consultative committees (industrial relations personnel managers and convenors intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
Agreement on whether there were any formally constituted JCCs within the establishment	% 85	% 65	No. 79
Agreement on whether there was a JCC covering all manual and non manual employees	80	58	55

And in 80 per cent of the establishments these two levels agreed on the existence or otherwise of a JCC which covered all the manual and non manual employees of the company. In those establishments where both these sampled levels sat on the JCC covering all employees, there was agreement in most companies on the regularity of meetings, though since nearly all informants gave the same answer it was not possible to identify an in-company effect. As with the range of bargaining, many of the subjects raised in JCCs gave rise to little more 'agreement' than could be expected to occur by chance, and in any case the numbers involved are rather too small for reliable conclusions.

When asked for their perception of how joint consultative committees operate, informants in the same company at these levels showed no clear inclination to agree or disagree, though convenors were more likely to mention joint decision making than their industrial relations/personnel manager counterparts.

The high proportions of informants at all levels who reported that any given issue (from the questionnaire list) was negotiated with unions at the establishment means that even when the answers from any two levels were uninfluenced by sharing a common workplace, one would still 'expect' the same answer in a higher proportion of company establishments. Thus when the responsible manager's answers were compared with those of his most senior employee representative (convenor), whilst there was a high pro-

portion of establishments in which the same answers were given, that proportion was not very different from what would be expected in the absence of an in-company effect (see Table 7.4). The only exception appears to be on changes in production methods where there was some evidence of a tendency to agree. When the sampled employee representatives within the same company are compared a similar problem arises. In the great majority of establishments the convenor and minority union steward agreed on whether any particular issue was negotiated (over 80 per cent for most issues) but there is little evidence that this consensus is associated with working in the same plant, except possibly on conditions of work and redundancy (see Table 64D in Appendix D). Similarly, comparison between 'most senior representative' and 'other senior representative' levels showed no satisfactory evidence of a propensity for intra-company agreement except over negotiations on changes in production methods (see Table 65D in Appendix D).

Comparisons between directors and between establishment based informants on information disclosure In the vast majority of companies (over 80 per cent) directors agreed on whether the firm had a written policy on information disclosure, but given the high proportion of companies without such a policy, the extent of intra-company agreement in the results does not exceed what might be 'expected' between any pair of directors from different companies. In the company establishments, comparisons

Table 7.4 Issues negotiated in company establishments (selected manager and convenor intra-company comparisons)

Base for percentages = 140 (weighted)	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company
Negotiated issues:	%	%
Capital investment	90	86
Changes in production methods	66	54
Pay issues	90	88
Physical working conditions	79	79
Hours of work	70	70
Safety matters	73	74
Disciplinary procedures	86	86
Redundancy	81	78
Welfare matters	66	64

Table 7.5 Information disclosure to employee representatives for negotiating purposes (directors intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
Whether information for negotiation purposes:	%	%	No.
Managing director and industrial relations/ personnel director	72	50	75
Managing director and finance director	61	50	84

between the steward levels produced the same result; and even comparisons between the managing director and the establishment manager or convenor levels showed no particular propensity towards in-company agreement or disagreement.

However, the question on whether companies passed confidential information to employee representatives for use in collective bargaining did reveal some evidence of agreement between the sampled directors within companies. Table 7.5 shows considerable intra-company consensus between managing directors and their industrial relations/personnel colleagues who between them might be expected to have a greater knowledge of the subject than finance directors. But no similar inclination to give the same, or opposite, answers was found between any of the pairs compared in the establishments.

The opinion question on satisfaction with the amount of information disclosed showed no evidence of an in-company effect between any of the levels compared.

Comparisons between all levels on opinions of worker director schemes Perhaps the most basic question is whether the informants were in favour or against the introduction of worker directors onto the board of their own company. The results do show a little evidence of a propensity for managing directors to agree with their finance directors. Such agreement occurred in more than three in every five companies and most often it was a consensus against worker directors. But within company establishments there was no adequate evidence for the anticipated disagreement between managerial and steward levels.

Most of the questions in the first two thirds of the interview schedules are based on company-wide application for directors and establishment application for other informants, so that comparisons between directors and the other sampled roles have been problematic. But the questions on worker directors open up the possibility of such comparisons, though they be subject to the limitations mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Comparisons were made between the managing director and the manager of the sampled estab-

lishment and its sampled steward levels, though the anticipated agreements and disagreements were, once again, not demonstrable. Similarly, there was no evidence of an in-company effect between the personnel director and establishment or personnel manager levels, or between the finance director and middle manager (white collar) levels.

If worker directors were introduced, their numbers on the board would probably affect their power and it was anticipated that management and stewards in the same company would have very different views on the matter. The comparison of managing directors and most senior representatives (convenors) in the same company¹ did indeed reveal disagreement, but this was inevitable because almost none of the managing directors had agreed with the idea of worker directors occupying at least half of the board places, whilst over 40 per cent of the sampled convenors had opted for this choice. In other words, such disagreement could be expected between any randomly selected pairs of managing director and convenor from different companies. Similarly, the agreement found between managing directors and their sampled establishment managers or between personnel directors and factory personnel managers was statistically predictable in the absence of an intra-company effect.

A series of similar comparisons on the question of whether worker directors should be elected and whether they should come from the company work force showed no evidence of intra-company agreement. The issue of whether a worker director should be able to come from any group of employees showed some slight evidence that managing directors and both senior representative levels in the same company were inclined to agree that some employees should not be eligible for directorship (see Table 7.6). However, the differences within these role groups were as great as those between them when it came to specifying which employees should be ineligible.

¹ As indicated earlier in this chapter, in companies with more than one establishment the most senior employee representative was not a unique role and could have been a different person had a different establishment been selected. This cautionary note applies to all establishment based roles.

Table 7.6 Views on whether all company employees should be eligible for worker directorship (intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
	%	%	No.
Whether or not all employees should be eligible for a worker directorship:			
Managing director & establishment manager	57	58	61
Managing director & most senior representative	55	47	139
Managing director & other senior representative	56	47	91
Most senior & other senior representative	56	50	103
Industrial relations/personnel manager & most senior representative	52	48	79
Middle manager (production) & middle manager (white collar)	54	49	114

Table 7.7 Opinion on whether or not worker directors should be paid for their services (intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
	%	%	No.
Agreement on fees for worker directors:			
Managing director & industrial relations/personnel director	67	50	79
Managing director & finance director	59	50	86
Industrial relations/personnel & finance director	75	54	51
Industrial relations/personnel manager & most senior representative	55	53	76
Most senior & other senior representative	58	51	102
Middle manager (production) & middle manager (white collar)	56	53	113

A series of similar comparisons were made on the question of whether worker directors should be elected or appointed in some other way but none showed any special propensity for informants in the same company to agree or disagree.

There was evidence of agreement between directors on whether the new worker directors should be paid in some way for their extra responsibilities (Table 7.7). In 75 per cent of companies the industrial relations/personnel director was in agreement with his finance director and in 67 per cent he gave the same answer as his managing director. But there was not the same clear evidence of in-company agreement in the company establishments.

Questions on whether worker directors should be bound by customary rules of boardroom confidentiality and collective responsibility showed no reliable evidence of an in-company effect; nor did the issue of whether a worker director should also continue with his regular job.

A general question on whether the introduction of worker directors would lead to an increase in trades union power did show disagreement between the small number of informants at each level who expected the innovation to decrease union power. However, comparisons among the vast majority who expected either an increase or no change in union power showed no evidence of a company effect. Similarly, comparisons based on views of whether worker

directors would introduce bargaining into the boardroom, and whether their existence would increase employees' feelings of involvement with the company, showed nothing of interest.

Altogether then, it seems that the comparisons based on opinion questions about worker directors were particularly unproductive. Perhaps the detailed questions on the implementation of a worker director scheme were raising issues which most informants had never considered before. Thus, although they were asked to consider the questions in the context of their own company, the opinions expressed were mainly a reflection of their personal values because they did not have time to think out the implications for their own company¹. Certainly such intra-company effects as were demonstrated by the findings above were most often between directorial levels, whose incumbents were much more likely to have thought out the detailed implications of a worker director scheme.

If this argument holds, then one would forecast that informants' views on worker directors on supervisory boards, combining as it does two unfamiliar ideas, would show little or no indication towards intra-company agreement or disagreement between any pair of levels compared. This indeed proved to be the case.

¹ Some interviewers reported that they sensed this to be the case, but since no systematic investigation of the problem was made at the time of fieldwork, there is no reliable evidence for this hypothesis.

Table 7.8. Opinion of industrial relations in company/establishment (intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
	%	%	No.
Agreement on opinion of industrial relations in company/establishment:			
Managing director & industrial relations/personnel director	71	52	76
Managing director & finance director	60	50	88
Industrial relations/personnel & finance director	65	49	52
Industrial relations/personnel manager & most senior representative	56	48	61
Most senior representative & other senior representative	69	56	97
Most senior representative & minority union representative	63	54	60

When asked about their general opinion of how good the climate of industrial relations was within their company, informants were back on familiar ground and there is clear evidence of an inclination to give the same answer¹ between the industrial relations/personnel director and each of his fellow sampled directors in the same company (see Table 7.8). In the company establishments there was a definite indication that the two senior employee representative levels were inclined to agree, with a weaker and unreliable indication of such agreement between the most senior representative and both the minority union representative and the personnel manager.

Informants' overall view of the nature of industrial relations, in terms of the 'conflict-consensus' model mentioned earlier² shows adequate evidence of a tendency towards agreement between personnel managers and convenors in the same company establishment, which most commonly occurred when they agreed on the 'consensus' model (see Table 7.9). However, when the managing directors were compared

with each of the sampled steward levels in their companies there was little indication of any company effect whatsoever.

Summary and appraisal

In this chapter the responses from pairs of informants at different levels in the *same* companies were compared to seek reliable evidence which might suggest a greater inclination to give the same (or opposite) answers as one would expect of pairs of informants from *different* companies.

Most of the comparisons between sampled levels which showed reasonable evidence of an intra-company effect related to the more factual questions, such as:

- the frequency of board meetings
- the board style of involvement in decision making
- the application of board control mechanisms such as pre-meetings and the vetting of board papers by chairmen
- whether information is passed to unions for use in negotiations
- the existence and function of joint consultative machinery

and even when consensus was found its meaning was not always unequivocal. (It may be noticed that most of the evidence of 'agreement' is based

¹ The number of informants giving the answer 'not very good' was so small that comparisons could not be made. Thus, the comparisons mentioned in this report have merged the answers for this small sub group with those cases who thought industrial relations in the company were only 'fairly good'.

² See explanation of the conflict-consensus model in Chapter 5.

Table 7.9 Opinion on the nature of industrial relations: conflict-consensus model (intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
	%	%	No.
Agreement on nature of industrial relations (conflict-consensus model):			
Managing director & industrial relations/personnel director	70	67	80
Managing director & finance director	75	73	95
Industrial relations/personnel manager & most senior representative	65	51	74
Most senior representative & other senior representative	49	50	96
Managing director & most senior representative	48	51	132
Managing director & other senior representative	61	55	89
Managing director & minority union representative	46	43	67

on information from the directorial levels, but one should bear in mind that directors were asked far more 'factual' questions than were the other sampled levels.)

At the planning stage of the survey a number of possible situations of strong intra-company disagreement were anticipated, particularly between the steward and managerial or directorial levels. However, almost none of the comparisons undertaken produced reliable evidence of an intra-company effect in this direction.

The vast majority of comparisons on opinion questions (particularly those relating to worker directors, which was an unfamiliar subject for many informants) showed no clear evidence of an inclination towards intra-company agreement or disagreement. So it seems quite possible that informants' answers to such questions may have been influenced far more by their occupational values and status than by the company

situation in which they worked. Nor is this pattern of results unique to the present survey: the lack of a distinguishable intra-workplace effect was clear in most of the analyses undertaken in the Workplace Industrial Relations surveys¹. While it can be useful to compare the views of stewards and managers on industrial relations matters, the optimal sample design for such comparisons to be made on a representative basis is rather different from that required for the intra-company comparisons undertaken here.

Where company based information is required, given limited resources, it would seem that the researcher can gain better value by maximising the number of companies to increase statistical precision in the results than by undertaking intra-company analysis of the type described above.

¹ Dr. S. Parker: 1974 and 1975 quoted earlier.

8 Summary of survey findings and some conclusions

This chapter begins with a summary of the survey findings and ends with some tentative conclusions on the prospects for worker director schemes in the private sector of British industry.

Summary of findings

Like any summary of a large report, the findings presented below inevitably represent a limited and selective account of the survey. It is intended as a reminder of the main findings rather than an adequate presentation of all the survey results.

The survey is based on a sample of 296 manufacturing companies having a functioning board of directors. Each company is represented by its head office and (one of) its establishment(s). The sample excludes small firms, service industries and the public sector. Within the companies, interviews were made with individuals in a series of key roles at director level, management level and employee representative level.

Over 70 per cent of the sampled companies had only one establishment engaged in production; more than half employed less than 500 employees, and three quarters had less than 1000 workers. The industrial distribution of the sample shows about a third in some form of engineering but the other industrial categories are all rather small.

Some 72 per cent of these companies were subsidiaries of larger concerns. Two thirds of the sampled subsidiaries were controlled by their parent companies through directors which the latter had placed on their board. Nine tenths of the subsidiaries needed parent company approval for major board decisions.

Nine in every ten of the sampled companies had recognised trades unions or staff associations, the proportion increasing with company size; and the level of union organisation within companies was greatest among manual workers and their supervisors.

Investigation of current participative practices was concentrated on three key areas: information disclosure, joint consultation machinery and collective bargaining.

About one in eight companies had a formal policy covering which information should be

made available to their employees. According to personnel directors, half of the sampled companies with trades unions passed information to stewards on a confidential basis for use in negotiations.

Just over half of the sampled companies had joint consultative committees at company-wide level and two in five of those companies maintained the traditional distinction between white and blue collar workers, with two separate committees. When asked about the way in which their JCC functioned, most of them said their committee was for joint discussion prior to management decisions or for exchange of information.

In the sampled establishments, two in five companies had a JCC covering all employees. Only half of these committees were union based but in most establishments the convenor was a member of the JCC.

The sampled managerial levels tended to see current practice of joint consultation, and the ideal situation, in terms of joint discussion, leaving decisions to management, while the sampled stewards were inclined to see both, but particularly the ideal, as a matter of joint decision making (and collective bargaining).

To gain comparable results on the range of bargaining, companies were asked about negotiations in terms of a list of specific issues. The range of these negotiated issues at company-wide level and within the sampled establishments were broadly similar. When asked whether any issues were not negotiable, the most common answers related to capital investment and, to a lesser extent, new product planning at both company and establishment level.

Comparison of the issues open to joint consultation, but not covered by collective bargaining, show a relatively high mention of capital investments, suggesting that management may sometimes offer the limited concession of consultation when they are not willing to sacrifice their prerogative to collective bargaining. Otherwise, with the exception of pay issues, the

issues covered in JCCs tend to overlap with those covered by negotiating machinery.

When asked how the board learned the views of company employees, more than three in five companies mentioned the trades union machinery. But the results also show considerable reliance on indirect information fed up the management chain and supervisors' reports supplemented by the 'grapevine'. In the company establishments a similar picture emerged with the sampled managers and stewards each showing a propensity to stress their own function in communications.

When asked their view of industrial relations in their company, over half of those interviewed at each of the selected managerial levels felt that industrial relations were very good. The 'not very good' option was chosen by only a very small minority of these roles, but among the employee representatives at each level one in eight had a low opinion of industrial relations in their plant. At the managerial level there was a tendency to think that the interests of management and employees were basically the same, while about half of the senior employee representatives held the view that the interests of the two sides were basically different.

Informants were invited to choose from a range of options ranging from 'management alone makes the decisions' through to 'employees decide' to indicate how they thought people in general conceived worker participation. The most common choice was the option which involved joint decision making, while the option which involved joint discussion prior to a management decision was the second choice of all sampled levels. However, when views were sought on what informants felt worker participation should involve the most common answer from directors was the joint discussion option. The majority of the selected stewards, on the other hand, felt that participation should involve joint decision making.

Investigation of the boards of directors in the sampled companies showed that size tended to increase with company size, though the rate of growth declined at a size of about 1500-2000 employees. In 55 per cent of companies all executive directors specialised in particular areas of company business though this tendency was more common on larger boards. Just over a third of the sampled company boards had non executive directors, their most common *raison d'être* being their specialist knowledge and contacts.

When asked to recall the issues discussed at the last meeting, the most frequently mentioned topics were cash flow/trading position (90 per

cent), sales and marketing (66 per cent), industrial relations issues (51 per cent), production and output (49 per cent), capital expenditure (48 per cent).

Directors most commonly saw the board style of decision making as one of generating policy drawing on its own or outside expertise, but at the other end of the spectrum one in six managing directors saw the board involved in the decision making function more as a checking committee, deciding whether or not to accept the suggested policy put before them.

To facilitate corporate decision taking between full board meetings, half the sampled companies had formed more frequently meeting inner boards of the main executive directors.

More than three in five companies made use of management committees just below board level to recommend strategy to the board, but in most cases these committees contained at least one director.

Half of the sampled companies reported that their executive directors met before the formal board meetings to discuss the agenda and about seven in ten reported that it was usual for directors to give notice of any issues they wanted to raise in the main meeting. Chairmen or managing directors sometimes exercise personal control over their board meetings by insisting on the right to vet all board papers and this was reported by 24 per cent of companies at managing director level.

According to managing directors, three quarters of the company boards normally relied on the emergence of a clear consensus in board meetings and voting on decisions was reported as common in only 4 per cent of boards.

When asked to choose between a series of options describing key influences on company boards, market forces was the most common choice of directors as the greatest influence, and the money market was chosen most often as having the least influence.

Those sampled informants in the company establishments who had no direct experience of the boardroom were asked a series of questions on their perception of their company boards. They were asked which subjects were discussed at board meetings, and by and large they mentioned the same topics as directors. A question on board style of involvement in decision making showed that at least 40 per cent of informants at all levels thought that important decisions tended to be taken outside the boardroom and only ratified at the board meeting. But when asked whether they thought the board

voted to reach majority decisions, this was very much a minority view at almost every level.

There are some problems associated with asking questions about a subject outside the experience of informants, but it was felt worthwhile to ask some questions on the prospects for a worker director scheme. The majority of companies at the director levels were against the introduction of worker directors. In the company establishments at least three in five at the managerial levels were also against boardroom representation, while at the worker representative levels over two thirds were in favour. Those who saw the basic interests of management and workers as different were most likely to oppose the introduction of worker directors. When asked to choose from a series of options about what worker directors would do, the view that worker directors would pass shop floor opinion to the board was most common.

The majority of informants at all sampled levels felt that any worker director should be elected, though almost half of the convenors interviewed wanted to deny a vote to some company employees, most commonly management. There was general agreement at all selected levels that worker directors, however selected, should come exclusively from among company employees and that some or all worker directors should be chosen from existing representatives.

At the management levels it was felt that worker directors should be bound by the normal rules of boardroom confidentiality, but among the employee representatives there was strong minority support for the idea that worker directors should be free to discuss board matters with other employees.

Close to two thirds at each director level felt that worker directors should hold their position until the end of their terms of office, but just over half of the worker representatives were ready to demand the instant resignation of any worker director who lost the employees' confidence. More than half at every level thought that these directors should report back to their constituencies to explain board decisions and most thought that they should continue with their normal occupation.

Some 30 per cent at each director level envisaged that worker directors would try to introduce bargaining into the boardroom, rising to around 40 per cent at the managerial levels and up to 55 per cent among convenors. Two thirds at each director level expected the introduction of worker directors would affect what was discussed at board meetings. The most common reason for this view was the belief that decisions would be made and contentious issues discussed

outside the boardroom in meetings which exclude employee representatives.

When asked whether worker directors should sit on board and senior management committees, around two thirds of the directors and more at other levels thought that they should; and the majority also felt that they should sit on joint management-employee committees.

Just over two in five managing directors thought that the existence of worker directors would increase employees' feelings of involvement with the company, and up to four in five sampled stewards took this view. The directorial and managerial levels were inclined to expect the introduction of worker directors to increase trades union power while the majority view among the sampled stewards was that union power would not be affected. A minority of the sampled managers in the company establishments feared that worker directors would undermine their authority.

When asked about the disadvantages of worker directors, companies at the directorial levels most commonly claimed that the innovation would lead to more decisions being made outside the boardroom. In the selected company establishments the sampled managers most frequently expressed the fear that worker directors would lack the necessary knowledge and experience to make good board decisions. Stewards were more likely than other levels to mention a personal conflict of interests for worker directors, while the directors and managers were more likely to be worried about delay in decision making. Concern over the possible election of trades union militants and politically motivated men was most commonly mentioned by personnel directors and personnel managers.

The most common view of the advantages of worker directors was that board level representation would make employees feel more involved in their company. A minority, largest among the stewards, hoped that they would give employees a better understanding of the problems faced by the board, and stewards most commonly mentioned the advantage that worker directors would explain shop floor views to the board.

The prospects for worker directors in manufacturing companies in Britain

Some tentative conclusions Any survey of attitudes must be interpreted in the light of the circumstances prevailing during the fieldwork period. When people were being interviewed for this survey the Bullock Committee on Industrial Democracy was sitting, but although this had encouraged public discussion of the subject, there had been no proposals to which people

could react. Thus, reactions to the idea of employee representation at board level were conditioned by informants' preconceptions of the role of a 'worker director' in the absence of any agreed model. Since that time, the Bullock Committee has reported, the government has considered its recommendations, and a White Paper has been published. Yet in spite of these changed circumstances and the consequent limitations they place on the interpretation of the survey attitude data, the results do have some clear implications for any worker director schemes.

Commentators commonly write about representation at board level as if there were an agreed model to which all company boards adhere, but the survey shows a considerable variation between companies. So any directive which sought to introduce worker directors into the boardroom would either have to take account of the different ways in which directors act within companies or attempt to impose some uniformity.

The extent to which a board can function as a collective entity, and the degree of its collective involvement in decision making, must vary with the frequency of its meetings. Within the survey sample the reported frequency of company board meetings varied from once a week to once a year¹, the two most common answers being monthly and quarterly. Some directors felt that their board evaluated a range of proposals, or generated its own proposals, rather than simply accepting or rejecting a policy package put before it for approval, and these boards met more frequently than others in the survey. However, even among these more 'involved' boards, close to half met less than once a month². Such infrequent board meetings would surely preclude much collective policy generation unless board members met regularly outside the formal board meeting. So perhaps their answers suggest that many directors do not distinguish between the board as a formal entity acting in the board meeting and its individual members acting individually, or in small groups on behalf of the board, in between formal meetings. Equally, it may be that board members are answering in terms of an ideal model of the board function rather than what usually happens. (This is not to imply any sinister motives of concealment but only to acknowledge a common trait among human beings to 'tidy up a bit' when recalling past practice.) Thus there remains some doubt about the precise function of the board meeting in the management of companies.

Many company boards, particularly those which reported that they tend only to accept or reject

policy packages put before them, often delegated policy formulation to sub committees of the board, or even delegated the entire decision-making process to an inner 'executive' board'. So some major decisions were merely reported to the board at its next meeting or brought before the board merely for formal ratification.

These decision making structures have very important implications for any worker directors of the future. The simple appointment of employee representatives to the board and their attendance at full meetings would not automatically involve them in all or even most of the decision making activities in which directors are involved. Moreover, the subjects which came before the directors at formal board meetings would not necessarily be the ones in which worker directors had the most interest. Boards vary in the subjects which they feel they need to discuss in their meetings. Only half of the surveyed companies had discussed industrial relations matters at their last meeting and less than one in five had dealt with pay matters, while four in five had dealt with the company trading position or cash flow matters³. Worker directors would need to become involved in many of the informal management meetings of individual directors if they were to influence many of the major decisions affecting their fellow employees.

A majority of companies are in fact subsidiaries of larger industrial groups⁴ and this raises further problems of employee representation. Decisions involving more than a specified amount of company resources usually have to be referred up to the board of the parent company and not even the management directors, let alone the worker directors, are able to have much influence on some of the ultimate decisions.

None of these problems is insurmountable: companies could gradually move towards more formal and identifiable structures of decision making through channels which give employee representatives a greater degree of influence and involvement (indeed, this would be possible to some extent without any worker director scheme). But the complexity of the different subjects and contexts in which senior management decisions must be made, would render it impossible to legislate for a fixed system of participative management. At the time of the survey a number of boards were given some direction⁵ to a greater or lesser extent by pre-meetings of the senior directors, or even a careful control of board papers and agenda by the chairman,

¹ see page 45.

² see page 34.

³ see page 13.

⁴ see page 44.

⁵ see page 33.

⁶ see page 37.

and no set rules would prevent such extra-board activities if there was a will to make use of them. So unless there is a will to make the idea succeed among all parties involved, no worker director scheme will stand a chance of becoming more than a notional exercise.

Even with the will to make a worker director scheme succeed, there would still appear to be a number of inherent problems.

If, as seems to have been agreed at most sampled levels in the surveyed companies, worker directors should still retain their existing jobs, then they would probably have to function as non executive directors with specialist knowledge of 'shopfloor' matters. Many of the boards in the survey already had non executive directors¹ and saw their main function as bringing additional specialist knowledge into the boardroom, and a number of their directors saw the role of worker directors in this light². Non executive directors were not usually co-opted onto board sub committees, which were much more likely to contain managers³. So to the extent that any worker directors are treated like current non executive board members, they are likely to be less involved in decision making than their executive counterparts. Indeed, without serving full time as directors it is hard to see how worker directors could expect anything else.

At most sampled levels in the surveyed companies there was agreement that worker directors would need a period of training or learning by experience before they could make an effective contribution to board deliberations (or best represent employee views)⁴. This gives some importance to the view that worker directors should serve for a long enough period to ensure some continuity and stability of their work on the board⁵. So their term of office would have to be of reasonable length without the prospect of premature termination because they had alienated some important group within the company work force. Such a proposition does not endanger the role of the worker director as a

board member bringing specialist knowledge of shop floor views, but it does give a special meaning to the term 'representative'. How far an individual can represent the view of a work force (or part of it) whose confidence he no longer enjoys is not just a matter for debate, it is a possible source of tension in industrial relations.

The idea of a representative in the sense of one elected by a defined constituency may be important in terms of his acceptability to his fellow employees, but if the worker director is not one of the existing representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining, then the distinction between the latter and the former must be clear. Again, given a will to clarify their respective roles, there would be every prospect of success; but without a clear distinction between the two roles, the survey shows that some shop stewards would be concerned at the prospect of two different and possibly conflicting channels of employee representation⁶. In such a situation it would be unrealistic not to expect unions to encourage the work force to select existing shop stewards as their worker directors, if indeed they chose to be party to any worker director scheme. Some union officials in the survey declared themselves against any representation on boards of directors because they see the risk of being associated with management decisions which might conflict with the interests of their members⁷. The survey results show that there is still a degree of mutual distrust between management and unions in some companies⁸ which would militate against the mutual goodwill needed for a successful worker director scheme. Combined with the other problems discussed above, this situation suggests that many companies still need more experience of joint discussion over decision areas which have hitherto been regarded as management prerogatives⁹ before employee representatives can easily take a part in board decision making. Indeed, the high proportion of sampled companies which already have some form of joint consultation machinery at sub-board level, suggests that there is a will to develop industrial democracy in this direction.

¹ see page 31.

² see page 105.

³ see page 31.

⁴ see page 123.

⁵ see page 116.

⁶ see page 132.

⁷ see page 132.

⁸ see pages 82 and 132-3.

⁹ see pages 66 and 90.

Appendix A: Report on sample design and implementation

Contents

1. Survey design
2. Sampling frames
 - 2.1 Possible sampling frames of companies
 - 2.2 Possible sampling frames of establishments
 - 2.3 Sampling frame used
3. Definition of a company
4. Selection of companies
 - 4.1 Sample size
 - 4.2 The sample of areas
 - 4.3 Selection of establishments
 - 4.4 Postal stages
5. Selection of levels within companies
 - 5.1 Sampling method
 - 5.2 Levels selected at head offices
 - 5.3 Levels selected at establishments
 - 5.4 Levels selected at head offices and establishments combined
 - 5.5 Employee representatives
6. Response rates
 - 6.1 Overall response of companies
 - 6.2 Response of levels within companies
7. Reweighting

1. Requirements of survey design

The survey design was based on the requirement for interviews to be made with individuals at various levels within companies, including directors, members of lower levels of management and employee representatives (see 5). This involves, as a rule, interviewing at both head offices and working establishments of the companies. Since data collected from the various levels within companies would be related, it was not acceptable to draw independent samples of head offices and of establishments.

Two alternative methods of sampling were admissible:

(a) to select a sample of companies, obtain information about the number of establishments comprising these companies and take a random sample of one establishment per company.

(b) to select a sample of establishments and also include the head offices of the companies to which the sampled establishments belong.

As the unit of analysis is a company (see 9.1) sampling method (b) involves reweighting the results to adjust for the differing probabilities of selection. The two methods were assessed by considering sampling frames of companies and also of establishments.

2. Sampling frames

2.1 Possible sampling frames of companies

(i) **Companies Register** This is an alphabetical list of 500,000 public and private limited companies in England and Wales (a separate list is held for Scotland). The two major drawbacks in its use are that the only address held for each company is the registered office (which may not be the head office or even an establishment) and that no information is kept on the size of the company.

We felt that, before using the Companies Register as a sampling frame, we would need to conduct an extensive study to estimate its accuracy, together with such factors as the proportions of companies which had never traded, ceased trading, or were otherwise ineligible for inclusion in the survey. We would have been able to cluster a sample on only the broadest terms (that is, by oversampling companies, conducting a postal enquiry and re-selecting on an area basis).

(ii) **Register of Business Names** This is a list of unlimited companies which could be used to supplement a sample from the Companies Register and which suffers from similar disadvantages.

(iii) **Employers' associations** There are approximately 75 national federations, 1500 employers' organisations and 1300 manufacturers' associations. Membership of all these bodies is voluntary and no single one has an adequate coverage to be used as a frame. Combining several of these lists would be difficult as companies may join several associations and this could present problems in determining probabilities of selection.

(iv) **Trade directories** There is a wide range of trade directories, but none is suitable for use as a sampling frame because of the incomplete coverage of companies and the lack of clustering. From small tests conducted we suspect that the coverage is biased in respect of industry and size of company. Very few directories give any indication of the size of the company and, in those which do, these data are incomplete.

2.2 Possible sampling frames of establishments

(i) **Employers register** These are (locally held) lists of establishments by employment exchange area. There is no statutory obligation to update these registers, and experience has shown that they are now frequently out of date. They are biased in favour of large establishments and those using the employment exchanges, and establishments can sometimes appear on more than one register.

(ii) **Census of Employment** This is an annual census of companies having three or more employees. It is updated by comparison with PAYE information and only excludes agriculture, private domestic service and share fishermen. Census units are groups of employees paid from a common pay point. Thus, an establishment can consist of one census unit or several and, although the Department of Employment hope to be able to link census units comprising an establishment, they were unable to conduct this in time for this survey.

If we used the Census of Employment as a sampling frame, then each company would have a probability of selection proportional to the number of census units it contains, which in turn means that data relating to each company would have to be individually reweighted. However, the ability to apply the correct reweighting factors depends upon the unlikely possibility of each company knowing the number of census units it contains.

(iii) **Census of Production** This is an annual census covering mining, quarrying, manufacturing, gas, electricity and water. The census unit, identified on the computer file, is usually the establishment (as defined in paragraphs 6 to 8

of the Standard Industrial Classification), and establishments comprising an enterprise are linked to the parent company by a code.

2.3 Sampling frame used

Thus, having investigated possible sampling frames, we decided we should either:

- (a) draw a sample of pay points from the Census of Employment and estimate the probability of selection of a company or
- (b) draw a sample of establishments from the Census of Production, thereby restricting the coverage of industry types.

It was decided to exclude companies containing fewer than 200 employees. It was also proposed to exclude small establishments, since the survey did not seem very meaningful for people working in them. The size of the establishment can be obtained from the Census of Production but not from the Census of Employment (which gives the size of 'pay points' only, and, obviously, the size of company is not available from either list. Drawing a sample from the Census of Employment would have entailed oversampling pay points and then conducting a postal sift to eliminate those relating to small companies and small establishments. No data were available to enable us to calculate the extent of oversampling required. The Department of Employment wished to minimise the number of firms which were contacted but subsequently found to be ineligible, and so we decided to restrict the survey to establishments with over 200 employees and draw the sample from the 1975 Census of Production. This had the advantage that establishments with over 200 employees could be identified on the frame *and*, obviously, all would relate to companies with over 200 employees.

The main disadvantage is that the results of the survey cannot be generalised to all industry types. On the other hand, comparisons between companies will be more valid because the companies are homogeneous with respect to industry type.

3. Definition of a company

As explained in the first paragraph, the unit of analysis is the company, and so it was necessary to link the establishments to the head office of the company which controls them. This was not as simple as it sounds, since some companies have an hierarchical structure of ownership, and so it was essential to define the level of company in which we were interested. It was decided that we should interview at the *first level of functioning board*. This information is not available centrally and so we had to contact the selected

establishments in order to identify this first level. Originally we had hoped that the Business Statistics Office could provide the relevant information, but they link establishments under common ownership to the highest level of company. Thus an enterprise, as they identify it, can consist of several companies according to our definition.

In order to make the optimum use of our resources we included only one establishment per company. Thus, when more than one establishment 'led' to the same board we selected one establishment at random. This rejection of 'duplicates' took place at all stages at the sampling procedure, that is, as soon as the relevant information became available. It is important to note that because we have rejected 'duplicates' we do not have a self-weighting sample of establishments.

Company law requires that every company must have at least one director (two directors in all public companies) but it does not require that any company should have a board of directors. Although a number of subsidiary companies do not have boards of directors, it is usually possible to trace a functioning board at parent company level. However, it is possible to find some companies whose first level of functioning board is situated abroad and other companies which have no functioning board of directors (all decisions being made at other levels with the director(s) simply fulfilling the minimum legal requirements). Since the number of these companies selected on our survey would be too small for separate analysis we decided to exclude them.

4. Selection of companies

4.1 Sample size

The survey covered a very heterogeneous population, the organisational structure of companies being very varied. We envisaged carrying out fairly detailed analyses on the results and we knew that the necessity to reweight the data would result in a reduced effective sample size. We decided, therefore, to aim to achieve 2500 interviews, the maximum that our resources would allow within the time constraints.

Although interviews were conducted at 11 different levels within companies, not all levels existed in every company. On the pilot study we achieved an average of 7-8 interviews in those companies which participated. For the main survey we therefore aimed to achieve co-operation with approximately 330 companies. We had little data on the number of companies, or establishments, which would prove to be ineligible

or refuse to co-operate, and we decided to select a large sample of establishments initially and then randomly reject some later if necessary.

4.2 The sample of areas

The Business Statistics Office provided a list giving the number of establishments with 200 or more employees in each employment exchange area in Great Britain. In order to reduce the variation in the number of establishments selected per area we assigned the areas to 3 strata, according to size, and selected a different proportion of areas in each stratum. Thus 122 areas were selected (see Table 1A below).

4.3 Selection of establishments

Under a ministerial authority required by the Statistics of Trade Act 1947 the Business Statistics Office sent a computer print-out of all the establishments having 200 or more employees in the selected areas. This list was ordered by enterprise and excluded the public sector. A different proportion of establishments was randomly sampled from the areas in each size stratum to adjust for the differing probabilities of selection at the first stage. The resultant sample comprised 900 establishments.

Table 1A Selection of areas and establishments within

Size stratum	Sampling fraction of areas	Number of areas selected	Sampling fraction of estabs. selected	Number of estabs. selected
0-19 estabs.	1/8	89	1/1	554
20-35 estabs.	1/4	20	1/2	249
40 or more	1/1	13	1/8	97
Total	-	122	-	900

Having decided to include only one establishment per company we were immediately able to reject some 'duplicate' establishments. (Whenever more than one establishment had an identical company name we selected one establishment at random.) We also rejected a few establishments relating to companies which had been approached on previous stages of the survey and which it would be undiplomatic to contact again, and a few companies which already had worker directors.

Table 2A Selection of establishments prior to first postal stage

	Number of establishments	% of establishments
Original sample size	900	100
Duplicates rejects	110	12
Exclusions (see above)	20	2
Remaining sample size	770	86

4.4 Postal stages

We contacted the personnel managers of the remaining 770 establishments in order to check the information provided by the Business Statistics Office and also to ask for the address of their head office. A copy of this form is given at Appendix B. 585 usable replies were received: of these, 37 were rejected because they related to duplicate establishments and 35 (6 per cent) were randomly excluded in order to reduce the sample size.

Table 3A Response to first postal stage

	Number of establishments	% of establishments
Letters sent	770	100
Establishment too small/company or establishment closed	88	11
Functioning board located abroad	8	1
Company nationalised	2	-
Total ineligible	98	12
Postal form returned by Post Office	9	1
No reply received	45	6
Reply received too late	28	4
Refusals	5	1
Eligible replies	585	76

For each of the remaining establishments we wrote to the head office given at Q4 on the form if they said they had a board of directors. Otherwise, we wrote to the head office given at Q5. In this letter we sought permission to conduct interviews at the head office and selected establishments and asked for a contact at the latter. We received replies, either by phone or letter, from 89 per cent of them. Refusals were received on behalf of 141 companies and these were excluded, as were three duplicate establishments.

Table 4A Response to second postal stage

	Number of companies	% of companies
Letters sent	513	100
Refusals	141	27
Rejected duplicates	3	1
Eligible acceptances	313	61
Total replies received	457	89
No reply received	56	11
Contacted by interviewers	369 (ie 313 + 56)	72

Interviewers contacted 369 companies and obtained at least one interview in 296 of them. Table 5A gives a breakdown of the response at this stage of the survey.

Table 5A Response at field stage

	Number of companies	% of companies
Contacted by interviewers	369	100
Fewer than 200 employees	2	1
Duplicate establishment	4	1
Functioning board located abroad	4	1
Company closed/receiver in	5	1
Total ineligible	15	4
Refusals and non-contracts	58	16
Companies in which one or more interviews were conducted	296	80

5. Selection of levels within companies

5.1 Sampling method

Interviewers conducted the sampling procedure within selected establishments and head offices using structured sampling questionnaires (see Appendix B). The sampling method consisted of identifying up to a maximum of 11 roles per company. We aimed to select roles which were as homogeneous as possible over the different types and sizes of companies and so we defined roles in terms of type and level of responsibility, that is, by using a crude 'job description' rather than relying upon a job title. This places some limitations upon the results; for example, we do not have a representative sample of middle managers since we deliberately biased the sample towards middle managers with responsibility for a large number of production staff. However, any inter-company analysis is more meaningful.

It was essential to maintain objectivity in our sample selection and so whenever two or more people satisfied the criteria for a role the interviewer selected one of them at random.

A separate sampling questionnaire was designed for the situation where the head office and establishments were at the same location, in order to deal with the overlap of selected roles.

5.2 Levels selected at head offices

(a) **Managing director** The managing director or equivalent. Where there was more than one managing director one was selected according to the following priority system:

- (i) the managing director responsible for selected establishment
- (ii) the managing director responsible for production
- (iii) the managing director responsible for industrial relations
- (iv) random selection of managing director.

(b) **Industrial relations director** An executive director with responsibility for industrial relations; if none exists, an executive director with responsibility for personnel matters.

If neither of these levels existed in the company then the managing director was asked the extra questions usually asked of this director.

(c) **Financial director** An executive director with functional responsibility for financial matters.

5.3 Levels selected at establishments

(a) **Establishment manager** The manager with overall responsibility for the selected establishment, usually known as the factory or general manager.

(b) **Personnel manager** A manager who reports directly to the selected establishment manager and who takes general responsibility for industrial relations; if none exists, then a personnel manager reporting directly to the selected establishment manager.

(c) **'Production' middle manager** A manager who reports to the selected establishment manager and has responsibility for the largest number of employees in the production or manufacturing process. The term 'production' was not defined for informants but, if asked, interviewers instructed that marginal activities such as transport and warehousing should be excluded.

(d) **'White collar' middle manager** A manager who reports to the selected establishment manager and has responsibility for the largest number of non manual employees.

(e) **Foreman** A random selection of one foreman who reports ultimately to the 'Production' middle manager. A foreman was defined as someone of first level of responsibility who supervises more than 3 employees. Charge hands were excluded.

If either of the selected middle managers were also sampled as the personnel manager, extra 'personnel questions' were asked of them in addition to the middle manager interview.

5.4 Levels selected at head offices and establishments combined

The selection of up to 3 directors was carried out as for a separate head office. We came across a full range of different organisations. In some companies, particularly small ones, the head office and establishments were run by the managing director as one integral unit. In other

companies the head office and establishments were run separately, although they were at the same address, so that all the levels could be assigned to either the head office or the manufacturing part.

Where there was one overall manager of the establishment who reports direct to a director of the company then this person was interviewed as the establishment manager. The middle managers were defined as previously, that is, managers who report to the establishment manager.

Where there was no overall manager of the establishment then we obtained no 'establishment manager' interview, and the middle manager level was redefined to include only those managers who report to a director of the company.

In those cases where an industrial relations director was selected we did not interview a personnel manager. In all other respects the sampling procedure was the same as that at an establishment located separately from the head office.

5.5 Employee representatives

The general aim of the sampling method was to select the most senior employee representative of each status type (that is, manual and non manual) and a representative of a minority union. 'Senior' was defined not according to age or length of service but according to union responsibilities in the selected establishment.

Only those unions which functioned at the selected establishment (or joint establishment and head office) were included, even though other unions may have had members in the company as a whole. Staff associations were included and for sampling purposes treated as unions, if either or both status types contained no union members. Some unions are part of larger unions and, if the sampling informant spoke of them as separate unions, they were treated as such.

(a) Most senior employee representative One union (or staff association) only:

If there was a joint shop steward committee then we selected the senior representative of this committee; otherwise we selected the senior manual representative.

More than one union:

If there was a joint union committee then we selected the senior representative (usually called the convenor) of this committee; otherwise we selected the senior manual representative of the union containing the largest number of manual employees.

(b) Other senior employee representative One union (or staff association) only:

We selected the senior representative of the alternative status type to the person already chosen.

More than one union:

We selected the senior representative of the union containing the largest number of employees of the opposite status type to the person already chosen.

(c) **Minority union representative** The interviewers listed all the unions recognised at the establishment excluding those represented by the people already selected (as at (a) and (b) above). A random sample of one of these unions was drawn and the senior representative of this union was selected.

6. Response rates

6.1 Overall response of companies

Table 6A gives the overall response rate of companies. This has been calculated by combining the response achieved at the various postal stages. We are unable to weight this data to take account of the different probabilities of selection of companies because we need to know how many eligible establishments comprise a selected company in order to calculate its weighting factor and this information was obtained from only those companies which participated.

Although 296 companies participated in the survey, interviews took place in the head offices only in 20 companies and in the establishments only in a further 18 companies. Interviews which took place in 5 'head offices' were rejected because they did not relate to the correct level of functioning board.

6.2 Response of levels within companies

In order to calculate the response rates of individuals within companies we need to know which levels were identified in each company, but this information is available only when a sampling interview was obtained. Full sampling interviews were conducted in 275 establishments and 272 head offices. Table 7A gives the response rate of the various levels identified within these establishments and head offices.

In addition, one interview was obtained with a managing director and one with a 'non manual middle manager' in a head office and an establishment where only partial sampling information was collected.

Table 6A Overall response rate of companies

	Number in sample	% in sample	% in sample
Original sample of establishments	900	100	
Randomly rejected establishments	35	4	
Establishment had fewer than 200 employees	82	9	
Functioning board located abroad	12	1	
Company nationalised	2	—	
Company has worker directors	7	1	
Company or establishment has closed	13	1	
Postal form returned by Post Office	9	1	
Total ineligible	125	14	
Duplicate establishments	154	17	
Total eligible	586	65	100
No reply received from selected establishments	45	5	8
Reply received too late from selected establishments	28	3	5
Establishments 'belonging' to companies which refused at previous stages	13	1	2
Refusals and non-contracts	204	23	35
Companies in which one or more interviews were conducted	296	33	51

NB This table should be interpreted with caution since no account has been taken of the relative importance of the various losses.

This will be affected by

- (i) the probability of selection of the company
- (ii) the stage at which an establishment or head office was excluded.

7. Reweighting

Each company had an initial chance of selection in direct proportion to its number of establishments with over 200 employees in Great Britain. This probability of selection is reduced if more than one establishment relating to the same company was selected, because only one of these establishments was included.

Thus, if company A has n eligible establishments in Great Britain, of which t were selected in our initial sample,

$$\text{Probability of selection (company X)} = \frac{n}{t}$$

In the majority of cases $t=1$.

In order to make the data additive the results for each company have been reweighted by the inverse of the probability of selection. These reweighting factors are given in Table 8A.

Table 8A Reweighting factors

Reweighting factors	Number of companies
.02—09	18
.1—18	23
.2—33	55
.4—75	48
1	152
Total	296

Glossary

An *establishment* includes all the people who work for the same company at or from the same address.

A *company* consists of the establishment(s) which report to the same lowest level of functioning board.

A *parent or holding company* is one which has a controlling interest in a subsidiary company.

An *enterprise* is the group of companies under common ownership or control as defined in the Companies Act 1949.

Denise Lievesley
Sampling Branch

Table 7A Response of individuals

Sample type	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
Level	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Eligible people identified	274	152	177	157	156	249	183	266	251	172	145
Refusals	8	5	8	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	4
Non-contacts	4	1	3	—	1	1	—	1	1	1	—
Interviews	88	94	89	97	97	98	99	97	97	97	96

Representativeness of the sample As already described above, the sample was selected by random methods from a frame thought to contain virtually all companies with establishments engaged in production and employing over 200 people. Thus, within the limitations of its relatively small size, the sample is likely to be representative of that frame. The problem, as always in social surveys, lies in the companies included in the selected sample but not included among those successfully interviewed, that is, the non-respondents. There is always a chance that the non-respondents will not represent a cross-section of the originally selected sample and thus their omission from the achieved interview sample will render the latter unrepresentative. The larger the proportion of non-response the greater the problem if this group are not a representative cross-section of the selected sample. It

is customary, when seeking to validate the representativeness of an achieved sample, to analyse the characteristics of the non-respondents in comparison with the achieved sample and/or to compare the characteristics of the achieved sample with those of the universe it is intended to represent. However, neither of these courses of action are feasible for this survey. The researchers have no information on the characteristics of non-responding companies, and the restricted definition of a company which was necessary in this survey does not coincide with the definitions used for the available industrial statistics. Thus, while every care has been taken in the selection of the sample and in attempts to maximise response, there is no way in which the representativeness of the sample over all measured variables can be absolutely guaranteed.

Appendix B:

Specimen sampling questionnaires

Office of Population
Censuses & Surveys
St Catherine's House
10 Kingsway
LONDON WC2B 6JP

S1082/10

Question Slip for

Co Ltd.

1. Approximately how many people are employed by the company named above

at

?

Please enter no. here

2. Is the company named above owned by central or local government or is it a nationalised industry?

Tick as
appropriate

☐

NO, NOT owned by central or local government/
nationalised industry

☐

YES, IT IS owned by central or local government/
nationalised industry

3. Does the company named above have a board of directors?

☐

YES

☐

NO

4. Please give the address of the head office of the company named above:

.....
.....
.....

5. Is the company owned above a wholly or partially owned subsidiary of another company or is it independent?

☐

it is a WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY of

..... (company name)

with head office at:

.....
.....

☐

it is a PARTIALLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY of

..... (company name)

with head office at:

.....
.....

☐

it is independent.

Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
St Catherine's House 10 Kingsway London WC2B 6JP

Companies Survey
Sampling Questionnaire - Head Office

S 1082

Interviewer's name

Auth No

Sampled Unit Name

Address

Company	
Serial no.	

1. Is there more than one managing director in (SAMPLED COMPANY)?	No - just one Yes - more than one ..	1 see note B 2 ask Q2
2. Is one of the managing directors responsible for (SAMPLED ESTABLISHMENT)	No Yes ...	1 ask Q3 2 see note B
3. Does one of the managing directors take responsibility for the "production" side of the company?	No Yes ...	1 ask Q4 2 see note B
4. Does one of the managing directors usually take responsibility for industrial relations matters?	No Yes ...	1 see note A 2 see note B

NOTE A Take a random sample of one managing director following random sampling instructions. Record the name of this director (the Managing Director - serial no. 01) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q3

NOTE B Record the name of this director (the Managing Director - serial no. 01) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q5

5. In some companies each executive director takes responsibility for one area of company business, for example finance or production or sales.

Does any executive director on the (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board take particular responsibility for industrial relations matters when they arise at Board meetings?

Yes ...	1 ask Q6
No	2 go to Q7
All/Everyone takes responsibility for it ..	3

1

IF YES

6. Is there only one director who usually takes responsibility for industrial relations matters in Board meetings?

Yes - only one	1 see note C
No - more than one	2 see note D

NOTE C Record the name of this director (the I.R./Personnel Director - serial no. 02) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q9

NOTE D Take a random sample of one of the directors responsible for industrial relations. Record the name of the selected director (the I.R./Personnel Director - serial no. 02) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q9

7. Does any executive director on the (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board take particular responsibility for personnel matters when they arise at Board meetings?

Yes	1 ask Q8
No	2 go to Q9

IF YES

8. Is there only one director who usually takes responsibility for personnel matters in Board meetings?

Yes - only one	1 see note E
No - more than one	2 see note F

NOTE E Record the name of this director (the Personnel/I.R. Director - serial no. 02) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q9

NOTE F Take a random sample of one of the directors responsible for personnel matters. Record the name of the selected director (the Personnel/I.R. Director - serial no. 02) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q9

9. Does any executive director on the (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board take particular responsibility for finance matters when they arise at Board meetings?

Yes	1 ask Q10
No	2 END QUESTIONNAIRE

IF YES

10. Is there only one director who usually takes responsibility for finance matters at Board meetings?

Yes - only one	1 see note G
No - more than one	2 see note H

NOTE G Record the name of this director (the Finance Director - serial no. 03) on the sampling sheet AND END QUESTIONNAIRE

NOTE H Take a random sample of one of the finance directors. Record the name of the selected director (the Finance Director - serial no. 03) on the sampling sheet AND END QUESTIONNAIRE

2

Companies Survey

Sampling Questionnaire - Establishment
Version 11 Head Office is NOT the same
as selected establishment

Sampled establishment	Name	Serial No.
	Address	

1. Is there one manager with overall responsibility for (SAMPLED ESTABLISHMENT)?

Yes - one manager	1 see note B
No - more than one manager ..	2 see note A

NOTE A Take a random sample of one establishment manager
NOTE B Record the name of this manager (the establishment manager - serial no. 04) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q2

2. Can you give me the names of all the managers of (SELECTED ESTAB) who report to (SELECTED ESTAB MANAGER)?

RECORD NAMES IN BOX (a) BELOW

3. Which of these managers are directly responsible for employees in the manufacturing or production process?

TICK IN BOX (b) BELOW AND SEE Q4

(a) Name	(b) manufacturing/production	(c) Non-manual

IF MORE THAN 1 MANAGER TICKED IN BOX (b)
Just one manager in box (b) DNA - GO TO NOTE D

4. Which of these managers is responsible for the largest number of employees in the manufacturing or production process?

IF JOINT MANAGERS MENTIONED GO TO NOTE C
IF JUST 1 GO TO NOTE D

NOTE C Take a random sample of one manager
NOTE D Record the name of this manager (the middle manager (production) serial no. 06) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q5

5. Can you tell me which of these managers is directly responsible for more than 10 non-manual employees?

TICK IN BOX (c) ABOVE AND SEE Q6

IF MORE THAN 1 MANAGER TICKED IN BOX (c)
Just 1 manager in box (c) DNA - GO TO NOTE F

6. Which of these managers is responsible for the largest number of non-manual workers?

IF 1 MANAGER MENTIONED - GO TO NOTE F
IF JOINT MANAGERS MENTIONED - GO TO NOTE E

NOTE E Take a random sample of one of these managers
NOTE F Record the name of this manager (the middle manager (non-manual) serial no. 07) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q7

7. Is there a manager here at (SELECTED ESTABLISHMENT) reporting direct to (ESTABLISHMENT MANAGER) who takes general responsibility for industrial relations matters?

Yes ..	1 see note H
No ..	2 ask Q8

8. Is there a personnel manager who reports direct to (ESTABLISHMENT MANAGER)?

Yes - one	1 see note H
Yes - more than one	2 ask Q9
No	3 go to Q10

9. Is there a most senior manager among these personnel managers?

Yes ..	1 see note H
No ..	2 see note C

NOTE G Take a random sample of one of these personnel managers

NOTE H Record the name of this manager (the personnel/IR manager serial no. 05) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO NOTE J

NOTE J Check if the personnel/IR manager selected above is the same person as one of the selected middle managers. If he has already been selected make a note to ask him the questions in the blue schedule which are designed for the personnel/IR manager

NOW GO ON TO Q10

10. Now I want to talk about the first level of responsible supervision in your establishment. In the context of a factory production establishment, this is the person or persons who are responsible for the work of the people in an office the sort of people I am interested in might be called supervisors. Now can you give me the names of all the people at that level who report ultimately to [SELECTED MIDDLE MANAGER (PRODUCTION)].

11. And do all of these people supervise more than 3 other employees?

Yes ..
No ...

1 see note L
2 see note K

NOTE K Delete from list anyone who does not supervise more than 3 other employees.

NOTE L Take a random sample of one person from this list. Record the name of this person (the supervisor/foreman - serial no. 08) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q12

SECTION 2 - SELECTION OF STEWARDS/REPRESENTATIVES

12. Are there any recognised trade unions operating here?

COUNT AS RECOGNISED IF UNION IS RECOGNISED FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS

Yes ..
No ...

1 go to Q24
2 ask Q13

13. Are there any staff associations here?

Yes ..
No ...

1 ask Q14
2 ask Q15
3 questionnaire

14. Can you give me the name(s) of the staff association(s) here?
RECORD ON SAMPLING SHEET THEN GO ON TO Q15

15. Is there a senior representative of the staff association(s)?

Yes ..
No ...

1 see note M
2 ask Q16

16. Are there any manual workers' representatives in the staff association(s)?

Yes - one
Yes - more than one
No
1 see note O
2 go to Q20
3 go to Q21 -

NOTE M Record the name and title of this representative (the Convenor/List steward - serial no. 09) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q17

17. Does this senior representative represent manual or non-manual workers?

manual
non-manual
both
(SPONTANEOUS)

1 go to Q21
2 go to Q19
3 ask Q18

18. Is this senior representative a non-manual worker?

Yes ..
No ...

1 ask Q19
2 go to Q21

19. Are there any manual workers' representatives in the staff associations?

Yes - one
Yes - more than one
No
1 see note O
ask Q20
2 go to Q21
3 questionnaire

20. Is there a senior manual workers' representative in the staff association(s)?

Yes ..
No ...

1 see note O
2 see note N

NOTE N Take a random sample of one manual workers' representative

NOTE O IF YOU HAVE SELECTED A REPRESENTATIVE AT NOTE M This selected representative will be the 2nd steward/representative serial no. 10. Record the name and title of this representative on the sampling sheet THEN END QUESTIONNAIRE

IF NO SELECTED REPRESENTATIVE AT NOTE M This selected representative will be the Convenor/List representative serial no. 09. Record the name and title of this representative on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q21.

21. Are there any representatives of non-manual workers in the staff association(s)?

Yes ..
No ...

1 ask Q22
2 End of questionnaire

22. Is there more than one representative of non-manual workers?

Yes ..
No ...

1 ask Q23
2 see note Q

23. Is there a senior representative of non-manual workers?

Yes ..
No ...

1 see note Q
2 see note P

NOTE P Take a random sample of one representative of non-manual workers.

NOTE Q Record the name and title of this representative (the 2nd steward/representative - serial no. 10) on the sampling sheet THEN END QUESTIONNAIRE

24. Can you give me the names of all the recognised unions here?

RECORD ON SAMPLING SHEET THEN SEE Q25

IF MORE THAN 1 UNION

One union only DMA

A go to Q44

25. Is there a joint union committee?

Yes ..
No ...

1 ask Q26
2 go to Q30

26. Is there a senior representative, or chairman, or convener of this committee?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	see note R go to Q30
NOTE R Record the name and title of this representative (the Convenor/1st representative - serial no. 09) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO Q27			
27. Does this senior representative/convener represent manual or non-manual workers?	manual non-manual both	1 2 3	go to Q34 go to Q29 ask Q38
28. Is he a non-manual worker?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	ask Q29 go to Q34
29. Are there any recognised unions representing manual workers here?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	go to Q31 see note Z
30. Are there any recognised unions representing manual workers here?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	ask Q31 go to Q34
31. Which union represents the largest number of manual workers here?	the (RECORD) union only one manual worker union	1 2	
NOTE U Take a random sample of one non-manual workers' union representative in that union.			
32. Is there more than one shop steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) in (UNION at Q31)?	No - only one Yes - more than one	1 2	see note I ask Q33
33. Is there a senior shop steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) in this union?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	see note I see note S
NOTE S Take a random sample of one manual workers' shop steward in this union.			
NOTE T IF YOU HAVE SELECTED A STEWARD AT NOTE R This selected steward will be the 2nd steward/representative - serial no. 10. Record the name and title of this steward on the sampling sheet THEN END QUESTIONNAIRE.			
IF NO SELECTED STEWARD AT NOTE R This selected steward will be the Convenor/1st representative - serial no. 09. Record the name and title of this steward on the sampling sheet THEN GO ON TO Q34.			
34. Are there any recognised unions representing non-manual workers here?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	ask Q35 go to Q38
NOTE V Record the name and title of this representative (the 2nd steward/representative - serial no. 10) on the sampling sheet THEN GO TO NOTE Z.			
35. Which union represents the largest number of non-manual workers here?	the (RECORD) union only one non-manual workers union (RECORD)	1 2	
36. How many union representatives of non-manual workers in (UNION AT Q31) are there here?	more than one only one none at all	1 2 3	ask Q37 see note V go to Q38
37. Is there a senior representative of non-manual workers in that union here?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	see note V see note U
NOTE U Take a random sample of one non-manual workers' union representative in that union.			
38. Do any of the non-manual workers belong to a recognised staff association?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	ask Q39 see note Z
39. How many representatives of non-manual workers are there in this staff association?	None one more than one	1 2 3	see note Z see note Y see note X
40. Is there a senior representative of non-manual workers in this staff association?	Yes .. No ...	1 2	see note Y see note X
NOTE X Take a random sample of one representative of non-manual workers in the staff association.			

NOTE 2 Check which union/staff association each steward/representative selected so far belongs to. Cross through these unions/staff associations on the list already made on the sampling sheet THEN GO ON TO NOTE (a)

NOTE (a) IF THIS LEAVES NO OTHER RECOGNISED UNIONS END QUESTIONNAIRE
IF THIS DOES LEAVE ONE OR MORE UNIONS ON LIST .. SEE NOTE (b)

NOTE (b) Take a random sample of one additional recognised union and record name

41. How many shop stewards (EQUIVALENT TITLE) are there for [UNION SELECTED AT NOTE (b)] at this establishment?	None	1	End of questionnaire
	One	2	see note (d)
	More than one	3	ask Q42

42. Is there a senior shop steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) in [UNION SELECTED AT NOTE (b)]?

Yes ..	1	see note (d)
No ...	2	see note (c)

NOTE (c) Take a random sample of one of the shop stewards.

NOTE (d) Record the name and title of this steward (the 3rd steward/representative - serial no. 11) on the sampling sheet END QUESTIONNAIRE

44. Is there a joint shop stewards (EQUIVALENT TITLE) committee here?

Yes ..	1	ask Q45
No ...	2	go to Q49

45. Can you tell me the name of the chairman or most senior representative of this committee?

RECORD NAME AND TITLE OF THIS REPRESENTATIVE (CONVENOR/1ST REPRESENTATIVE - SERIAL NO. 09) ON THE SAMPLING SHEET THEN GO ON TO Q46

46. Does (PERSON NOTED AT Q45) represent manual or non-manual workers?

manual	1	go to Q51
non-manual	2	go to Q48
BOTH	3	ask Q47

47. Is (PERSON AT Q45) a non-manual worker?

Yes ..	1	ask Q48
No ...	2	go to Q51

48. Are there any shop stewards representing manual workers in the union?

Yes - one	1	see note (e)
Yes - more than one	2	go to Q50
No	3	End questionnaire

49. Are there any shop stewards representing manual workers?

Yes - one	1	see note (g)
Yes - more than one	2	ask Q50
No	3	go to Q51

50. Is there a senior shop steward representing manual workers in the union here?

Yes ..	1	see note (g)
No ...	2	see note (f)

NOTE (f) Take a random sample of one shop steward representing manual workers.

NOTE (g) IF YOU HAVE SELECTED A REPRESENTATIVE AT Q45

This selected representative will be the 2nd steward/representative - serial no. 10). Record the name and title of this representative on the sampling sheet THEN END QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF NO SELECTED REPRESENTATIVE AT Q45

This selected representative will be the Convenor/1st representative - serial no. 09). Record the name and title of this representative on the sampling sheet THEN GO ON TO Q51

51. Are there any stewards/representatives of non-manual workers in the union here?

Yes - one	1	see note (i)
Yes - more than one	2	ask Q52
No	3	End questionnaire

52. Is there a senior steward/representative of non-manual workers in the union here?

Yes ..	1	see note (i)
No ...	2	see note (h)

NOTE (h) Take a random sample of one steward/representative of non-manual workers.

NOTE (i) Record the name and title of this steward/representative (the 2nd steward/representative - serial no. 10) on the sampling sheet and END QUESTIONNAIRE.

Appendix C:

Specimen interview schedules and associated cards

1. Could I start by asking you about the size of the establishment (COMPANY), how many people does employ?

2. How many establishments with over 200 employees does (SAMPLED COMPANY) have in Great Britain which are dependent on the parent company?

3. And how would you describe the main activity of (SAMPLED COMPANY)?

4. Is there a parent company which has a controlling interest in (SAMPLED COMPANY)?

5. Can you tell me the name of your parent company?

6. Is your parent company part of a larger group?

1042

COMPANY NO.	
SAMPLE TYPE NO.	

Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
 Social Survey Division
 St Catherine House 10 Kingsway London WC2B 6UP
 COMPALED SURVEY

Interviewer name
 Authorization no:
 Length of interview minutes

TRANSFER
 RUCSD
 00000000000000000000
 BOX (b) ABOVE

SAMPLE TYPE

01 Handling director
 02 Director resp. for Industrial Relations
 03 Director resp. for Finance
 04 go to (a)
 05 go to (b)
 06 go to (c)

(a) Record the name
 INTERVIEWER'S CHECK:
 (b) Are you fairly sure you will be interviewing the Handling director?
 Yes
 No
 (c) Have you already asked Q1-18 of one director in this company?
 Yes
 No
 1 start at Q19
 2 start at Q1

<p>IF YES</p> <p>15. Do you need to have the approval of your parent company before your Board can.....</p> <p>INDIVIDUAL</p> <p>PROFIT</p> <p>1. Acquire or dispose of major assets? .. 1 A</p> <p>2. Spend money in excess of a fixed sum? .. 2 B</p> <p>3. Borrow money in excess of a fixed sum? .. 3 C</p> <p>4. Make investments? .. 4 D</p> <p>5. Make redundancy plans? .. 5 E</p>		<p>Yes</p> <p>No</p> <p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p>
<p>16. In some companies each full-time director takes responsibility for a specific area of the company business. Is this true for some, or all members of the..... (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board?</p> <p>Yes true for all .. 1</p> <p>Yes true for some .. 2</p> <p>No .. 3</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>
<p>IF TRUE FOR SOME</p> <p>(a) How many full-time directors take executive responsibility for areas of this kind?</p> <p>Number.....</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>
<p>17. Can I have checks, is there a director on the Board who takes executive responsibility for industrial relations matters?</p>		<p>Yes .. 1</p> <p>No .. 2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>IF YES</p> <p>(a) Does the director who takes responsibility for industrial relations matters also take responsibility for meetings dealt with this subject as his sole area of executive responsibility?</p>		<p>Yes .. 1</p> <p>No .. 2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>(b) Does this director who takes responsibility for industrial relations matters also take responsibility for personnel matters at Board level?</p>		<p>Yes .. 1</p> <p>No .. 2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>(c) What are his other areas of executive responsibility on the Board?</p> <p>Production .. 1</p> <p>Finance .. 2</p> <p>Other (specify) .. 3</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>

<p>IF I.E. DIRECTOR NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSONNEL (code 2 Q17b)</p> <p>I.E. Director responsible for Personnel .. Q18</p> <p>18. Is there a director on the Board who takes executive responsibility for personnel matters?</p> <p>Yes .. 1</p> <p>No .. 2</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>IF YES</p> <p>(a) Does the director who takes responsibility for personnel matters also take responsibility for subject as his sole area of executive responsibility?</p>		<p>Yes .. 1</p> <p>No .. 2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>IF NO</p> <p>(b) What are his other areas of executive responsibility on the Board?</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p>
<p>TO ALL DIRECTORS</p> <p>19. Does the..... (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board meet ..</p> <p>monthly .. 1</p> <p>quarterly .. 2</p> <p>yearly .. 3</p> <p>at some other interval (specify) .. 4</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>
<p>IF YEARLY</p> <p>(a) And how many months ago was the last Board meeting?</p> <p>No. of months ago.....</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>
<p>20. A number of companies have a standing agenda for all Board meetings, but at the meetings a number of items are added to this agenda. How far in advance of the meeting can you recall, which topics were discussed at the last Board meeting you attended?</p>		<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p>

21. Which matter would you say took up the most time at the last board meeting you attended?

0

21. Are the topics you discussed at the last (SAMPLED COMPANY) board meeting the sort of thing you usually discuss at board meetings or was your last board meeting rather unusual?

usually sort of thing... 1
last meeting unusual... 2

IF USUAL

(a) Can you recall the topics discussed at the meeting before the last meeting you attended?

(b) And which topic took up the most time at that board meeting?

0

3500 CARD A

23. Now I would like to talk to you about the way in which you usually discuss matters at board meetings. Can you look at this card and tell me which of the approaches come closest to the way the (SAMPLE COMPANY) board usually operates?

0 usually few decisions arrived at elsewhere... 1
usually many decisions arrived at elsewhere... 2
usually many decisions arrived at elsewhere... 3
usually many decisions arrived at elsewhere... 4

3500 CARD B

24. Thinking back again to the last board meeting you attended, can you tell me the way in which most decisions were made since the necessary discussion had taken place?

0 Directors voted to reach a majority... 1
Chairman voted on the arguments on both sides and then gave the Board decision... 2
Chairman made an announcement... 3
Chairman made an announcement... 4
Chairman made an announcement... 5

25. Do directors usually give the Board some notice if they often raise issues at the board meeting without notice? usually give notice... 1
often raise issues without notice... 2

3500 CARD C

26. This card lists a number of approaches which Boards could adopt in dealing with issues. Can you tell me which approach which your Board adopted last time it had to consider... (Add FOR EACH IN CARD)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549	550	551	552	553	554	555	556	557	558	559	560	561	562	563	564	565	566	567	568	569	570	571	572	573	574	575	576	577	578	579	580	581	582	583	584	585	586	587	588	589	590	591	592	593	594	595	596	597	598	599	600	601	602	603	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611	612	613	614	615	616	617	618	619	620	621	622	623	624	625	626	627	628	629	630
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27. Some company boards find themselves more involved in dealing with personnel or industrial relations matters than others. Which of these approaches best describes the way your board does personnel and industrial relations matters taken up most of the time, quite a lot of the time, or not very much of the time?

0 none 1
quite a lot 2
not very much 3

3092 CARD C AGAIN

28. Which letter on the card best describes the approach of your board the last time it had to consider

(SEE THE CARD 30 CARD)

	board				board				board				board			
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
Health and safety matters	1	2	3	4	5	6	7									
Redundancy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7									
Major changes in production methods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7									
Pay issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7									
Pension schemes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7									

CARD A AGAIN

29. And which of these approaches best describes the way your board does industrial relations and personnel matters in general?

0 1. Neither 1
2. Neither 2
3. Neither 3
4. Neither 4
5. Neither 5
6. Neither 6
7. Neither 7

30(a) Nowadays company boards may feel that their influence and pressures, which of these 4 categories could you say has most effect on your board?

0 big customers and suppliers 1
big customers and suppliers 2
big customers and suppliers 3
big customers and suppliers 4
big customers and suppliers 5
big customers and suppliers 6
big customers and suppliers 7

(b) And which of these 4 categories have the least effect on your board?

0 big customers and suppliers 1
big customers and suppliers 2
big customers and suppliers 3
big customers and suppliers 4

31. Does the chairman or managing director have to refer all matters of importance to the board?

Yes 1
No 2

32. Do executive directors of the (SAMPLED COMPANY) have to refer all matters of importance to the board?

Yes 1
No 2

33. Apart from the full board of Directors, does (SAMPLED COMPANY) have an executive board? I mean a group of executive directors who meet formally to consider matters of importance of the company or a large part of it?

Yes it has more than one 1
Yes it has more than one 2
Yes it has more than one 3

34. Does chairman of these executive boards have responsibility for

overseeing the operation of the whole company? 1
overseeing the operation of the whole company? 2
overseeing the operation of the whole company? 3

ASK OR LET EXECUTIVE INTERVIEW

Inf. not let director interviewed 1
Inf. not let director interviewed 2
Inf. not let director interviewed 3

35. Has the (SAMPLED COMPANY) board any sub-committees which are responsible for formulating policy recommendations for board approval?

Yes 1
No 2

IF YES

36. How many such sub-committees does your board have at the moment?

No. of sub-committees 1
No. of sub-committees 2
No. of sub-committees 3

37. Does this/one of these committee(s) contain any executive directors?

Yes 1
No 2
Some do, some don't 3

38. And does this/one of these committee(s) contain any non-board members?

Yes 1
No 2
Some do, some don't 3

39. Are there any other management committees just below board level which consider areas of company business in order to make recommendations to the Board?

Yes 1 ask Q40
No 2 go to Q42

40. How many of these management committees are there?

No. of management committees 1
Yes 1
No 2
Some do, some don't 3

41. Does this/one of these committee(s) contain either executive or non-executive directors?

Yes 1
No 2
Some do, some don't 3

IF YES

42. Now I would like to talk with some aspects of decision making in the company. This card lists a wide range of possible decision making issues. Please indicate whether or not you think the company (SHEPDED COMPANY) takes decisions at a company-wide level on (ASK FOR EACH IN Q43)

	Yes	No/other answer
Capital investment?	1	1
Major changes in production methods?	2	2
Pay issues?	3	3
Physical working conditions?	4	4
Hours of work?	5	5
Safety matters?	6	6
Disciplinary procedures?	7	7
Redundancy?	8	8
Welfare matters like canteens and recreation facilities?	9	9

45. Are company suggestions with unions/staff associations usually conducted with shop stewards (EQUIVALENT TITLE) or full-time union officials?

usually shop stewards only 1
usually full-time officials only 2
both 3

46. Are there any issues that the company feels it is inappropriate to negotiate about?

Yes 1 ask Q47
No 2 go to Q47

0

	Yes	No	ask Q40	ask Q41	ask Q42	ask Q43	ask Q44	ask Q45	ask Q46	ask Q47
Capital investment?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Major changes in production methods?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Pay issues?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Physical working conditions?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Hours of work?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Safety matters?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Disciplinary procedures?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Redundancy?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Welfare matters like canteens or recreation facilities?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			

-11-

ASK OF ONE DIRECTOR ONLY

Priority:

1) I & Director

2) Managing Director

3) Finance Director

One Director already asked ... DMC

43. Are there any trade unions or staff associations operating in (SHEPDED COMPANY)

Yes - trade union 1
No 2
Yes - staff association 3
No 4

IF YES

44. I have a list of issues which some companies negotiate with their trade unions. Please indicate whether or not you think the company (SHEPDED COMPANY) negotiates on a company-wide basis with any of these issues.

	Yes	No/other answer
Capital investment?	1	1
Major changes in production methods?	2	2
Pay issues?	3	3
Physical working conditions?	4	4
Hours of work?	5	5
Safety matters?	6	6
Disciplinary procedures?	7	7
Redundancy?	8	8
Welfare matters like canteens and recreation facilities?	9	9

45. Are company suggestions with unions/staff associations usually conducted with shop stewards (EQUIVALENT TITLE) or full-time union officials?

usually shop stewards only 1
usually full-time officials only 2
both 3

46. Are there any issues that the company feels it is inappropriate to negotiate about?

Yes 1 ask Q47
No 2 go to Q47

0

-12-

IF YES
(c) that are thus issued?

0

SHOW CARD E

47. Nowadays people talk a lot about worker participation in decision making. In this card which of the following ideas do you think should be taken into general use by the firm worker participation?

- 0
- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| A | Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed | 1 |
| B | Management makes the decisions but takes workers into account | 2 |
| C | Joint decisions and then management makes the decisions | 3 |
| D | Joint decision making between management and workers | 4 |
| E | Workers alone make the decisions | 5 |
| F | None of these | 6 |

SHOW CARD F

48. Looking at this card again which of the ideas mentioned comes closest to your view of what worker participation should involve?

- 0
- | | |
|---|---|
| A | 1 |
| B | 2 |
| C | 3 |
| D | 4 |
| E | 5 |
| F | 6 |

ASK OF ONE DIRECTOR ONLY

Priority:

- 1) I R Director
2) Managing Director
3) Finance Director

One Director already asked ... DRA A go to Q55

49. Apart from those dealing with health and safety do you have any specially constituted committees or sub-committees in the firm which meet regularly to discuss matters of concern to either party?

Yes... 1 ask (a)
No... 2 go to Q55

IF YES

(a) Does(UNIONED COMPANY) have any company-wide joint consultative committee(s)?

Yes... 1 ask Q50
No... 2 go to Q55

IF YES

50. Do all or some of the company-wide joint consultative committee(s) cover both manual and non-manual employees?

Yes - all... 1
No... 2 go to Q55

51. Do(es) each of the committee(s) cover both manual and non-manual employees?

Yes - all... 1
Yes - some... 2
No... 3

52. Which of the following matters are raised at your company-wide joint consultative committee(s)? If none... (ASK FOR EACH) If some... (ASK FOR EACH) your company-wide joint consultative committee(s)?

	Yes	No
Physical working conditions	1	A
Major changes in production methods	2	A
Safety matters	3	A
Major changes in production methods	4	A
Health and safety matters	5	A
Redundancy	6	A
Disciplinary procedures	7	A
Wages and salaries	8	A
Current trading position of the Company	9	A

SHOW CARD F

53. Which of the approaches on this card best describes the way in which you and your colleagues discuss with in your company - wide joint consultative committee(s)?

- 0
- management pass information to employees
 - management consults workers on matters of concern
 - management and employees discuss a matter before management decision
 - management and employees discuss a matter before come to a joint decision

54. And looking at the card again which of the statements best describes what you think should happen at company-wide joint consultative committees?

- management pass information to employees
- management receive information from employees ..
- management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
- management and employees discuss a matter and

COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION

55. Does (SAMPLED COMPANY) have a written policy which determines just which information is passed to employees or their representatives?

Yes	Yes for representatives only
Yes	Yes for employees only
No	

SPONTANEOUS

56. How satisfied are you with the amount of information currently given to employees or their representatives? Are you ...

57. Was the company alerted the range of information it gives to employees or their representatives in the past 12 months?

IF YES

58. Has this led to an increase or decrease in the range of information given?

(SPONTANEOUS) \longrightarrow no difference ... } go to Q60

IF INCREASE

59. Do you think this increase in the range of information given to employees has helped management or has it helped employee representatives in their negotiations? (SPONTANEOUS) helped both

SPORTS AND RECREATION

(SPONTANEOUS)

(SPONTANEOUS)

1

1

50. Does the company pass information in confidence to trade unions or staff associations for

1	frequently
2	sometimes
3	never

51. What would you describe as the MAIN method by which the Board learn the views of their employees?

0

41-

SHOW NAME O MALEN

62. I asked you earlier about the way in which decisions are made in (SAMPLED COMPANY) on company-wide matters. I asked you to say how you think they should be made. Ideally how should decisions about GO THROUGH LIST IN GRID) be made?

Ques. decision should be made by	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Capital Investment?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Major changes in production methods?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pay issues?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Physical working conditions?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hours of work?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Safety matters?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Disciplinary procedures?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Redundancy?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Welfare matters like canteens/ recreation facilities?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

0

WORKER DIRECTION QUESTIONS

There have been suggestions that representatives of employees, often called "worker directors" should sit on Company Boards of Directors.

63. If such a scheme was adopted in Britain would you be in favour of the idea or against it?

0 in favour ... 1
against ... 2

SHOW GRID C

64. If the boards of British companies were to have worker directors which of the ideas on this card best describes what you think they should do?

0 A communicate Board views to company employees 1
B communicate employees views and 2
C actively promote and safeguard the 3
rights of company employees 4
D make it difficult for the Board to 5
function effectively 6
E make it difficult for the Board to 7
function effectively 8

65. If your company were to introduce worker directors on the Board, do you think this should be:

0 RUNNING 1
or exactly % of the total Board 2
PROFIT 3
director? 4

66. If the (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board were to introduce worker directors, do you think they should be elected to the Board or appointed in some other way?

0 elected 1
appointed in other way 2
don't know 3

IF APPOINTED IN SOME OTHER WAY

67. Who do you think should choose worker directors ...
The management A
union/staff association representatives B
PROFIT C
full time or part time union officials D
or none of these? E
CODE ALL THAT
APPLY
management and unions together F

go to Q5A
ask Q5?
go to Q7D
go to Q7D

IF ELECTED (code 1 066)

68. Do you think everyone employed by the company, including management, should be eligible to elect a worker director or should some be excluded?

0 everyone vote .. 1 go to Q70
some excluded .. 2 ask Q69

IF SOME EXCLUDED

69. Who should be excluded?

0

70. Should worker directors come from among company employees, including management, or from outside of the company?

0 From company employees .. 2 go to Q72
From both sources .. 3 ask Q71

(SPONTANEOUS)

71. Do you think that worker directors from outside the company should be limited to certain types of people from some other background?

0 Fall into union officials .. 1
from some other background .. 2

SHOW CARD B

72. Can you show me this card which lists a number of people who are eligible to come from inside of the company, do you think they should be eligible or should some of these groups be excluded?

0 all should be eligible .. 1 go to Q73
some excluded .. 2 ask (a)

IF SOME EXCLUDED

(a) Which of the groups on this card should be excluded?

0 RECORD BELOW

(b) And why should .. be excluded?
0 (ASK FOR ALL REASONS AT (c) AND RECORD BELOW)

GROUPS ON CARD	EXCLUDED OR NOT	REASON FOR EXCLUSION
Senior managers	1	
Other managers	1	
Foremen/Supervisors	1	
Clerical staff	1	
Skilled manual	1	
Unskilled manual	1	
Scientific and Technical	1	

73. Suppose a worker director were to come from among a group of employees for which there is no union or staff association in the company. How would you feel about his being eligible to elect a worker director? Would you want to exempt the union/staff association representatives or not?

0 s.s./union representatives .. 1 ask (a)
s.s./union representatives .. 2 ask (b)
come from both sources .. 3 go to Q74

IF UNION REPRESENTATIVES

(a) Once a union representative has joined the board as a worker director should he be allowed to continue holding his union/staff association office?

0 Yes .. 1 go to Q74
No .. 2

IF BOTH UNION REPRESENTATIVES

(b) Once a worker director has joined the board should he be allowed to hold office in his trade union/staff association or not?

0 Yes allowed .. 1
No, not allowed .. 2

-20-

74. If there were worker directors on the Board of (SOUTHAMPTON) do you think that those who selected them should be able to demand their resignation and that the Board of Directors should be able to demand that those who refused to resign should be removed from the Board of Directors?	1 should be able to demand his resignation 2 should be able to demand his resignation if office ends	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
75. If your company had worker directors do you think that they should be bound by rules of confidentiality, or should they be free to discuss Board matters with other company employees?	1 bound by rules of Boardroom confidentiality 2 free to discuss matters with other employees 3 discuss matters free to	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
76. After a Board decision is taken, do you think worker directors should be bound to support the general Board view or should they be free to oppose it?	1 should support general Board view 2 should oppose general Board view 3 should resign	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
77. Do you feel it should be part of a worker director's job to explain the reasons behind decisions made and to explain the reasons behind them?	1 Yes 2 No 3 Other (SPONTANEOUS)	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
78. Do you think all the employees in the company should accept all Board decisions if they are given representation on the Company Board, or should they be free to oppose decisions when they do not like?	1 should accept all Board decisions 2 should not accept all Board decisions	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
79. If worker directors were to join company boards there might be some disagreement about the part they should play in Board discussions. Do you think there are any circumstances in which worker directors should be excluded from discussing?	1 they should discuss any issue 2 should be excluded from some issues	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
80. Some people think that worker directors would always find it difficult to join in general Board discussion.	1 My card lists a number of views about worker directors. Do you think any of them are closest to your own view? 2 A they would have no difficulty in joining in general Board discussion 3 B with training they would soon pick up the necessary expertise 4 C they would be able to do so naturally 5 D they would always find some excuse 6 E they would never understand the discussion 7 F none of these	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
81. We have talked earlier about sub committees of the Board and senior management committees. Do you think that in the future, in (SOUTHAMPTON), worker directors should sit on such committees or not?	1 Yes 2 No 3 Other (SPONTANEOUS)	1 go to Q10 ask (a)
82. Why do you feel they should be excluded from (some of) these committees?	1 2	1 go to Q10 ask (a)



82. Should worker directors be able to sit in with the directors on the joint employee-management committee?	Yes No	1 2 3			
0	(CONTINUOUS)				
83. If worker directors were to be considered to the Board of this company would you expect their presence to result in the introduction of new ideas and suggestions in Board meetings?	Yes No Don't know ..	1 2 3			
0					
84. Do you think that the presence of worker directors would affect what is discussed at Board meetings?	Yes .. No ...	1 2 3	ask (a) go to Q45		
0					
IF YES					
(a) How would it affect what is discussed?					
0					
85. And do you think that the presence of worker directors would change the way in which matters are dealt with in Board meetings?	Yes .. No ...	1 2 3	ask (a) go to Q46		
0					
IF YES					
(a) How would it change the way in which matters are dealt with?					
86. If worker directors were to come from amongst the workers would you expect all their time on worker director duties, or should they also continue to do their regular job?	continue regular job ... all time on no duties ...	1 2			
0					
87. Do you think worker directors should receive directors' fees?	Yes, fees No	1 2			
0	(CONTINUOUS)				
88. Should you expect the inclusion of worker directors on the Board to result in a decrease in their power or would it make no difference?	increase decrease make no difference ..	1 2			
0					
89. Do you think that the existence of worker directors on the Board would increase employees' feeling of involvement with the Company or would it make no difference?	Yes No make no difference ..	1 2			
0					
90. How, all in all, if a worker director scheme were ever introduced what would you expect to be the effect on the Company? Would it be a benefit or a disadvantage to the Company? Would it help one of more worker directors on the Board?					
0					

91. And what would you expect to be the major advantages of having 1 or more worker directors on the board?

□

SHOW DIAGRAM AND READ OUT EXPLANATION

As you know, at present each company has a Board of directors who are responsible to the shareholders for controlling the business of the company. The Board includes some directors who are also employed as top managers in the company, and often there are other directors who are only paid by the company as part-time directors.

Only two types of Board in each company. The first type was the day-to-day Board, which was responsible for the day-to-day running of the company and could be called the Management Board. The other type of Board would have the job of supervising the Management Board. This Supervisory Board would appoint directors on the Management Board, and lay down general company policy. The Supervisory Board would not become involved in the day-to-day running of the Company.

LEAVE DIAGRAM WITH INFORMANT

22. It has been suggested that if Supervisory Boards were ever introduced in Britain then worker directors should sit on these Boards. Would you be in favour of worker directors on Supervisory Boards if they existed in Britain or would you be against it?

in favour ..	1
against	2

2). Again if worker directors were introduced onto this new type of Supervisory Board, would you favour an equal number of worker directors and other directors on such a board, or would you prefer a minority of worker directors?

Equal number ..	1
Midpoints ..	0

44. If your own company did have a Supervisory Board with half of its members sitting as worker directors, do you think that would improve or worsen industrial relations, or wouldn't it make any difference?

improve IR	1
worsen IR	2
Make no difference	3

35. And if the Supervisory Board contained less than half worker directors do you then think it could ...

```

RUNNING
PROMPT
improve industrial relations -- 1
worsen industrial relations -- 2

```

STATE OF ALABAMA BIRTH DEATH AND MARRIAGE DIVISION

K 096-97 OF IR/PERSONNEL MANAGER
OR ESTAB. MANAGER

Other Informants...	Other Informants... DNA	Other Informants... DNA
...

IF ESTAB HAS TUO/STAFF ASSOCIATIONS (Q18)

6. Can you tell me which trade unions or staff associations have members within this establishment? RECORD BELOW IN BOX (a)

(a) And is NAME OF TU/STAFF ASSOCIATED with the above mentioned person?

CONTENT IS RECOGNISED IF
IT IS RECOGNISED FOR ANY
REASON IN BOX (4)
NOTES

(a) Name of T-11 or staff association

(a) Name of T.U or staff association	(b) Recognised:	
	Yes	No

97. Now I'd like you to think different groups of your employees and tell me what proportion of each group has been in the past 12 months. (SAMPLE COMPANY)
(First of all) what proportion of your (ASK FOR EACH IN GRID) are in a union or staff association... less than a 1/4 of them, between a 1/4 and 1/2 of them, more than 1/2 of them, or all of them?

RUNNING
PROFIT

	under 1/4	1/4 to 1/2	over 1/2	all
Supervisory staff		1	2	3
Managerial staff		1	2	3
Technical and Clerical staff		1	2	3
Manual workers		1	2	3

98. Apart from national strikes, how often have strikes occurred in (SAMPLE COMPANY) in the past 12 months? How strikes occurred ...

RUNNING
PROFIT

	frequently	1	2	3	4
often					
or not at all?					
Yes	No				
Has there been any...	threats to strike?	1	2	3	4
over time has?	work-to-rule or go-slow?	1	2	3	4
period of slow-down operations ..		1	2	3	4

100. Would you say that industrial relations in (SAMPLE COMPANY) were very good, fairly good or not very good?

very good
fairly good
not very good

TO ALL DIRECTIONS

101. Some people say that for most purposes the interests of management and workers are the same but others say that although there must be some comparison the interests of management and workers are fundamentally different. Which comes closest to your view?

interests the same ...
interests different ...

102. Finally I would like to ask 2 or 3 questions about your company's directors. Have any of them ever been a director of (SAMPLE COMPANY)?

103. Can I just check have you been in the past or are you currently a director of any other company apart from (SAMPLE COMPANY)?

104. Can you tell me your age last birthday?

105. And at what age did you complete your full time education?

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
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over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
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Under 15 ... 1
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over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
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17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
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17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
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17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Under 15 ... 1
15 - 16 ... 2
16 - 17 ... 3
17 - 18 ... 4
over 18 ... 5

Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
 St Catherine's House
 St Catherine's House 10 Kingsway London WC2B 6LP
 COMPANIES SURVEY

COMPANY NO.		SAMPLE TYPE NO.	

(4)

(5)

Interviewers name _____

Authorisation No: _____

Length of interview _____ minutes

Date of interview _____

TRANSFER FROM CODE TO BOX (b) ABOVE

SAMPLE TYPE

Establishment manager	04	} start at Q10
1st./2nd./3rd./4th. manager	05	
Middle manager (Production)	06	
Middle manager (non-manual)	07	
Foreman/supervisor	08	} start at Q1
Consumer/kit representative	09	
2nd shop steward/representative	10	
3rd shop steward/representative	11	

SHOP STEWARDS OR EQUIVALENT START HERE

1. What is your job at (SAMPLED ESTABLISHMENT)?

2. And which trade union/staff association do you belong to?

3. How long have you been a steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) continually for the workers you now represent in this establishment?

less than 1 year 1
 1 but under 3 years 2
 3 but under 5 years 3
 5 but under 10 years 4
 over 10 years 5

4. How many years altogether have you been a steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) in this Company or elsewhere?

less than 1 year 1
 1 but under 3 years 2
 3 but under 5 years 3
 5 but under 10 years 4
 over 10 years 5

IF TRADE UNION

Staff association 100

5. Apart from your duties as a steward (EQUIVALENT TITLE) do you hold any of the offices on this card?

A Senior steward/representative of your own union 1 ask Q6
 B Senior steward/rep. representing more than one union 2 go to Q11
 C Hold office in your branch 3
 D Hold office in your region/district committee 4 ask Q6
 E Hold office at national level 5

6. Do any of your responsibilities ever involve you in acting on behalf of another staff association's/union's members?

Yes
 No

7. Are you able to contact the most senior manager here when you feel it necessary?

Yes ...
No ...

1 ask (A)
2 go to Q8

IF YES

(a) Can you contact this direct or are you expected officially to go through a lower level of management?

1 go to Q8
2 can contact his direct
3 expected to go through
4 depends on the management
5 have to go through senior
6 ahead

(SPONTANEOUS)

IF THROUGH LOWER LEVEL/SPONTANEOUS

(1) Do you sometimes unofficially contact the most senior manager of whom you go through a lower level of management?

Yes ...
No ...

1
2

IF STRAND OF A UNION FOR OVER A YEAR

year ...
year ...

A go to Q19
B

8. Some stewards (EQUIVALENT TITLES) find they have more contact with full time union officials than they do with the full time union officials. Have you been in contact with a full time union officer about a problem related to this plant/factory?

Never ...
Once ...
2-4 times ...
5-25 times ...
26+ times ...

9. How often in the last 12 months has a union officer actually visited you here at your place of work?

Never ...
Once ...
2-4 times ...
5-25 times ...
26+ times ...

MANAGERS AND FOREMEN/SUPERVISORS STATE HERE

10. What is your position in the company?
JOB TITLE

NAME OF ALL EXCEPT ESTABLISHMENT MANAGER (SAMPLE TYPE ON)

Informant is establishment manager... (ON)

SEE CHECK
ABOVE Q13

11. And how many employees work in the department or section which you manage?

1-5
6-10
11-24
25-50
51-100
over 100

1
2
3
4
5
6

12. Would you say that the employees in the department or section which you manage are mostly manual workers?

1 mainly manual
2 mainly non-manual
3 about equal numbers
4 of both

1
2
3

13. How would you describe the main activity of the section or department which you manage?

(SPONTANEOUS)

1
2
3

14. Are there any recognized trade unions or staff associations in the section or department which you manage?

1 Yes - trade union
2 Yes - staff association
3 No

1
2
3

(a) Are you personally involved in negotiations with chief/branch union(s)/staff association(s)?

Yes ...
No ...

1
2
3

INTERVIEWER CHECK

(a) Is Informant Estab. manager or HR/Personnel manager?

Yes ..

No ...

(b) Have you already interviewed either Estab. manager or HR/Personnel manager?

Yes ..

No ...

15. Can you tell me about the size of this establishment: how many people are working here at (SAMPLED ESTABLISHMENT)?

under 200

200 - 500

over 500 - 1000

over 1000 - 2000

over 2000 - 5000

over 5000 - 10000

over 10000

DK

SHIP CARD 1

16. Are thinking about the work done at this establishment, what is the most important work done closest to the one generally used here?

A CONTINUOUS FLOW/PROCESS

eg. chemical production process

B ASSEMBLY LINE

eg. most motor vehicle production

C EQUIPMENT REPAIRS

equipment frequently reset to vary product

D ONE OFF/RESPONSE

each item produced to a different specification

E MAINTENANCE/SERVICING/REPAIRS

.....

F OTHER TYPE

specify

G CAPACITY

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19. I have a list of issues which some firms negotiate with trade unions or staff associations. Does the management at this establishment negotiate with a trade union or staff association on any matters connected (ASK FOR GRID IN GRID)?

	Negotiations (see Q20 below)		Negotiations with:	
	Yes	No	Shop Stewards	To Official Both
Capital investment?	1 A	1	1	1
Major changes in production methods?	2 A	2	2	2
Physical working conditions?	3 A	3	3	3
Hours of work?	4 A	4	4	4
Disciplinary procedures?	5 A	5	5	5
Belonging to the union or staff association?	6 A	6	6	6
Belonging to the union or staff association?	7 A	7	7	7
Belonging to the union or staff association?	8 A	8	8	8
Belonging to the union or staff association?	9 A	9	9	9

ASK FOR EACH ISSUE WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN GRID ABOVE

20. Are negotiations with the union/staff associations over (ISSUE IN GRID) usually conducted with

- a shop steward or other employee

- an equivalent position

- a full time union official

- or both?

RUNNING

PROBET

RECORD ANSWER IN GRID

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21. Are there any issues which management here feel it is most appropriate to negotiate about?

IF YES

(a) Can you tell me which issues do management find it is most appropriate to negotiate about?

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30. (Apart from the committee set up to deal with the current emergency do you have any formally constituted joint committees covering all the usual matters of concern to either party?)	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
IF YES			
31. How many of these joint consultative committees exist within this establishment?		
32. (Is there a/Does the) plant/factory level joint consultative committee cover(ing) all the usual matters of concern to manual employees at (ESTABLISHMENT NAME)?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q13 go to Q14
IF YES			
33. Are the employee representatives on this committee elected by the employees of the plant/factory machinery or is the choice independent of them?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q13 go to Q14
34. Does (one of) your joint consultative committee(s) cover all the non-manual workers at (ESTABLISHMENT NAME)?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	
35. Does (one of) your joint consultative committee(s) cover all the non-manual workers at (ESTABLISHMENT NAME)?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	
IF CODE 2 AT BOTH Q14 AND Q15	A	go to Q15	
IF CODE 2 AT EITHER Q14 OR Q15	B	go to Q16	
IF CODE 1 AT BOTH Q14 AND Q15	C	ask Q16	

36. Are the employee representatives on the joint consultative committee covering all the usual matters of concern to manual employees of this establishment machinery or is the choice independent of them?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
37. Are the employee representatives on the joint consultative committee covering non-manual workers of this establishment machinery or is the choice independent of them?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
38. Which of these two committees covers the largest number of employees in this establishment	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
39. Are you yourself a member of either of these committees?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
40. Are you yourself a member of that joint consultative committee?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	ask Q11 go to Q15
41. Do(es) that committee(s) you belong to meet at regular intervals or only when a specific issue is raised?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	
42. Can you tell me which of these matters are raised at the factory/plant level consultative committee(s) you are a member of (ask for each IN Q110) raised?	Yes ... No ...	1 2	

Physical working conditions	1	A
Major changes in production methods	2	A
Safety matters	3	A
Wages and salaries	4	A
Disciplinary procedures	5	A
Current trading position of the company	6	A
	7	A
	8	A
	9	A

13. Which of the statements mentioned on this card best describes the way in which most issues are dealt with on the plant/factory level joint consultative committee?

management pass information to employees
 employees
 management and employees discuss a matter
 before management decides
 management and employees discuss a matter

SHOW CARD F

44. And looking at the card again which of the statements best describes what you think should happen at plant/factory level joint consultative committees?

- management pass information to employees
- management receive information from employees
- management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
- management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision

COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION

5. Does the management here have a written policy which determines just which information is passed to employees or their representatives?

SPONTANEOUS

Yes
Yes for representatives only
Yes for employees only

16. How satisfied are you with the amount of information currently given to employees or their representatives? Are you ...

Very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
Not very satisfied
Not at all satisfied?

17. Has there been any alteration in the range of information given to employers or their representatives in this establishment in the past 12 months?

YES

48. Has this led to an increase or decrease in the range of information event

	ask (s)
increase	1
decrease	2
no difference	3
too early to say	4

IF INCREASE

(a) Do you think this increase in the range of information given to employees has helped management or has it helped employee representatives in their negotiations?

1. *Introduction*

(SPONTANEOUS) helped b
helped e
helped e

9. Does the management here pass information in confidence to trade unions or staff associations strictly for negotiating purposes only?

50. What would you describe as the main methods by which the top managers in this establishment learn the views of their employees?

0

TO PERSONS

51. In general do you find that senior management
0 gives you enough information?

Yes ... 1
No ... 2

SHOW CARD B AGAIN

52. I asked you earlier about the way in which decisions are made on matters affecting this establishment. Now I am asking you to describe the way in which decisions should be made. Ideally how should decisions about (GO THROUGH LIST IN Q12) be made?

	Top person	Top person through intermediate	Joint decision through intermediate	Joint decision through intermediate	Joint decision through intermediate	Joint decision through intermediate	Joint decision through intermediate
1. Major changes in production methods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. New items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Physical working conditions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Hours of work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Safety matters	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Disciplinary problems	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Disciplinary matters	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Matters relating to the colour/condition of the premises	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Matters relating to the colour/condition of the premises	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

0

BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

53. (a) Is your company has a board of directors, but you do not know what they do? (b) Do you know how they deal with things? Could you say what sorts of decisions they think your company board discusses at its meetings?

Yes/No Idea

1

2

0

54. Is your company the Board of Directors meets regularly to make the important decisions; but in other companies the important decisions are taken by the Board of Directors but they do not have to satisfy them. Which do you think happens in (SAMPLED COMPANY)?

0

Board meets to take important decisions
Important decisions taken outside

1

2

55. When the Board of directors discuss matters and has to take a decision do you think it usually ...

0

Runs the company
Runs the company

1

2

56. Do you think that other generally happens at board meetings has ...

0

Little effect
Little effect
Little effect
Don't know

1

2

3

4

SHOW CARD F

43. Which of the statements mentioned on this card best describes the way in which most issues are dealt with on the plant/factory level joint consultative committee?

- 1 management pass information to employees
 2 management receive information from employees
 3 management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
 4 management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision

SHOW CARD F

44. And looking at the card again which of the statements best describes what you think should happen at plant/factory level joint consultative committees?

- 1 - management pass information to employees
 2 - management receive information from employees
 3 - management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
 4 - management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision

COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION

45. Does the management here have a written policy which determines just which information is passed to employees or their representatives?

- Yes
 No for representatives only
 No for employees only
 No

SPONTANEOUS

46. How satisfied are you with the amount of information currently given to employees or their representatives? Are you ...

- 0 Very satisfied
 1 Satisfied
 2 Not very satisfied
 3 Not at all satisfied?
 4 Don't know

BURNING PROMPT

47. Has there been any alteration in the range of information given to employees or their representatives in this establishment in the past 12 months?	1 ask Q48 2 go to Q49 Yes .. No ...	
IF YES		
48. Has this led to an increase or decrease in the range of information given?	1 ask (a) 2 increase 3 no difference 4 too early to say (SPONTANEOUS) (SPONTANEOUS)	
IF INCREASE		
(a) Do you think this increase in the range of information given to employees has helped management and employee representatives in their negotiations?	1 helped both 2 helped management only 3 helped employee representatives only 4 not helped 5 too early to say (SPONTANEOUS) (SPONTANEOUS) (SPONTANEOUS)	
49. Does the management here pass information to employees or their representatives for purposes strictly for negotiating?	1 Yes .. 2 No ...	

WORKER QUESTION QUESTIONS

These have been submitted that representatives of employees, often called "worker directors" should sit on Company Boards of Directors.

62. If such a scheme was adopted in Britain would you be in favor of the idea or against it?

in favor .. 1
against 2

SOME CARD C

64. If the Boards of British companies were to have worker directors which of the ideas on this card best describes what you think they would do?

- A communicate Board views to company employees .. 1
- B communicate employees' views and problems to the Board .. 2
- C advise the Board of company problems .. 3
- D contribute nothing to the Board .. 4
- E make the Board aware of company function effectively .. 5
- F none of these .. 6

65. If your company were to introduce worker directors on the Board, do you think they should make up ...

- more than 1/2 of the total Board .. 1
- 1/2 of the total Board .. 2
- less than 1/2 of the Board .. 3
- or should there be only 1 worker director? .. 4

66. If the (SAMPLED COMPANY) Board were to include one or more worker directors do you think they should be elected to the Board or appointed in some other way?

- elected .. 1
- appointed in other way .. 2
- don't know .. 3

IF APPOINTED IN SOME OTHER WAY

67. Who do you think should choose worker directors ..

- A the management .. 1
- B the workers .. 2
- C full time or national union officials .. 3
- D or some of them? .. 4
- E management and unions together .. 5

IF ELECTED (CODE 1 066)

68. Do you think anyone excluded by the company, including management, should be allowed to vote in the election of worker directors or should some be excluded?

everyone vote .. 1
some excluded .. 2

IF SOME EXCLUDED

69. Who should be excluded?

go to Q70
ask Q69

70. Should worker directors come from among company employees, including management, or from outside of the company?

- From company employees .. 1
- From outside .. 2
- Both areas .. 3

71. Do you think that worker directors from outside the company should be full time union officials or people from some other background?

go to Q72
ask Q71

SOME CARD E

72. Can I show you this card which lists a number of groups of employees who you think should be included in the company, do you think all of these groups of employees should be included or should some of these groups be excluded?

all should be eligible .. 1
some excluded .. 2

IF SOME EXCLUDED

(a) Which of the groups on this card should be excluded?

RECORD BELOW

(b) And why should be excluded?

(ASK FOR ALL MENTIONED AT (a) AND RECORD BELOW)

GROUPS ON CARD	EXCLUDED	OFFICE USE ONLY	REASON FOR EXCLUSION
Senior managers	1		
Other managers	1		
Foremen/Supervisors	1		
Clerical staff	1		
Skilled manual	1		
Unskilled manual	1		
Scientific and Technical	1		

75. Suppose a worker director were to come from among a group of workers who are not in a union or staff association in the company.

0 If he were to come from among the union/staff association representatives or not?

1	ask (a)
2	ask (b)
3	go to Q74

IF S.A./U REPRESENTATIVES (CODE 1, Q23)

(a) Once a union representative has joined the board as a worker director should he be allowed to continue holding his union/staff association office?

Yes ...	1	go to Q74
No ...	2	

TO STRONGS OR EQUIVALENT

(b) Do you think a worker director should be allowed to represent his union/staff association or the workplace as a whole?

1	ask (a)
2	ask (b)

IF NOT UNION REPRESENTATIVES (CODE 2, Q23)

(b) Once a worker director has joined the Company Board should he be allowed to hold office in his trade union/staff association or not?

Yes allowed	1
No, not allowed	2

-18-

76. If there were worker directors on the Board of (SAMPLED COMPANY) do you think that those who elected or accepted them should be able to demand their resignation if elected and then to leave the company and to hold other offices? Directors keep their position until their term of office ends?	1 should be able to demand his resignation should keep position until term of office ends	2
0		
75. If your company had worker directors do you think they should be bound by rules of confidentiality, or should they be free to discuss Board matters with other company employees?	1 bound by rules of confidentiality free to discuss with other employees	2
0		
76. After a Board decision is taken, do you think worker directors should be bound by rules of confidentiality, or should they be free to discuss Board matters with other company employees?	1 bound by rules of confidentiality free to discuss with other employees	2
0		
77. On your fact it should be part of a worker director's job to report back to the workers on the reasons behind decisions were and to explain the reasons behind them?	1 Yes 2 No 3 Other (SPECIFY)	2
0		
78. Do you think all the employees in the company should accept all Board decisions if they are given? Should they be free to oppose decisions which they do not like?	1 should accept all Board decisions 2 should be free to oppose decisions	2
0		

-20-

79. If worker directors were to join company boards there might be some disagreement about the part they should play in the discussion. Do you think there are any issues which worker directors should be excluded from discussing?	1 go to Q80 ask (a) 2			
0	they should discuss any issue should be excluded from some issues.....			
IF NOT SOME ISSUES				
(a) What should they <u>NOT</u> discuss?				
0				
80. Some people think that worker directors would always find it difficult to join in general Board discussion.				
SHOW CARD J				
We need a number of ideas about this. Can you say which comes closest to your own view?				
0	A they would have no difficulty B with training they would soon pick up C with the necessary experience D they would find it difficult E they would never understand the subjects difficult F none of these	1 2 3 4 5 6		
81. Many companies have senior management committees and the Board which includes directors. Do you think that worker directors should sit on such committees or not?	Yes Only on some	1 go to Q82 2 3 ask (a)		
0	(SPONTANEOUS)			
(a) May do you feel they should be excluded from (some of) these committees?				
0				
82. Should worker directors be able to sit in their capacity as worker directors, on any joint employer-management committees?	Yes No (SPONTANEOUS)	1 2 3		
0				
83. If worker directors were to be appointed to the Board of this company would you expect to be involved in the discussion and decision making of negotiating and negotiations in Board meetings?	Yes No Don't know ..	1 2 3		
0				
84. Do you think that the presence of worker directors would affect what is discussed at Board meetings?	Yes No ask (a) go to Q85	1 2		
IF YES				
(a) How would it affect what is discussed?				
0				
85. And do you think that the presence of worker directors would change the ways in which matters are dealt with in Board meetings?	Yes No ask (a) go to Q86	1 2		
0				
IF YES				
(a) How would it change the way in which matters are dealt with?				

86. If worker directors were to come from amongst company employees, should they spend all their spare time on their duties? If not, should they also continue to do their regular job?	1 2		
0	continue regular job ... All time on WD duties ..		
87. Do you think worker directors should receive directors fees?	1 2 3		
0	Yes, fees No (SUPPORT/MAINTENANCE)		
88. If worker directors were introduced on to the Board of your own company would you expect them to affect your authority as manager/foreman?	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT AU AV AW AX AY AZ BA BB BC BD BE BF BG BH BI BJ BK BL BM BN BO BP BQ BR BS BT BU BV BW BX BY BZ CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM CN CO CP CQ CR CS CT CU CV CW CX CY CZ DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN DO DP DQ DR DS DT DU DV DW DX DY DZ EA EB EC ED EE EF EG EH EI EJ EK EL EM EN EO EP EQ ER ES ET EU EV EW EX EY EZ FA FB FC FD FE FF FG FH FI FJ FK FL FM FN FO FP FQ FR FS FT FU FV FW FX FY FZ GA GB GC GD GE GF GG GH GI GJ GK GL GM GN GO GP GQ GR GS GT GU GV GW GX GY GZ HA HB HC HD HE HF HG HH HI HJ HK HL HM HN HO HP HQ HR HS HT HU HV HW HX HY HZ IA IB IC ID IE IF IG IH II IJ IK IL IM IN IO IP IQ IR IS IT IU IV IW IX IY IZ JA JB JC JD JE JF JG JH JI JJ JK JL JM JN JO JP JQ JR JS JT JU JV JW JX JY JZ KA KB KC KD KE KF KG KH KI KJ KK KL KM KN KO KP KQ KR KS KT KU KV KW KX KY KZ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LR LS LT LU LV LW LX LY LZ MA MB MC MD ME MF MG MH MI MJ MK ML MM MN MO MP MQ MR MS MT MU MV MW MX MY MZ NA NB NC ND NE NF NG NH NI NJ NK NL NM NN NO NP NQ NR NS NT NU NV NW NX NY NZ OA OB OC OD OE OF OG OH OI OJ OK OL OM ON OO OP OQ OR OS OT OU OV OW OX OY OZ PA PB PC PD PE PF PG PH PI PJ PK PL PM PN PO PP PQ PR PS PT PU PV PW PX PY PZ QA QB QC QD QE QF QG QH QI QJ QK QL QM QN QO QP QQ QR QS QT QU QV QW QX QY QZ RA RB RC RD RE RF RG RH RI RJ RK RL RM RN RO RP RQ RR RS RT RU RV RW RX RY RZ SA SB SC SD SE SF SG SH SI SJ SK SL SM SN SO SP SQ SR SS ST SU SV SW SX SY SZ TA TB TC TD TE TF TG TH TI TJ TK TL TM TN TO TP TQ TR TS TT TU TV TW TX TY TZ UA UB UC UD UE UF UG UH UI UJ UK UL UM UN UO UP UQ UR US UT UU UV UW UX UY UZ VA VB VC VD VE VF VG VH VI VJ VK VL VM VN VO VP VQ VR VS VT VU VV VW VX VY VZ WA WB WC WD WE WF WG WH WI WJ WK WL WM WN WO WP WQ WR WS WT WU WV WW WX WY WZ XA XB XC XD XE XF XG XH XI XJ XK XL XM XN XO XP XQ XR XS XT XU XV XW XX XY XZ YA YB YC YD YE YF YG YH YI YJ YK YL YM YN YO YP YQ YR YS YT YU YV YW YX YY YZ ZA ZB ZC ZD ZE ZF ZG ZH ZI ZJ ZK ZL ZM ZN ZO ZP ZQ ZR ZS ZT ZU ZV ZW ZX ZY ZZ		
89. Would you expect the introduction of worker directors on the Board to increase the power of the company to decrease their power or would it make no difference?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT AU AV AW AX AY AZ BA BB BC BD BE BF BG BH BI BJ BK BL BM BN BO BP BQ BR BS BT BU BV BW BX BY BZ CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM CN CO CP CQ CR CS CT CU CV CW CX CY CZ DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN DO DP DQ DR DS DT DU DV DW DX DY DZ EA EB EC ED EE EF EG EH EI EJ EK EL EM EN EO EP EQ ER ES ET EU EV EW EX EY EZ FA FB FC FD FE FF FG FH FI FJ FK FL FM FN FO FP FQ FR FS FT FU FV FW FX FY FZ GA GB GC GD GE GF GG GH GI GJ GK GL GM GN GO GP GQ GR GS GT GU GV GW GX GY GZ HA HB HC HD HE HF HG HH HI HJ HK HL HM HN HO HP HQ HR HS HT HU HV HW HX HY HZ IA IB IC ID IE IF IG IH II IJ IK IL IM IN IO IP IQ IR IS IT IU IV IW IX IY IZ JA JB JC JD JE JF JG JH JI JJ JK JL JM JN JO JP JQ JR JS JT JU JV JW JX JY JZ KA KB KC KD KE KF KG KH KI KJ KK KL KM KN KO KP KQ KR KS KT KU KV KW KX KY KZ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LM LN LO LP LQ LR LS LT LU LV LW LX LY LZ MA MB MC MD ME MF MG MH MI MJ MK ML MM MN MO MP MQ MR MS MT MU MV MW MX MY MZ NA NB NC ND NE NF NG NH NI NJ NK NL NM NN NO NP NQ NR NS NT NU NV NW NX NY NZ OA OB OC OD OE OF OG OH OI OJ OK OL OM ON OO OP OQ OR OS OT OU OV OW OX OY OZ PA PB PC PD PE PF PG PH PI PJ PK PL PM PN PO PP PQ PR PS PT PU PV PW PX PY PZ QA QB QC QD QE QF QG QH QI QJ QK QL QM QN QO QP QQ QR QS QT QU QV QW QX QY QZ RA RB RC RD RE RF RG RH RI RJ RK RL RM RN RO RP RQ RR RS RT RU RV RW RX RY RZ SA SB SC SD SE SF SG SH SI SJ SK SL SM SN SO SP SQ SR SS ST SU SV SW SX SY SZ TA TB TC TD TE TF TG TH TI TJ TK TL TM TN TO TP TQ TR TS TT TU TV TW TX TY TZ UA UB UC UD UE UF UG UH UI UJ UK UL UM UN UO UP UQ UR US UT UU UV UW UX UY UZ VA VB VC VD VE VF VG VH VI VJ VK VL VM VN VO VP VQ VR VS VT VU VV VW VX VY VZ WA WB WC WD WE WF WG WH WI WJ WK WL WM WN WO WP WQ WR WS WT WU WV WW WX WY WZ XA XB XC XD XE XF XG XH XI XJ XK XL XM XN XO XP XQ XR XS XT XU XV XW XX XY XZ YA YB YC YD YE YF YG YH YI YJ YK YL YM YN YO YP YQ YR YS YT YU YV YW YX YY YZ ZA ZB ZC ZD ZE ZF ZG ZH ZI ZJ ZK ZL ZM ZN ZO ZP ZQ ZR ZS ZT ZU ZV ZW ZX ZY ZZ		
90. Do you think that the existence of worker directors on the Board would increase employees' feeling of involvement with the company or would it make no difference?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT AU AV AW AX AY AZ BA BB BC BD BE BF BG BH BI BJ BK BL BM BN BO BP BQ BR BS BT BU BV BW BX BY BZ CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM CN CO CP CQ CR CS CT CU CV CW CX CY CZ DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN DO DP DQ DR DS DT DU DV DW DX DY DZ EA EB EC ED EE EF EG EH EI EJ EK EL EM EN EO EP EQ ER ES ET EU EV EW EX EY EZ FA FB FC FD FE FF FG FH FI FJ FK FL FM FN FO FP FQ FR FS FT FU FV FW FX FY FZ GA GB GC GD GE GF GG GH GI GJ GK GL GM GN GO GP GQ GR GS GT GU GV GW GX GY GZ HA HB HC HD HE HF HG HH HI HJ HK HL HM HN HO HP HQ HR HS HT HU HV HW HX HY HZ IA IB IC ID IE IF IG IH II IJ IK IL IM IN IO IP IQ IR IS IT IU IV IW IX IY IZ JA JB JC JD JE JF JG JH JI JJ JK JL JM JN JO JP JQ JR JS JT JU JV JW JX JY JZ KA KB KC KD KE KF KG KH KI KJ KK KL KM KN KO KP KQ KR KS KT KU KV KW KX KY KZ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LM LN LO LP LQ LR LS LT LU LV LW LX LY LZ MA MB MC MD ME MF MG MH MI MJ MK ML MM MN MO MP MQ MR MS MT MU MV MW MX MY MZ NA NB NC ND NE NF NG NH NI NJ NK NL NM NN NO NP NQ NR NS NT NU NV NW NX NY NZ OA OB OC OD OE OF OG OH OI OJ OK OL OM ON OO OP OQ OR OS OT OU OV OW OX OY OZ PA PB PC PD PE PF PG PH PI PJ PK PL PM PN PO PP PQ PR PS PT PU PV PW PX PY PZ QA QB QC QD QE QF QG QH QI QJ QK QL QM QN QO QP QQ QR QS QT QU QV QW QX QY QZ RA RB RC RD RE RF RG RH RI RJ RK RL RM RN RO RP RQ RR RS RT RU RV RW RX RY RZ SA SB SC SD SE SF SG SH SI SJ SK SL SM SN SO SP SQ SR SS ST SU SV SW SX SY SZ TA TB TC TD TE TF TG TH TI TJ TK TL TM TN TO TP TQ TR TS TT TU TV TW TX TY TZ UA UB UC UD UE UF UG UH UI UJ UK UL UM UN UO UP UQ UR US UT UU UV UW UX UY UZ VA VB VC VD VE VF VG VH VI VJ VK VL VM VN VO VP VQ VR VS VT VU VV VW VX VY VZ WA WB WC WD WE WF WG WH WI WJ WK WL WM WN WO WP WQ WR WS WT WU WV WW WX WY WZ XA XB XC XD XE XF XG XH XI XJ XK XL XM XN XO XP XQ XR XS XT XU XV XW XX XY XZ YA YB YC YD YE YF YG YH YI YJ YK YL YM YN YO YP YQ YR YS YT YU YV YW YX YY YZ ZA ZB ZC ZD ZE ZF ZG ZH ZI ZJ ZK ZL ZM ZN ZO ZP ZQ ZR ZS ZT ZU ZV ZW ZX ZY ZZ		
91(a) Now, all in all, if a worker director scheme were introduced would you expect to be the manager/foreman of your own company or would you expect to be a worker director on the Board?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN AO AP AQ AR AS AT AU AV AW AX AY AZ BA BB BC BD BE BF BG BH BI BJ BK BL BM BN BO BP BQ BR BS BT BU BV BW BX BY BZ CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM CN CO CP CQ CR CS CT CU CV CW CX CY CZ DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN DO DP DQ DR DS DT DU DV DW DX DY DZ EA EB EC ED EE EF EG EH EI EJ EK EL EM EN EO EP EQ ER ES ET EU EV EW EX EY EZ FA FB FC FD FE FF FG FH FI FJ FK FL FM FN FO FP FQ FR FS FT FU FV FW FX FY FZ GA GB GC GD GE GF GG GH GI GJ GK GL GM GN GO GP GQ GR GS GT GU GV GW GX GY GZ HA HB HC HD HE HF HG HH HI HJ HK HL HM HN HO HP HQ HR HS HT HU HV HW HX HY HZ IA IB IC ID IE IF IG IH II IJ IK IL IM IN IO IP IQ IR IS IT IU IV IW IX IY IZ JA JB JC JD JE JF JG JH JI JJ JK JL JM JN JO JP JQ JR JS JT JU JV JW JX JY JZ KA KB KC KD KE KF KG KH KI KJ KK KL KM KN KO KP KQ KR KS KT KU KV KW KX KY KZ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LM LN LO LP LQ LR LS LT LU LV LW LX LY LZ MA MB MC MD ME MF MG MH MI MJ MK ML MM MN MO MP MQ MR MS MT MU MV MW MX MY MZ NA NB NC ND NE NF NG NH NI NJ NK NL NM NN NO NP NQ NR NS NT NU NV NW NX NY NZ OA OB OC OD OE OF OG OH OI OJ OK OL OM ON OO OP OQ OR OS OT OU OV OW OX OY OZ PA PB PC PD PE PF PG PH PI PJ PK PL PM PN PO PP PQ PR PS PT PU PV PW PX PY PZ QA QB QC QD QE QF QG QH QI QJ QK QL QM QN QO QP QQ QR QS QT QU QV QW QX QY QZ RA RB RC RD RE RF RG RH RI RJ RK RL RM RN RO RP RQ RR RS RT RU RV RW RX RY RZ SA SB SC SD SE SF SG SH SI SJ SK SL SM SN SO SP SQ SR SS ST SU SV SW SX SY SZ TA TB TC TD TE TF TG TH TI TJ TK TL TM TN TO TP TQ TR TS TT TU TV TW TX TY TZ UA UB UC UD UE UF UG UH UI UJ UK UL UM UN UO UP UQ UR US UT UU UV UW UX UY UZ VA VB VC VD VE VF VG VH VI VJ VK VL VM VN VO VP VQ VR VS VT VU VV VW VX VY VZ WA WB WC WD WE WF WG WH WI WJ WK WL WM WN WO WP WQ WR WS WT WU WV WW WX WY WZ XA XB XC XD XE XF XG XH XI XJ XK XL XM XN XO XP XQ XR XS XT XU XV XW XX XY XZ YA YB YC YD YE YF YG YH YI YJ YK YL YM YN YO YP YQ YR YS YT YU YV YW YX YY YZ ZA ZB ZC ZD ZE ZF ZG ZH ZI ZJ ZK ZL ZM ZN ZO ZP ZQ ZR ZS ZT ZU ZV ZW ZX ZY ZZ		

91 (b) What would you expect to be the major advantage of having 1 or more worker directors on the Board?

0

SHINE GLAZON AND READ OUT EXPLANATION

As you know, at present each company has a Board of directors who are appointed by the shareholders to run the business of the company. The Board includes some directors who are shareholders and some who are not. There are also part-time directors who work for the company as part-time directors, and some who are full-time directors. Suppose one (or three) Board contained only the most important day running of the company and could be called the Management Board. The other type of Board would have the job of supervising the day running of the company and could be called the Supervisory Board. The Management Board would not become involved in the day-to-day running of the company.

LEAVE GLAZON WITH INFORMATION

92. It has been suggested that if Supervisory Boards were ever introduced in Britain then worker directors should sit on these Boards. Would you be in favour of worker directors on these Boards if they were ever introduced in Britain or would you be against it?

0

In favour ... 1
against ... 2

93. Again if worker directors were introduced since this would mean that there would be an equal number of worker directors and other directors on such a board, or would you prefer a minority of worker directors?

0

Equal number ... 1
Minority ... 2

94. If your own company did have a Supervisory Board with half of its members sitting as worker directors, would you expect to have better industrial relations, or wouldn't it make any difference?

0

Improve IR 1
worsen IR 2
make no difference .. 3

95. And if the Supervisory Board contained less than half worker directors do you then think it would ...

0

Improve industrial relations .. 1
worsen industrial relations .. 2
or made no difference? 3

TAKE GLAZON BACK FROM INFORMATION

SEE Q96-97 OF ONE DIRECTOR

Priority:

- (1) IR Director
- (2) Managing Director
- (3) Finance Director

Other directors ... 200 A 10 to 0 (1)

IF COMPANY HAS TWO/STAFF ASSOCIATIONS (Q 98) - others go to Q92

96. Can you tell me which trade unions or staff associations have members within your own company? (Name them in BOX (a))

(a) And is (NAME OF TWO/STAFF ASSOCIATION CITED) recognised for negotiating purposes?

COUNT AS RECOGNISED IF

TO BE RECOGNISED FOR ANY
NEGOTIATIONS

(a) Name of T.U. or staff association

(b) Recognised?

Yes No

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 A

5 A

6 A

7 A

97. How I'd like you to think different groups of your organization are represented in the union? (First of all) what proportion of your (SECTORS) are in a union or staff association...

SECTORS
PROBT
more than 1 of them,
or all of them?

	under 1	1 to 1	over 1	all
Supervisory staff	1	2	3	4
Managerial staff	1	2	3	4
Technical and Clerical staff	1	2	3	4
Manual workers	1	2	3	4

98. Apart from national strikes, how often have there been strikes in your establishment? (in the past 12 months) Have strikes occurred ...

frequently
seldom
or not at all?

99. And what other forms of pressure, if any, have been used here in this establishment (in the past 12 months)?

Have there been any ...
change in staff?
work-to-rule or go-slow?
operational?
PROBT

100. Would you say that industrial relations in (SAMPLED ESTAB) were very good, fairly good or not very good?

very good
fairly good
not very good

TO ALL MANAGERS/FOREMEN

A go to Q104

101. On most of the managers/foremen at your level in (SAMPLED ESTAB) belong to a trade union or staff association?

Yes ..
No ..

102. Do you personally belong to a trade union or a staff association?

Yes ..
No ..

ASK ALL

103. Some people say that for most purposes the interests of management and workers are the same. Others say that although there must be some cooperation the interests of the two sides are basically different. Which comes closest to your view?

Interests the same ..
Interests different ..

CLASSIFICATION

104. Finally I would like to ask 3 or 4 questions about you yourself. Can you tell me how long you have been working for (SAMPLED ESTAB)?

less than 1 year
1 year
2 but less than 5 years
5 but less than 10 years
10 years or more

105. Can you tell me your age last birthday?

under 35
35 - 45
45 - 55
55 - 65
over 65

106. And at what age did you complete your full time education?

under 16
16 - 17
17 - 18
over 18

CARD A

Apart from the normal review
of company business the Board.....

- L formally RATIFIES policy decisions arrived at elsewhere in the organisation
- P DECIDES whether to accept policy recommendations formulated elsewhere in the organisation
- X EVALUATES a number of possible policy options formulated elsewhere in the organisation
- Y GENERATES policy drawing on its own or other sources of expertise

S1082
W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD B

- 1 Directors voted to reach a majority decision
- 2 Chairman summed up the arguments on both sides and then gave the Board decision
- 3 Chairman noted that most directors favoured one solution, and asked the Board to agree
- 4 General consensus view emerged which was obvious to all present
- 5 None of these

S1082
W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD C

the Board of directors.....

- A RATIFIED a decision taken elsewhere
- B DECIDED whether to accept a policy recommendation formulated elsewhere
- C EVALUATED a number of possible policy options formulated elsewhere
- D GENERATED a policy drawing on its own or other sources of expertise
- E LEFT company executives to take all the decisions on what was to be done
- F the matter is dealt with outside of the company
- G none of these

S1082
W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD D

- A Management alone makes the decisions
- B Management makes the decisions, but takes account of workers' views
- C Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions
- D Joint decision making between management and workers
- E Workers alone make the decisions
- F This is not decided within the company
- G None of these

S1082
W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD E

- A Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed
- B Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views
- C Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions
- D Joint decision making between management and workers
- E Workers alone make decisions
- F None of these

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD F

- A Management pass information to employees
- B Management receive information from employees
- C Management and employees discuss a matter before management decides
- D Management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD G

- A Communicate Board views to company employees
- B Communicate employees views and problems to the Board
- C Actively promote and safeguard the rights of company employees
- D Contribute nothing to the Board
- E Make it difficult for the Board to function effectively
- F None of these

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD H

- Senior managers
- Other managers
- Foremen/Supervisors
- Clerical staff
- Skilled manual
- Unskilled manual
- Scientific and Technical workers

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD J

- A They would have no difficulty
- B With training they would soon pick up the necessary expertise
- C With training they might eventually cope
- D They would always find some subjects difficult
- E They would never understand the issues involved
- F None of these

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD K

- A Senior steward/representative of your own union
- B Senior steward/representative representing more than one union
- C Hold office in your Branch
- D Hold office in your region/district committee
- E Hold office at national level

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD L

- A **CONTINUOUS FLOW/PROCESS**
e.g. chemical production process
- B **ASSEMBLY LINE**
e.g. most motor vehicle production
- C **BATCH PRODUCTION**
equipment frequently reset to vary product
- D **ONE OFF/BESPOKE**
each item produced to a different specification
- E **MAINTENANCE/SERVICING/REPAIRS**
- F **NONE OF THESE**

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD M

- G The board would not be influenced
- R The board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of managers views
- F The board would usually do what managers wanted

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

CARD N

- C The board would not be influenced
- U The board would be prepared to change their minds to take account of union or staff association views
- K The board would usually do what the union or staff association wanted

S1082

W316 OFCS 2/76

Appendix D: Additional tables

- 1D Members of sampled subsidiary board also on parent company board
- 2D Unions active and recognised in sampled companies
- 3D Unions recognised in company establishments
- 4D Unions to which sampled employee representatives belonged
- 5D Length of service as a director in sampled company
- 6D Length of service with present company
- 7D Topic which took most time at the last board meeting
- 8D Board style in industrial relations matters generally
- 9D Whether chairman/managing director vets board papers analysed by board style
- 10D Whether directors meet before main board meeting by board style
- 11D Whether company has executive board by size of main board
- 12D Whether company has executive board(s) by frequency of board meetings
- 13D Whether company has an executive board by number of executive directors on main board
- 14D Whether company has an executive board by size of company
- 15D Whether board has sub committees by size of board
- 16D Board style by whether company has an executive board
- 17D Whether the board has sub committees by board style
- 18D Whether company has management committee by size of board
- 19D Directors' opinions on the greatest and least influences affecting their boards
- 20D Informant knowledge of whether the company is independent or a subsidiary
- 21D Informant knowledge of whether the company had a director who took special responsibility for industrial relations matters at board meetings
- 22D Whether company has a formal (written) policy on which information may be disclosed to employees or their representatives
- 23D Effect of increase in information disclosure in past 12 months
- 24D Whether information given for negotiating purposes by range of bargaining at company-wide level (managing directors)
- 25D Whether information given for negotiating purposes by range of bargaining in company establishments (industrial relations/personnel manager level)
- 26D Whether information passed to employee representatives for use in negotiations by satisfaction with level of information disclosure
- 27D Level of union membership by issues negotiated at plant level
- 28D Contact with full time paid union officials in past year
- 29D Visits from full time paid union officials to selected stewards by the range of bargaining at plant level
- 30D Existence of JCCs in the company establishments
- 31D Issues discussed in JCCs at company and/or establishment-wide level
- 32D Way in which JCCs at company and establishment-wide level were said to function (industrial relations/personnel managers)
- 33D Way in which JCCs at company and establishment-wide level were said to function (convenors)
- 34D How board learns the views of company employees by company size
- 35D Main methods by which top managers at company establishments are said to learn the views of their employees
- 36D Range of bargaining at company-wide level by way in which board deals with industrial relations matters
- 37D Range of bargaining at company-wide level by the time board spent on industrial relations matters
- 38D Opinion of industrial relations in the company

- 39D(i) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean
- 39D(ii) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean
- 39D(iii) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean
- 40D Ways in which informants think decisions on capital investment are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 41D Ways in which informants think decisions on major changes in production methods are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 42D Ways in which informants think decisions on pay issues are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 43D Ways in which informants think decisions on hours of work are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 44D Ways in which informants think decisions on physical working conditions are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 45D Ways in which informants think decisions on safety matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 46D Ways in which informants think decisions on disciplinary procedures are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 47D Ways in which informants think decisions on redundancy matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 48D Ways in which informants think decisions on welfare matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made
- 49D Attitude to worker directors of sampled employee representatives analysed by union membership
- 50D View of worker directors by other employee representative offices held
- 51D Attitude to worker directors by the company-wide range of bargaining
- 52D(i) View of worker directors by view of what worker participation should involve
- 52D(ii) View of worker directors by view of what worker participation should involve
- 53D(i) View of worker directors by view of what they would do
- 53D(ii) View of worker directors by view of what they would do
- 54D Whether worker directors should come from among company employees or from other sources
- 55D Whether worker directors should be chosen from among existing union or staff association representatives
- 56D Whether worker directors should be bound to support general board view
- 57D Stewards' views of worker director responsibilities to employees who belong to a different union
- 58D Whether worker directors should receive directors fees
- 59D Whether informants believe that the introduction of worker directors would bring bargaining into the boardroom
- 60D Whether employees should be free to oppose board decisions if given representation at that level
- 61D(i) Expected effect of worker directors on power of trades unions by attitude to worker directors
- 61D(ii) Expected effect of worker directors on power of trades unions by attitude to worker directors
- 62D Whether company has an executive board by managing director's view of worker directors on supervisory boards
- 63D Outside influences on board deliberations (directors intra-company comparisons)
- 64D Issues negotiated in company establishments (convenor and minority union steward intra-company comparisons)
- 65D Issues negotiated in company establishments (most senior and other senior employee representatives intra-company comparisons)
- 66D Age of sampled role incumbents
- 67D Union membership in sampled companies
- 68D Union/staff association membership by grade in sampled establishments

Table 1D Members of sampled subsidiary board also on parent company board

	All subsidiaries with some directors who also sit on parent company board
Base (weighted)	99
Directors on both boards:*	%
Managing director	45
Chairman	47
Finance director	12
Sales/marketing director	6
Non-executive directors	14
Other directors	38

* Some informants mentioned more than 1 director so table adds to more than 100%.

Table 2D Unions active and recognised in sampled companies

	All companies with recognised trades unions giving information*
Base (weighted)	171
Unions in company:	%
Transport and General Workers	42
General and Municipal Workers	27
Electricians	28
Amalgamated Engineering Workers	58
UCATT	8
APEX	18
ASTMS	30
Print unions	7
TASS/other 'staff' sections	29
Textile unions	11
MATSA	3
FTAT	3
USDAW	3
Sheet Metalworkers	9
Metal Mechanics	3
Other unions	22
Company staff association	4
Not answered	6

* Table excludes 18 companies with no recognised unions.

Table 3D Unions recognised in company establishments

	All company establishments giving information
Base (weighted)	142
Unions in company establishments:*	%
Transport and General Workers	35
General and Municipal Workers	23
Electricians	29
Amalgamated Engineering Workers	61
UCATT	9
APEX	12
ASTMS	30
Print unions	9
TASS/other 'staff' sections	28
Textile unions	9
MATSA	3
FTAT	2
USDAW	3
Sheet Metalworkers	8
Metal Mechanics	2
Other unions	19
Company staff association	6

* Table excludes company establishments in which there were no recognised unions and those in which the question was not answered.

Table 4D Unions to which sampled employee representatives belonged

	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	161	108	84
Union steward belonged to:	%	%	%
Transport and General Workers	21	5	6
General and Municipal Workers	12	—	8
Electricians	0	1	19
Amalgamated Engineering Workers	34	5	32
UCATT	4	—	3
APEX	1	22	1
ASTMS	1	24	5
Print unions	6	6	4
TASS/other 'staff' sections	0	24	6
Textile unions	9	1	2
MATSA	—	2	1
FTAT	1	2	1
USDAW	2	—	—
Sheet Metalworkers	2	—	3
Metal Mechanics	1	1	5
Other unions	6	2	3
Company staff associations	—	6	2
Total	100	100	100

Table 5D Length of service as a director in sampled company

	Managing director	IR/ personnel director	Finance director
Base (weighted)	173	93	106
Directorial service in company			
Under 1 year	6	8	15
1 year	4	9	10
2-5 years	14	26	26
5-10 years	15	14	15
Over 10 years	58	41	23
Not answered	3	3	1
Total	100	100	100

Table 6D Length of service with present company

	Managers				Employee representatives			
	Estab. manager	Industrial/relations personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Length of service:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Less than 1 year	2	11	9	3	2	1	—	0
Over 1 but under 2 years	8	15	5	8	2	3	6	2
Over 3 but under 5 years	13	23	11	12	7	10	16	11
Over 5 but under 10 years	22	22	17	25	18	24	24	33
10 years or more	55	28	57	53	72	62	54	54
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 7D Topic which took most time at the last board meeting

	Managing directors	Industrial relations/ personnel directors	Finance directors
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
Topic which took most time:	%	%	%
Cash flow/trading position/profits	35	34	39
Sales and marketing	15	21	24
Production/output	11	13	8
Future planning/budgets	14	14	14
Pay and pensions	2	2	3
Capital investment	5	9	4
Research and Development	7	3	4
Plant/property maintenance	1	1	1
IR/training/recruitment	6	8	2
MD's management report	3	6	4
Last board minutes/internal board matters	0	0	1
Overseas branches/subsidiaries	4	3	3
General day-to-day problems	1	—	1
General economic situation	1	1	1
Government legislation	1	—	—
Other	11	7	11
Not answered	1	0	0

* Columns add to more than 100 per cent because some informants gave more than one answer.

Table 9D Whether chairman/managing director vets board papers analysed by board style

	Whether chairman vets papers before they are put to the board	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	42	130
Way in which board usually operates:	%	%
Formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	13	14
Decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	15	24
Evaluates options formulated elsewhere	8	14
Generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	62	45
Not answered/don't know	1	2
Total	100	100

Table 8D Board style in industrial relations matters generally

	Managing directors	Industrial relations/ personnel directors	Finance directors
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106
Board style in relation to I.R. matters:	%	%	%
Formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	14	12	17
Decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	22	25	30
Evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	14	15	15
Generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	47	45	37
Not answered/varies	3	3	1
	100	100	100
Board style in I.R. matters shows:	%	%	%
Greater involvement than in general	17	12	13
Less involvement than in general	27	24	31
Same level of involvement as in general	55	64	56
	100	100	100

Table 10D Whether directors meet before main board meeting by board style

	Whether directors meet beforehand to discuss issues for board meetings	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	74	98
Way in which board usually operates:	%	%
Formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	10	18
Decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	18	16
Evaluates options formulated elsewhere	9	11
Generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	60	55
Not answered/don't know	2	—
Total	100	100

Table 11D Whether company has executive board by size of main board

	Whether company has an executive board	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	82	91
Size of board	%	%
2	2	1
3	4	10
4	6	19
5	22	19
6	16	17
7	16	12
8	9	11
9	7	4
10	13	2
11-15	4	3
16+	—	—
Average no. of directors	7.0	6.3

Table 12D Whether company has executive board(s) by frequency of board meetings

	Whether company has executive board(s)	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	82	91
Frequency of board meetings:	%	%
Weekly	1	2
Fortnightly	—	1
Monthly	42	49
Bi-monthly	12	5
Quarterly	15	12
Twice a year	5	4
Yearly	4	2
When needed	5	8
Other answers	16	14
Total	100	100

Table 13D Whether company has an executive board by number of executive directors on main board

	Whether company has an executive board	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	82	91
Number of executive directors:	%	%
None	1	—
1	4	5
2	9	19
3	12	25
4	16	20
5	24	11
6	16	8
7	10	3
8	6	3
9	2	2
10 or more	1	1
Total	100	100

Table 14D Whether company has an executive board by size of company

	Whether company has an executive board	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	82	91
Size of company:	%	%
Under 500	44	59
501-1000	26	24
1001-2000	14	8
2001-5000	9	4
5001-10,000	3	4
More than 10,000	3	1
Don't know/not answered	2	1
Total	100	100

Table 15D Whether board has sub-committees by size of board

	Whether board has any sub-committees	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	67	122
Number of Directors on board:	%	%
1	—	—
2	1	2
3	2	9
4	12	12
5	18	20
6	11	19
7	16	13
8	10	9
9	9	4
10	10	7
11-15	10	4
16+	1	—
Not answered	—	2
Average	7.2	6.7

Table 16D Board style by whether company has an executive board

	Way in which board usually operates:			
	Ratifies	Decides	Evaluates	Generates
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	23	30	17	99
Whether company has an executive board:	%	%	%	%
Yes, one	59	38	35	45
Yes, more than one	5	5	3	—
No	36	57	62	55
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 17D Whether the board has sub-committees by board style

	Whether board has any sub-committees	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	60	113
Way in which board usually operates:	%	%
Formally ratifies decisions arrived at elsewhere	17	12
Decides whether to accept policy formulated elsewhere	25	14
Evaluates a number of options formulated elsewhere	7	12
Generates policy drawing on own/other expertise	51	61
Not answered/can't say	—	2
Total	100	100

Table 18D Whether company has management committee by size of board

	Whether there are any other management committees below board level	
	Yes	No
Base (weighted)	116	71
Number of directors on board:	%	%
1	—	—
2	1	3
3	9	3
4	12	10
5	16	25
6	16	17
7	13	15
8	8	12
9	7	4
10	10	4
11-15	6	6
Not answered	2	—
Average	6.6	6.5

Table 19D Directors opinions on the greatest and least influences affecting their boards

Percentages based on all informants answering both questions	Least influence on the board				
	Big customers/suppliers	Managers	Bankers and financiers	Employees/unions	All four/depends
MANAGING DIRECTORS	Base of percentage = 164 (weighted)				
Greatest influence:					
big customers and suppliers	1	9	44	5	1
managers	1	—	7	—	—
bankers and financiers	5	2	—	4	—
employees and unions	2	1	15	—	—
all the above/depends on issue	1	—	2	—	5
I.R./PERSONNEL DIRECTORS	Base of percentage = 88 (weighted)				
Greatest influence:					
big customers and suppliers	1	13	39	5	5
managers	—	—	3	—	—
bankers and financiers	5	5	—	2	—
employees and unions	2	3	9	—	—
all the above/depends on issue	1	1	3	1	8
FINANCE DIRECTORS	Base of percentage = 102 (weighted)				
Greatest influence:					
big customers and suppliers	—	18	39	7	—
managers	2	—	5	—	—
bankers and financiers	6	2	—	1	—
employees and unions	—	5	15	—	1
all the above/depends on issue	—	1	1	—	5

Table 20D Informant knowledge of whether the company is independent or a subsidiary

	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base* (weighted)	23	26	22	163	149	101	78
Whether informant knows if his company is independent or a subsidiary:†	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Informant gave correct answer	80	70	80	79	83	81	78
Informant gave incorrect answer	20	30	20	21	17	18	22

† Since the base for this group is very small the percentages are shown rounded to the nearest 10 per cent to avoid implying a spurious degree of precision.

‡ A higher proportion of the sampled managerial levels did not answer this question so the 'no answer' cases have been excluded to make the different role levels more comparable.

* Table excludes companies for which this information was not available.

Table 21D Informant knowledge of whether the company had a director who took special responsibility for industrial relations matters at board meetings

	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base* (weighted)	24	26	22	163	149	101	78
Whether informant knows if his company board has a director taking special responsibility for industrial relations matters:‡	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Informant knew	70	60	60	56	55	56	56
Informant did not know	30	40	40	44	45	44	44

† Since the base is very small for this group the percentages are shown rounded to the nearest 10 per cent to avoid implying a spurious degree of precision.

‡ A higher proportion of the sampled managerial levels did not answer this question so the 'no answer' cases have been excluded to make the different role levels more comparable.

* Table excludes companies for which this information was not available.

Table 22D Whether company has a formal (written) policy on which information may be disclosed to employees or their representatives

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether company has a written policy on information disclosure:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	9	12	4	7	13	9	12	23	19	13	22
No	90	87	95	92	86	88	84	65	74	71	70
Don't know/not answered	1	0	1	1	0	3	4	12	6	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 23D Effect of increase in information disclosure in past 12 months

	Directors			Managers					Employee representatives		
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Information disclosure:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
No increase in last year	47	41	46	42	37	49	50	53	57	57	57
Increase in last year	53	58	52	58	62	50	49	44	43	42	39
Don't know	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	3	0	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Increase has:											
helped both sides	30	33	30	42	42	35	28	29	30	23	23
helped management only	7	3	7	3	6	4	7	2	3	6	7
helped employee representatives only	4	13	6	5	7	5	7	10	6	11	8
not helped either	7	6	8	3	1	5	2	2	3	1	2
too early to say	5	2	1	3	6	2	6	0	1	1	—
not answered/don't know	—	—	—	3	1	—	—	1	—	—	—

Table 24D Whether information given for negotiating purposes by range of bargaining at company-wide level (managing directors)

Managing directors	Whether company passes information to unions for negotiations	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	90	74
Issues negotiated at company-wide level:	%	%
Capital investment	6	2
Major changes in production methods	59	40
Pay issues	93	82
Physical working conditions	80	72
Hours of work	80	69
Safety matters	78	70
Disciplinary procedures	83	77
Redundancy	81	70
Welfare matters like canteen or recreation facilities	73	62
Not answered/don't know	2	12

Table 25D Whether information given for negotiating purposes by range of bargaining in company establishments (industrial relations/personnel manager level)

Industrial relations/personnel managers	Whether company passes information to unions for negotiations:	
	Yes	No
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	32	55
Issues negotiated in company establishments:	%	%
Capital investment	1	4
Major changes in production methods	70	48
Pay issues	98	84
Physical working conditions	98	79
Hours of work	78	74
Safety matters	87	75
Disciplinary procedures	94	84
Redundancy	100	77
Welfare matters like canteen or recreation facilities	80	61
Not answered/don't know	—	5

Table 26D Whether information passed to employee representatives for use in negotiations by satisfaction with level or information disclosure

	Estab manager		Personnel manager		Most snr. rep.		Other snr. rep.	
	Inform. for negs.	No inform.	Inform. for negs.	No inform.	Inform. for negs.	No inform.	Inform. for negs.	No inform.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	19	54	32	55	78	81	47	58
Satisfaction with information:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very satisfied	22	34	32	26	17	12	15	8
Fairly satisfied	62	50	54	52	43	37	42	46
Not very satisfied	16	14	10	23	20	24	38	26
Not at all satisfied	—	2	4	—	20	26	5	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes 'don't know' answers regarding whether information passed.

Table 27D Level of union membership by issues negotiated at plant level

	Level of union membership among manual workers in the sampled establishment			
	Under $\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2}$	Over $\frac{1}{2}$ but not all	All
<i>Base (weighted) +</i>	5	8	61	64
Issues negotiated at plant level:	*	*	%	%
Capital investment			5	8
Major changes in prod. methods			58	73
Pay issues			91	98
Physical working conditions			89	97
Hours of work			81	83
Safety matters			86	86
Disciplinary procedures			86	97
Redundancy			88	95
Welfare matters			72	78

* Bases too small for percentages

+ Excludes companies not negotiating with unions at establishment level and 19 in which the question was not answered

Table 28D Contact with full-time paid union officials in past year

	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	142	76	70
Contact with full-time official in past year:	%	%	%
Never	9	19	20
Once	17	17	25
2-4 times	31	24	32
5-25 times	34	36	21
more than 25 times	9	3	3
Total	100	100	100

* Table excludes informants who have been stewards for less than a year

Table 29D Visits from full-time paid union officials to selected stewards by the range of bargaining at plant level.

Answers given by most senior employee representative	Visits from full-time officials		
	Once or not at all	2 to 4 times	5 times or more
Base (weighted)*	46	48	38
Issues negotiated:	%	%	%
Capital investment	7	6	3
Major changes in prod. methods	57	50	42
Pay issues	83	60	47
Physical working conditions	87	81	79
Hours of work	78	65	66
Safety matters	80	83	71
Disciplinary procedures	80	77	81
Redundancy	57	52	34
Welfare matters	76	79	81

* Table excludes informants who did not answer both questions.

Table 31D Issues discussed in JCCs at company and/or establishment-wide level

Table should be interpreted with caution due to small bases for percentages	Directors answers compared with:	
	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Most senior employee representative
Base (weighted)*	33	50
Issues discussed at company and/or plant level:	"	"
Physical working conditions	100	98
Hours of work	73	82
Major changes in production methods	100	92
Safety matters	94	92
Capital investment within the company	91	66
Redundancy	85	80
Disciplinary procedures	94	86
Welfare matters	100	94
Current trading position of the company	100	98

* Table is based on those companies with JCCs at both levels in which a director and a personnel manager or senior employee representative were interviewed

Table 30D Existence of JCCs in the company establishments

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Have no JCC in estab.	26	21	26	30	37	36	39	38
Have at least 1 JCC in estab.:								
—covering all employees	47	51	49	45	47	44	38	42
—covering all manual employees	23	23	20	22	12	18	19	18
—other coverage	4	5	5	2	5	2	5	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 32D Way in which JCCs at company and establishment-wide level were said to function (industrial relations/personnel managers)

Percentages based on 40 companies with JCCs at both levels in which a director and an industrial relations/ personnel manager were interviewed

	Management in JCCs at establishment wide level:			
	pass info. to employees	receive info. from employees	discuss with employees before managers decide	discuss with employees and make a joint decision
In JCCs at company-wide level:	Percentages			
management pass information to employees	—	5	3	—
management receive information from employees	3	3	5	8
management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	5	5	33	8
management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	—	5	12	8

Table adds to more than 100% due to rounding errors

Table 33D Way in which JCCs at company and establishment-wide level were said to function (convenors)

Percentages based on 60 companies with JCCs at both levels in which a director and a convenor were interviewed	Management in JCCs at establishment-wide level:			
	pass info. to employees	receive info. from employees	discuss with employees before managers decide	discuss with employees and make a joint decision
In JCCs at company-wide level:	<i>Percentages</i>			
management pass information to employees	—	5	3	—
management receive information from employees	3	3	5	8
management and employees discuss a matter before management decides	5	5	33	8
management and employees discuss a matter and come to a joint decision	—	5	12	8

Table adds to more than 100% due to rounding errors

Table 34D How board learns the views of company employees by company size

	Managing director		Industrial relations/personnel director	
No. of employees in company:	Under 500	500 or more	Under 500	500 or more
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	89	82	44	44
How board learns employee views:†	%	%	%	%
Formal meetings with employee reps.	48	37	22	25
Via TU/stewards (no mention of formal meetings)	14	7	8	10
Via management chain/personnel dept.	32	42	17	20
Personal contact with employees	35	24	20	13
Other answers	5	3	0	1
Don't know/not answered	0	0	1	0

* Table excludes informants in companies for which the number of employees was not ascertained.

† Some informants gave more than one answer

Table 35D Main methods by which top managers at company establishments are said to learn the views of their employees

	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
How managers learn employee views:†	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Formal meetings with employee reps.	33	39	33	28	29	35	36	43
Via TU/stewards (no mention of formal meetings)	20	18	15	17	23	34	29	33
Via management chain/personnel dept.	46	44	39	39	48	34	30	23
Personal contact with employees	45	34	40	43	29	19	20	11
Other answers	4	3	0	3	3	4	3	3
Don't know/not answered	—	1	2	0	2	2	8	3

† Answers add to more than 100% because some informants mentioned more than one method

Table 36D Range of bargaining at company-wide level by way in which board deals with industrial relations matters

Managing directors	Issues negotiated								
	Capital investment	Changes in production	Pay issues	Working conditions	Hours of work	Safety matters	Discipline	Redundancy	Welfare matters
Base (weighted)	6	84	145	126	124	122	133	125	112
Way in which board usually deals with industrial relations/personnel matters:	*	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ratifies		14	13	13	14	13	14	14	14
Decides		21	22	21	24	19	22	21	22
Evaluates		14	14	15	14	14	16	15	12
Generates		47	48	48	46	51	46	46	49
Not answered/don't know		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Base too small for reliable percentages

Table 37D Range of bargaining at company-wide level by time board spent on industrial relations matters

Managing directors	Issues negotiated:								
	Capital investment	Changes in production	Pay issues	Working conditions	Hours of work	Safety matters	Discipline	Redundancy	Welfare matters
Base (weighted)	6	84	145	126	124	122	133	125	112
Amount of time spent in dealing with industrial relations/personnel matters at meetings:	*	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Most		—	21	19	22	21	22	20	21
Quite a lot		24	75	76	73	75	73	76	74
Not very much		7	4	4	5	5	4	4	5
Not answered/don't know		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Base too small for reliable percentages

Table 38D Opinion of industrial relations in the company

	Directors			Managers in establishment				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Industrial relations in company/plant are:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Very good	58	61	46	59	52	50	53	40	32	29	25
Fairly good	39	37	48	33	45	41	36	45	47	55	60
Not very good	1	0	2	4	2	3	4	8	12	13	12
Don't know/not answered	2	2	4	4	1	6	7	7	9	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 39D (i) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean.

	What worker participation should involve					
	Management alone decides	Management takes account	Joint discussion	Joint decision	Workers alone decide	None of these
Managing director	<i>Base of percentages = 166 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	1	1	—	—	—	1
Management takes account	2	7	4	—	1	—
Joint discussion	1	3	19	4	—	—
Joint decision	1	13	25	10	—	4
Workers alone decide	1	—	1	—	—	—
None of these	1	1	1	1	—	—
Don't know	—	—	2	—	—	—
Industrial relations/personnel director	<i>Base of percentages = 90 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	—	—	—	—	—
Management takes account	—	6	2	1	—	—
Joint discussion	1	4	20	6	—	—
Joint decision	2	7	30	14	—	2
Workers alone decide	—	—	2	1	—	—
None of these	—	—	—	—	—	1
Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	—
Finance director	<i>Base of percentages = 103 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	—	1	—	—	—
Management takes account	—	4	2	1	—	1
Joint discussion	—	4	14	8	—	1
Joint decision	5	10	37	9	—	—
Workers alone decide	1	—	1	—	—	—
None of these	—	—	1	1	—	—
Don't know	—	1	—	—	—	—

Table 39D (ii) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean

	What worker participation should involve					
	Management alone decide	Management takes account	Joint discussion	Joint decision	Workers alone decide	None of these
Establishment manager	<i>Base of percentages = 77 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	1	4	—	—	—
Management takes account	—	4	1	—	—	—
Joint discussion	—	1	13	3	—	—
Joint decision	1	12	34	22	—	—
Workers alone decide	—	—	—	—	—	—
None of these	—	1	—	—	—	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	3
Industrial relations/personnel manager	<i>Base of percentages = 87 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	1	1	1	1	—	—
Management takes account	—	1	2	3	—	—
Joint discussion	—	2	10	9	—	—
Joint decision	—	—	25	38	—	—
Workers alone decide	—	—	1	—	—	—
None of these	—	—	—	1	—	—
Don't know	—	—	1	—	—	—
Middle manager (production)	<i>Base of percentages = 169 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	2	—	1	—	—
Management takes account	1	4	4	2	—	—
Joint discussion	1	6	10	10	—	—
Joint decision	1	10	21	24	—	1
Workers alone decide	—	1	—	1	—	—
None of these	—	—	1	1	—	—
Don't know	1	—	1	—	—	—
Middle manager (white collar)	<i>Base of percentages = 121 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	—	1	1	—	—
Management takes account	—	2	3	2	—	—
Joint discussion	2	2	15	3	—	—
Joint decision	4	9	35	17	—	—
Workers alone decide	—	—	1	—	—	—
None of these	1	—	—	—	—	—
Don't know	—	1	—	1	—	—
Foreman/supervisor	<i>Base of percentages = 179 companies</i>					
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	1	1	2	2	—	—
Management takes account	2	3	7	6	—	1
Joint discussion	—	4	10	12	—	—
Joint decision	1	7	12	25	—	—
Workers alone decide	1	1	1	1	—	—
None of these	1	—	1	—	—	—
Don't know	—	—	1	—	—	—

Table 39D (iii) Informants' views of what worker participation should involve by what people in general understand it to mean.

	What worker participation should involve					
	Management alone decide	Management takes account	Joint discussion	Joint decision	Workers alone decide	None of these
<i>Base of percentages = 162 companies</i>						
Most senior employee rep.						
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	1	1	6	1	—
Management takes account	—	2	3	10	1	—
Joint discussion	—	1	4	10	1	1
Joint decision	—	2	4	46	1	1
Workers alone decide	—	—	1	2	—	—
None of these	—	—	—	—	—	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	1	—
<i>Base of percentages = 105 companies</i>						
Other senior employee rep.						
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	1	4	4	—	—
Management takes account	1	1	1	8	—	—
Joint discussion	—	3	8	15	—	—
Joint decision	—	—	6	45	5	—
Workers alone decide	—	—	—	—	—	—
None of these	—	—	—	—	—	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Base of percentages = 83 companies*</i>						
Minority union rep.						
General view of worker participation:						
Management alone decides	—	2	1	7	—	—
Management takes account	—	1	1	6	—	—
Joint discussion	1	1	1	18	1	—
Joint decision	—	—	7	37	1	—
Workers alone decide	—	—	1	—	—	—
None of these	1	—	—	2	—	—
Don't know	—	—	—	—	—	—

* Table excludes one minority union representative who answered 'Don't know' to both questions.

Table 40D Ways in which informants think decisions on capital investment are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about capital investment	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	60	31	67	25	61	30	62	29	69	33	69	14	71	22	73	14
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	25	41	17	30	25	31	24	27	14	20	13	13	11	17	9	20
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	6	19	4	28	12	32	8	35	11	31	4	28	5	26	6	35
Joint decision making between management and workers	1	3	2	13	2	5	0	6	2	15	4	40	5	34	1	27
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—
Matter not decided in company	5	2	7	3	0	0	3	2	1	1	5	1	7	0	5	—
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	2	5	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	6	1	3	—	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 41D Ways in which informants think decisions on major changes in production methods are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about major change in production methods	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	19	8	23	4	19	6	24	8	29	7	32	2	36	1	29	1
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	37	28	34	21	44	27	33	24	28	21	20	8	28	17	34	12
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	30	45	32	46	24	45	36	52	25	36	24	18	25	21	17	25
Joint decision making between management and workers	11	16	7	29	12	23	5	15	15	34	19	68	9	58	16	63
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	2	—	—
Matter not decided in company	2	—	3	—	—	—	0	—	1	—	0	1	—	—	0	—
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	0	2	1	0	1	—	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 42D Ways in which informants think decisions on pay issues are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about pay issues	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	4	1	5	4	9	6	12	5	27	9	3	1	7	0	4	0
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	11	6	17	9	17	11	19	14	13	15	7	2	6	4	11	5
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	38	52	33	31	27	35	27	47	23	28	25	8	22	8	27	12
Joint decision making between management and workers	32	32	35	52	39	44	30	31	28	42	52	81	55	84	48	76
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	1	1	4	0	3	—	2
Matter not decided in company	10	1	5	2	4	2	7	2	4	3	9	3	7	0	9	3
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	5	7	4	1	4	2	4	1	2	3	4	2	2	0	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 43D Ways in which informants think decisions on hours of work are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about hours of work	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	9	2	8	2	15	4	17	7	23	9	7	1	16	4	19	2
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	24	10	22	10	17	9	18	11	17	15	7	3	12	5	14	7
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	24	42	22	31	18	30	21	38	22	20	16	8	21	7	14	9
Joint decision making between management and workers	27	39	30	51	39	52	32	40	28	49	43	70	40	77	36	68
Workers alone make the decisions	0	1	0	—	1	—	1	—	4	4	5	8	—	3	3	8
Matter not decided in company	10	4	12	5	8	3	8	4	5	1	16	7	8	2	10	4
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	6	2	6	1	3	2	3	1	2	2	6	3	2	1	5	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 44D Ways in which informants think decisions on physical working conditions are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about physical working conditions	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
Base (weighted)	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	3	—	3	—	5	—	2	0	8	1	5	—	8	—	8	—
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	23	10	15	8	20	6	27	6	21	11	17	1	22	3	18	5
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	40	31	40	26	32	28	38	38	29	20	23	9	21	7	23	13
Joint decision making between management and workers	33	56	42	65	42	65	31	54	38	62	51	80	47	85	46	75
Workers alone make the decisions	—	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	4	1	10	0	5	2	6
Matter not decided in company	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	0	—	—	1	1
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	1	3	—	—	1	0	1	—	3	2	2	—	1	0	1	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 45D Ways in which informants think decisions on safety matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about safety matters	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	1	1	2	1	3	2	3	2	7	2	3	1	6	—	8	1
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	14	4	15	5	12	5	18	7	14	12	12	3	11	4	11	4
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	29	22	33	21	27	27	33	26	29	18	21	10	28	10	20	11
Joint decision making between management and workers	54	69	50	72	56	64	42	61	45	62	57	80	53	82	55	77
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	0	1	3	1	6	0	3	2	5
Matter not decided in company	0	1	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	—	2	—	—	—	1	2
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	0	2	—	0	2	1	2	1	4	3	4	0	1	0	2	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 46D Ways in which informants think decisions on disciplinary procedures are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about disciplinary procedures	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	15	4	10	5	11	14	23	13	29	15	10	4	22	8	24	4
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	25	14	17	10	37	20	20	20	23	22	16	4	14	3	13	6
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	28	36	42	22	25	28	24	37	20	31	22	18	33	23	29	29
Joint decision making between management and workers	27	43	30	61	23	38	27	29	24	26	47	70	29	64	34	60
Matter not decided in company	—	—	—	0	0	—	—	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	—	1
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	0	0	—	0	—	—	—	—
	5	3	1	0	3	—	4	1	4	3	5	3	2	1	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 47D Ways in which informants think decisions on redundancy matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decision about redundancy matters.	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	12	2	10	3	19	8	25	11	33	10	12	2	15	4	18	4
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	14	11	12	5	18	13	16	17	9	13	13	4	12	4	16	2
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	35	41	43	43	30	41	27	42	28	37	23	12	33	14	29	17
Joint decision making between management and workers	30	40	26	47	25	37	23	26	18	37	43	73	37	14	31	72
Workers alone make the decisions	—	1	—	—	2	—	0	0	1	0	—	5	0	3	—	2
Matter not decided in company	2	2	2	0	0	—	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	—	1	3
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	7	3	6	2	7	1	8	2	12	3	9	2	1	1	4	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 48D Ways in which informants think decisions on welfare matters are made and how they feel such decisions should be made

Decisions about welfare matters	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal	Actual	Ideal
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	75	78	89	91	163	170	119	125	172	178	157	161	107	108	83	84
Way in which decisions are made/should ideally be made:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	4	—	4	1	6	2	6	2	7	1	9	1	9	—	8	1
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	18	3	22	5	14	8	15	5	15	9	12	3	13	3	10	4
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	36	30	36	21	36	28	36	35	28	16	23	8	29	10	38	9
Joint decision making between management and workers	38	64	36	71	40	60	38	56	45	70	51	80	45	82	42	79
Workers alone make the decisions	3	2	—	2	3	3	5	1	3	3	2	8	2	4	—	7
Matter not decided in company	1	—	—	1	—	—	0	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	0	—
Not answered/none of these answers/matter has never arisen	0	1	2	—	1	—	1	0	2	1	4	1	2	1	3	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 49D Attitude to worker directors of sampled employee representatives analysed by union membership

	Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	117	43	75	32	63	20
Union/staff association of which informant is a member:	%	%	%	%	%	%
TGWU	24	16	4	6	5	5
NUGMW	11	15	—	—	5	18
EEPTU/EETU	—	—	2	—	19	18
AUEW	29	47	8	—	35	26
UCATT	5	—	—	—	2	5
APEX	1	—	20	25	—	5
ASTMS	1	—	21	32	6	2
NGA/SOGAT/SLADE	7	4	5	8	3	6
TASS/TAAS/ACTSS	—	1	23	25	6	5
Textiles unions	9	7	1	—	2	—
MATSA	—	—	2	—	1	—
FTAT	1	—	1	—	2	—
USDAW	3	—	—	—	—	—
Nat. Union of Sheet Metal Workers etc	3	—	—	—	4	1
Nat. Society of Metal Mechanics	1	2	1	—	4	10
Staff Association	—	—	9	—	2	—
Other union	6	8	2	3	4	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 50D View of worker directors by other employee representative offices held

	Most senior employee representative	Other senior employee representative	Minority union representative
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	141	66	50
<i>In favour of 'worker directors'</i>			
Offices held (apart from steward):	%	%	%
Senior steward/own union rep.	53	50	60
Senior steward/multi-union rep.	15	3	6
Hold office in Branch	27	24	16
Hold office in Region/District Committee	14	6	4
Hold office at national level	3	3	2
All office-holders in favour	71	65	68
<i>Against 'worker directors'</i>			
Offices held (apart from steward):			
Senior steward/own union rep.	23	23	28
Senior steward/multi-union rep.	6	2	10
Hold office in Branch	17	23	10
Hold office in Region/District Committee	6	6	4
Hold office at national level	1	—	—
All office-holders against	29	35	32

Table 51D Attitude to worker directors by the company-wide range of bargaining

Attitudes to worker directors	Managing director		Industrial relations/ personnel director		Finance director	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)*</i>	46	99	26	52	36	46
Company-wide range of bargaining:	%	%	%	%	%	%
Capital investment	2	5	4	4	6	2
Major changes in prod. methods	65	50	50	58	61	63
Pay issues	100	95	100	92	97	98
Physical working conditions	93	79	92	79	81	89
Hours of work	89	79	81	79	81	89
Safety matters	91	77	92	69	78	87
Disciplinary procedures	89	88	85	90	97	89
Redundancy	85	83	88	92	81	89
Welfare matters	91	68	81	69	81	76

This table should be interpreted with caution due to the small bases for percentages

* Table excludes companies without unions and those which did not give their range of bargaining together with those informants who did not give an opinion on worker directors.

Table 52D(i) View of worker directors by view of what worker participation should involve

	Managing director		Industrial relations/ personnel director		Finance director	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	51	118	28	61	44	62
What worker participation should involve:	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	—	7	—	5	2	8
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	18	28	5	24	14	20
Joint discussion and then management makes the decisions	49	51	59	56	59	53
Joint decision making between management and workers	26	9	34	15	23	16
Workers alone make the decisions	—	1	—	—	—	—
None of these	7	4	2	—	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 52D(ii) View of worker directors by view of what worker participation should involve

	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee representative		Other senior employee representative		Minority union representative	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	27	48	31	58	60	107	49	73	115	62	117	43	75	32	63	20
What worker participation should involve:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Management alone makes the decisions but keeps workers informed	—	2	2	1	—	5	—	11	3	10	—	—	—	3	2	6
Management makes the decisions but takes account of workers' views	5	25	9	5	19	25	14	15	15	20	2	11	4	9	6	7
Joint discussion and then management makes the decision	50	53	27	50	31	37	55	56	27	40	13	14	17	24	17	13
Joint decision making between management and workers	44	16	62	45	50	33	31	18	54	31	83	59	77	53	71	71
Workers alone make the decisions	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	8	2	10	2	4
None of these	1	4	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	7	—	—	2	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 53D(i) View of worker directors by view of what they would do

	Managing director		Industrial relations/ personnel director		Finance director	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	58	118	28	61	44	62
Views on worker directors functions:	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communicate board views to company employees	21	6	6	11	22	4
Communicate employees' views and problems to the board	52	29	43	30	59	27
Actively promote and safeguard the rights of company employees	21	10	40	18	16	29
Contribute nothing to the board	5	11	4	11	8	11
Make it difficult for the board to function effectively	1	45	—	33	2	29
None of these	14	8	8	5	11	4
Don't know/not answered	4	—	1	2	—	—

Table 53D(ii) View of worker directors by view of what they would do

	Estab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee representative		Other senior employee representative		Minority union representative	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	27	48	31	58	60	107	49	73	115	62	117	43	75	32	63	20
Views on worker directors' functions:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Communicate board views to company employees	22	7	25	4	19	6	18	4	16	10	8	9	22	11	14	2
Communicate employees' views and problems to the board	67	27	62	28	61	34	59	25	62	32	47	38	50	29	52	42
Actively promote and safeguard the rights of company employees	36	18	29	25	18	20	33	19	20	11	48	34	29	26	32	23
Contribute nothing to the board	1	10	4	6	2	10	—	9	—	7	1	7	1	7	2	13
Make it difficult for the board to function effectively	—	37	2	32	—	30	3	44	3	34	0	12	—	24	2	18
None of these	—	5	1	7	6	3	2	—	0	7	1	4	7	3	3	3
Don't know/not answered	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—

Table 54D Whether worker directors should come from among company employees or from other sources

	Directors		Managers				Employee representatives				
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should come from among company employees, including management, or from outside:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
From company employees	93	94	95	96	96	96	95	95	95	98	97
From outside	3	2	3	2	1	2	2	4	3	0	2
From both sources	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1
From either source/ doesn't matter as long as suitable	—	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	—
Don't know/not answered	1	2	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 55D Whether worker directors should be chosen from among existing union or staff association representatives

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should be chosen from union/ staff association representatives:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
From t.u./s.a. representatives	33	40	28	41	37	40	32	32	76	58	66
Not from t.u./s.a. representatives	23	28	23	24	30	27	25	35	10	18	10
From both sources	29	24	37	30	26	27	34	27	13	20	23
Don't mind where they come from	8	6	7	3	5	5	4	4	1	4	1
Don't know/not answered	7	3	5	2	1	1	4	1	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 56D Whether worker directors should be bound to support general board view

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should be bound to support the general board view:	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Should support general board view	64	74	64	57	63	54	66	39	25	33	23
Should be free to oppose it	27	21	33	38	36	45	32	60	73	65	76
Should resign	5	4	2	3	1	1	3	—	1	1	—
Not answered/don't know	4	—	1	2	—	—	0	1	—	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 57D Stewards' views of worker director responsibilities to employees who belong to a different union

	Most senior employee representative	Other senior employee representative	Minority union representative
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	161	108	84
Worker director should:	%	%	%
Represent his own union members	18	15	20
The workplace as a whole	77	74	73
Not answered/don't know	5	10	6
Total	100	100	100

Table 58D Whether worker directors should receive directors fees

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether worker directors should receive directors' fees:											
Yes, fees	45	36	29	51	57	49	52	39	38	45	33
Other form of payment	3	9	5	8	5	10	13	14	18	13	14
No	49	54	60	39	36	39	33	47	44	40	51
Not answered/don't know	2	1	6	2	1	2	2	0	1	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 59D Whether informants believe that the introduction of worker directors would bring bargaining into the boardroom

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether appointment of WD's expected to introduce bargaining and negotiations in board meetings:											
Yes	32	30	30	37	43	42	39	59	55	51	37
No	61	64	63	61	52	54	58	38	43	46	62
Don't know/not answered	8	6	7	3	5	3	3	3	2	3	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 60D Whether employees should be free to oppose board decisions if given representation at that level

	Directors			Managers				Employee representatives			
	Managing director	Industrial relations/ personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/ personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior rep.	Other senior rep.	Minority union rep.
<i>Base (weighted)</i>	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Whether employees should be free to oppose board decisions:											
Should accept all board decisions	40	45	42	41	42	49	38	54	22	36	27
Should be free to oppose decisions	54	54	56	58	58	49	59	44	78	63	72
Not answered/don't know	5	1	2	1	—	2	3	2	1	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 61D(i) Expected effect of worker directors on power of trades unions by attitude to worker directors

Attitude to worker directors	Managing director		Industrial relations/ personnel director		Finance director	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
Base (weighted)*	51	118	28	61	44	62
Expected effect of WDs on TU power:						
Increase	29	44	40	45	52	50
Decrease	11	7	5	9	4	9
Make no difference	52	41	47	45	36	37
Hope would make no difference	—	—	—	—	—	—
Don't know/not answered	9	8	7	1	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes those informants who did not answer question on attitude to worker directors.

Table 61D(ii) Expected effect of worker directors on power of trades unions by attitude to worker directors

Attitude to worker directors	Etab. manager		Industrial relations/ personnel manager		Middle manager (production)		Middle manager (white collar)		Foreman		Most senior employee rep.		Other senior employee rep.		Minority union rep.	
	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against	Favour	Against
Base (weighted)*	27	48	31	58	60	107	49	73	115	62	117	43	75	32	63	20
Expected effect of WDs on TU power:																
Increase	41	58	42	50	33	57	38	42	25	44	44	34	41	30	28	36
Decrease	14	9	6	6	5	5	6	3	7	5	4	9	—	15	4	11
Make no difference	46	31	49	42	60	35	56	52	65	46	52	57	58	55	65	52
Hope would make no difference	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Don't know/not answered	—	2	3	—	2	3	—	3	3	4	—	—	1	—	2	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes those informants who did not answer question on attitude to worker directors.

Table 62D Whether company has an executive board by managing director's view of worker directors on supervisory boards

	Company has an executive board	No executive board
Base (weighted)*	78	86
Managing director's view of worker directors on supervisory boards:		
Favour	32	43
Against	68	57
Total	100	100

* Table excludes those who did not give their opinion of worker directors on supervisory boards.

Table 63D Outside influences on board deliberations (directors intra-company comparisons)

	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company	Base for percentages (weighted)
Directors compared:			No.
MD & Industrial relations/ personnel director	55	56	92
MD & Finance director	65	54	84

NB Comparison based on 'big customers and suppliers' answer considered against all other answers

Table 64D Issues negotiated in company establishments (convenor and minority union steward intra-company comparisons)

Base for percentages = 81 (weighted)	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company
Negotiated issues:	%	%
Capital investment	90	90
Changes in prod. methods	53	47
Pay issues	90	88
Physical working conditions	80	73
Hours of work	68	60
Safety matters	83	77
Disciplinary procedures	82	77
Redundancy	80	73
Welfare matters	71	68

Table 65D Issues negotiated in company establishments (most senior and other senior employee representatives intra-company comparisons)

Base for percentages = 104 (weighted)	Proportion of pairs in the same company giving the same answer	Proportion of pairs which might be expected to give the same answer even if not in the same company
Negotiated issues:	%	%
Capital investment	89	86
Changes in prod. methods	59	48
Pay issues	90	87
Physical working conditions	77	78
Hours of work	59	65
Safety matters	75	70
Disciplinary procedures	82	82
Redundancy	79	80
Welfare matters	68	63

Table 66D Age of sampled role incumbents

	Directors		Managers				Employee representatives				
	Managing director	Industrial relations/personnel director	Finance director	Estab. manager	Industrial relations/personnel manager	Middle manager (production)	Middle manager (white collar)	Foreman	Most senior employee rep.	Other senior employee rep.	Minority union rep.
Base (weighted)	173	93	106	78	91	170	125	178	161	108	84
Age	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
under 35	3	5	11	13	25	11	19	21	22	29	25
35-45	29	33	40	42	30	38	31	28	32	28	34
46-55	44	43	30	27	29	37	42	36	29	29	37
56-65	22	19	18	19	15	13	8	15	17	14	5
over 65	2	—	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 67D Union membership in sampled companies

Base for percentages = 171 companies* (weighted)	Managerial	Technical and clerical	Supervisory	Manual
T.U./Staff assoc. members:	%	%	%	%
less than $\frac{1}{2}$	79	39	37	4
$\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{3}{4}$	6	18	10	7
more than $\frac{3}{4}$	7	29	30	39
all	3	8	18	46
Don't know	6	6	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes companies which had no recognised union or staff association and those in which the whole question was not answered.

Table 68D Union/staff assoc. membership by grade in sampled establishments

Base for percentages = 142 companies (weighted) at establishment level*	Managerial	Technical and clerical	Supervisory	Manual
T.U./Staff assoc. members:	%	%	%	%
less than $\frac{1}{2}$	75	41	29	4
$\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{3}{4}$	10	18	12	6
more than $\frac{3}{4}$	10	30	36	44
all	4	8	20	46
Don't know	1	2	2	—
Total	100	100	100	100

* Table excludes establishments which had no recognised union or staff association and those in which question was not answered.

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